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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates how the governments of Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand balance the ideal of indigenous self-determination with other pressures, such 
as current trends in public administration and accountability, pressures on the health 
care system, issues of and sensitivities around minority rights, equity in health and 
cost-efficiency. It is based on four case studies conducted in Australia and New 
Zealand. The Canadian material is drawn from both the literature and a period of 
twelve years working in indigenous-controlled health services.
All three governments have made some policy commitments to increased 
indigenous participation and self-determination, in the pursuit of health gains. The goal 
is a more responsive health care system. Self-determination is often mentioned. In 
Australia and New Zealand, the commitment extends to primary, secondary and tertiary 
care. Canada focuses exclusively on improving the responsiveness of on-reserve 
primary health care services.
The contractual environment in which providers operate bears a highly nuanced 
resemblance to official policies. Two broad categories of contractual environments 
have emerged. Indigenous providers who operate in an environment where the funder 
is an indigenous-specific government authority (First Nations and Australia’s new 
PHCAP program) have access to a relational contractual environment that is 
advantageous administratively, financially and in terms of comprehensiveness of 
services. Indigenous providers that secure funding from non-indigenous specific 
funders (New Zealand, and Australian Aboriginal Health Services) operate in a classic 
contractual environment where funding is accessed via a multiplicity of fragmented, 
often proposal-driven, contracts with high administrative costs. Classic contractual 
environments lead to a patchwork approach to achieving health gains.
Indigenous aspirations for self-determination have been partially satisfied with 
increased opportunities for contracting in health. Although the link between increased 
indigenous participation and improved outcomes remains to be explored analytically, it 
is doubtful that classical contractual environments can yield the health gains expected.
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research project is funded by the Fondation Ricard of Canada, a charitable 
foundation that supports French Canadians pursuing secondary and tertiary university 
education (http://www.fondationricard.com/). It is the generosity of Ms. Alma Ricard, a 94 
year old French Canadian woman who established this foundation, and her foresight in 
allowing fellowship recipients the freedom to pursue their own research projects, that 
made this undertaking possible.
I am indebted to a large number of people who have supported my work in 
Australia. This includes the Boards and staff of the Katherine West Health Board and 
of Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Health Service Aboriginal Corporation. The 
National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health at the Australian National 
University in Canberra, and in particular Professor Beverly Sibthorpe, provided me with 
invaluable support in the initial stage of this process. In Darwin, the Menzies School of 
Health Research and Professor Ross Bailie generously offered academic and logistical 
support. In New Zealand, I am indebted to the Board and staff of Te Roopu Huihuinga 
Hauora and Te Runanga O Raukawa. The Maori Health Unit of Massey University 
provided me with priceless on-site support. A particular thank you to Professors Mason 
Durie, Chris Cunningham, Peter Crampton and Neil Pearson. In Canada, I am indebted 
to the Centre for Aboriginal Health Research and to its director, Professor John O'Neil. 
In addition to the above, l am grateful to all people who took the time to help me with 
on journey.
Finally, I wish to thank Dr. Stephen Jan and Ass. Prof. Lucy Gilson, my 
supervisors and the members of my committee, namely Prof. Gill Watts, Prof. Nicholas 
Mays and Dr. Carolyn Jones at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
for their contribution to the many drafts of this thesis, and for their on-going support and 
personal investment.
The views expressed in this document remain my own, and I take full 
responsibility for any error or misunderstanding that might have occurred.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..............
TABLE OF CONTENTS.................
LIST OF TABLES........ ..................
LIST OF FIGURES..........................
STATEMENT............. ....................
2
3
4 
6 
8 
9
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........ .................................................................. .............13
1.1 Purpose, Aims and Objectives.......................................................................... 15
1.2 Choice of countries.......................... ......................................... .......................20
1.3 Overview of Methodology and Thesis................................................. ..............28
1.4 Terminology........ ................................................. ............................................ 29
CHAPTER 2, REVIEW OF LITERATURE......................................................................31
2.1 Context: Debates shaping indigenous health policy....... ............................... .33
2.2 From policy formulation to practice........... ............................... ........................ 44
2.3 Options in health care contracting.................. ............... .............. ...... .............57
2.4 Linking policy, implementation and practice.... ................ ................................77
2.5 Conclusions............................. ................................ .......................................79
CHAPTER 3, METHODOLOGY.................. ................
3.1 Methodological choices....................................
3.2 Access to the Field and Ethical Considerations
3.3 Selecting sites............ ......................................
3.4 Data collection and analysis............................
3.5 Relevance and Generalisability........................
...81
81
86
87
91
99
CHAPTER 4, INDIGENOUS HEALTH POLICIES IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND.......................................................................................................................101
4.1 Australia: Background...............................................................................   ,101
4.2 New Zealand....................................................................................................114
4.3 Indigenous health policies in Canada, Australia and New Zealand................. 125
4.4 Conclusions...................................    130
■. ■ ■■. .. ■ ■ ■ ■ : ■ ■ ■ ■■• : ■ ■ '■ ; . ■ "V. . .-■■
■ ■ ' '
CHAPTER 5, INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES................................................... 131
5.1 The Selected Case Studies........................................................................... 131
5.2 Commonalties and differences........................................................................155
5.3 Conclusions..................................................................................................... 157
CHAPTER 6, DECISION-SPACE ANALYSIS ACROSS CONTRACTUAL 
ENVIRONMENTS..........................................................  158
6.1 Decision-space analysis..................................................................................158
6.2 Decision-space analysis applied to contractual environments.......................188
6.3 Conclusions.....................................................................................................195
CHAPTER 7, PATCHES FOR EQUITY?....................................................................... 196
7.1 Linking indigenous health policies to the contractual environment................ 196
7.2 Lessons from Contractual Environments........................................................ 201
7.3 Situating the findings within their Larger Context...........................................208
7.4 Generalising findings and direction for further research.................................215
7.5 Conclusions: A patchwork approach to health gains?....................................216
APPENDIX I, INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS, CONFERENCES AND THEIR 
RELEVANCE TO INDIGENOUS HEALTH....................................................................219
APPENDIX II, POLICY ANALYSIS........ ................................     226
APPENDIX III, INTERVIEW GUIDES.......................................... ................................. 231
APPENDIX IV, DOCUMENTS REVIEWED................................. .................................233
Australian Policy and Context Documents Reviewed............................. ...............233
New Zealand Policy Documents Reviewed....... .................................................... 236
Danila Dilba ............................................ ............................................... .................242
Katherine West Health Board................. ...................... ..........................................249
Te Runanga 0  Raukawa............................................................. ...........................252
Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Inc.............................................................................260
REFERENCES........................................................... ................................................... 263
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1, Health Inequalities in Canada, Australia and New Zealand....................... 19
Table 1.2, Indigenous Population in Canada, Statistic Canada Census 1996............ 22
Table 1.3, Estimated distribution of indigenous/non-indigenous populations, 1995-96 
.......................................................................................................................................25
Table 1.4, New Zealand Population as of 2001 (Statistics New Zealand 2001)...........26
Table 2.1, Modern Treaties in the Canadian context.................................................... 39
Table 2.2, Service delivery models and examples....................................................... 40
Table 2.3, Advantages and disadvantages of separate services................................. 40
Table 2.4, Programs and Transferability........... ........................................................... 55
Table 2.5, Models of Decentralisation........................................................................... 58
Table 2.6, Decision Space Analysis Bossert................................................................. 60
Table 2.7, Options in contracting...........................   66
Table 2.8, Contract characteristics................................................................................67
Table 2.9, Dimensions of accountability........................................................................71
Table 2.10, Decision Space Analysis............................................................................76
Table 2.11, Decision Space Analysis as it applies to the Health Transfer Policy........ 78
Table 3.1, Ensuring quality in research design.............................................................85
Table 3.2, Number of Cases per Category....................................................................89
Table 3.3, Selection criteria...........................................................................  90
Table 3.4, Research Plan.............................................................................................. 93
Table 3.5, Interview conducted................................     95
Table 3.6, Potential Strengths and Weaknesses of Sources of Evidence......... ........... 99
Table 4.1, Gross expenditures per person, ATSI and non-ATSI people, through publicly 
subsidised programs 1995-96, by program.... ........................................ ...................106
Table 4.2, Health funding bodies through the reforms............................................... 119
Table 4.3, Health Policy Frameworks in Australia and New Zealand...........................127
Table 5.1, The Development of KWHB.................................................. ....................143
Table 5.2, Timelines.............. ....................................................       152
Table 5.3, Service Priority Area for the MDO............................................................. 154
Table 5.4, Case studies’ commonalties and differences............ ...............................156
6
Table 6.1: Percentage allocation of funding per category for all case studies, sample
year 2001-02................................................................................................................160
Table 6.2, TROR's Contract Renewal through the Reforms.......................................165
Table 6.3, Estimated number of transactions (payments) for each provider.............168
Table 6.4, Services for which organisations are funded for.........................................170
Table 6.5, TROR contractual profile and service coverage.........................................176
Table 6.6, Te Roopu Huihuinga Existing Membership................................................179
Table 6.7, TRHHI Membership and Contract Assignation as of January 2003...........180
Table 6.8, Number of report for the 2001-02 sample year..........................................182
Table 6.9, Case Study Summary............................................................................... 189
Table 6.10, Decision Space Analysis as an analytical tool for contractual environments 
........................................................................................................................................ .190
Table 7.1 Indigenous health policies........................................................................... 198
Table 7.2, Competing values...............     .201
Table 7.3, Strengths and weaknesses of single classic contracts and contractual 
environments built on a collection of classic contracts..................................  204
Table 7.4, Strengths and weaknesses of relational contracts and relational contractual 
environments.................................................................... 206
7
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1, Conceptual Framework............... .......................................................... 32
Figure 2.2 Policy Implementation Framework..........................................................45
Figure 2.3, Canadian Health Care Financing........................................................... 48
Figure 3.1, Conceptual Framework and Methods......... '..........................................93
Figure 4.1, Australian Health Care Financing.... .....................,..............................102
Figure 4.2, Primary Health Care Access Program -  NT Implementation Process. 112 
Figure 4.3, New Zealand Health Care Financing...................................................117
Figure 5.1, Danila Dilba............... ........................................... ............................... 132
Figure 5.2, Katherine West Health Board............ ,................................................. 137
Figure 5.3, Te Runanga O Raukawa...................................................................... 144
Figure 5.4, Access to Health Contracts through the Reforms........ ....................... 146
Figure 5.5, Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Inc...... ............................................... ....150
Figure 6.1, Pooling of Funding...... ............................................ ............................ 162
Figure 6.2, Reform’s Impact on TRHHI Governance and Contracts............... ......166
Figure 6.3, The Money Story............... ..................................................................173
8
STATEMENT
LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE & TROPICAL MEDICINE
Statement of Own Work
All students are required to complete the following declaration when submitting their thesis A 
shortened version of the School's definition of Plagiarism and Cheating is as follows (the full 
definition is given in the Research Degrees Handbook):
The following definition of plagiarism will be used
Plagiarism is the act of presenting the ideas or discoveries of another as one s own To copy 
sentences, phrases or even striking expressions without acknowledgement in a manner which may 
deceive the reader as to the source is plagiarism. Where such copying or close paraphrase has 
occurred the mere mention of the source in a biography will not be deemed sufficient 
acknowledgement, in each instance, it must be referred specifically to its source Verbatim 
quotations must be directly acknowledged either in inverted commas or by indenting, (University of 
Kent)
Plagiarism may include collusion with another student, or the unacknowledged use of a fellow 
student's work with or without their knowledge and consent, Similarly, the direct copying by 
students of their own original writings qualifies as plagiarism if the fact that the work has been or is 
to be presented elsewhere is not clearly stated
Cheating is similar to plagiarism, but more serious. Cheating means submitting another student's 
work, knowledge or ideas, while pretending that they are your own, for formal assessment or 
evaluation.
Supervisors should be consulted if there are any doubts about, what is permissible.
Declaration by Candidate
I have read and understood the School's definition of plagiarism and cheating given in the 
Research Degrees Handbook I declare that this thesis is my own work, and that i have 
acknowledged alt results and quotations from the published or unpublished work of other people
Signed:,
Full name . ^ -A “L .1 V (please print clearly)
9
Abbreviations & Glossary
Terms/
Abbreviation
Country of 
use
Definition
ACCHS Australia Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisations: 
Contemporary term used to refer to what was previously 
known as AMSs.
AFN Canada Assembly of First Nations
AHW Australia Aboriginal Health Workers
AMS Australia Aboriginal Medical Services: the term emerged in the early 
1970 and refers to Aboriginal controlled health organisations 
created as a result of community mobilization and activism. 
The contemporary term is ACCHS (above).
AMSANT Australia Aboriginal Medical Services Alliance of the Northern 
Territory
ATSIC Australia Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
Replaced the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DDA)
Band Canada The governance body of a First Nation (Indians of Canada), 
as defined in the Indian Act.
CCT Australia Coordinated Care Trial
CDEP Australia Community Development Employment Projects, program 
operating since 1977, Participants in the scheme subsidise 
two thirds of the scheme's costs by voluntarily working for 
their Income Support Benefits. CDEP provides work and 
community development, assists with employment creation 
and the establishment of successful businesses and assists 
Indigenous Australians to gain training and skills, which are 
necessary for employment in the mainstream labour market.
CDNANZ Australia Communicable Diseases Network Australia New Zealand
CHR Canada Community Health Representative
Commonwealth 
Department of 
Health
Australia 2001, Department of Commonwealth Department of Health 
& Ageing (DHA). 1998 to 2001 .Commonwealth Department 
of Health & Aged Care (DHAC). 1 have opted to use DHAC 
throughout the document as most of the research was 
conducted and most references produced under the former 
name. 1996 to 1996: Department of Health and Family 
Services. 1994 to 1996: Department of Human Services 
and Health. 1993 to 1994: Department of Health, Housing, 
Local Government and Community Services. 1991 to 1993: 
Department of Health, Housing and Community Services.
1987 to 1991: Department of Community Services and 
Health. 1921 to 1987: Department of Health
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Terms/
Abbreviation
Country of 
use
Definition
Danila Dilba Australia Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Health Service 
Aboriginal Corporation in Darwin
DAA Australia See ATSIC
First Nation Canada Contemporary term and preferred self-referent for Canadian 
“Indians".
FNIHB Canada Stands for the First Nation and Inuit Health Branch, the 
branch of Health Canada that looks after indigenous health. 
Replaced the Medical Service Branch (MSB) in 1997.
hapu New Zealand Sub-tribe, in the Miori language Te Reo
HCA Australia Health Care Agreements, being the mechanism for transfer 
of payments from the Commonwealth Government to the 
States and the Territory
Health Canada Canada The national department of health, previously known as the 
Department of National Health and Welfare (1944 to 1997).
HIC Australia Health Insurance Commission
ICHS International Indigenous controlled health sector
INAC Canada Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, replaces the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
(1966). Prior to that (1867-1966) Indian and northern affairs 
administration was handled by various departments 
throughout the years, including the Office of the Secretary of 
State, Citizenship and Immigration, Mines and Resources, 
and Northern Affairs and National Resources.
iwi New Zealand Tribe, in the Maori language Te Reo. The iwi, or whole tribe, 
generally came together in times of conflicts.
KWHB Australia Katherine West Health Board
MBS Australia Medicare Benefit Scheme
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Terms/ Country of Definition
Abbreviation
Medicare Australia Australia: Medicare is financed largely from general taxation
Canada revenue, which includes a Medicare levy based on a
person's taxable income. Commonwealth funding for 
Medicare is mainly provided as: 
subsidies for prescribed medicines (with a safety net 
providing free medicines for the chronically ill) and free or 
subsidised treatment by practitioners such as doctors, 
participating optometrists or dentists (specified services 
only);
substantial grants to State and Territory governments to 
contribute to the costs of providing access to public 
hospitals at no cost to patients; and 
specific purpose grants to State/Territory governments and 
other bodies.
Canada: Medicare provides access to universal, 
comprehensive coverage for medically necessary hospital, 
in-patient and out-patient physician services. Most doctors 
are private practitioners who work in independent or group 
practices, enjoy a high degree of autonomy, and are 
generally paid on a fee-for-service basis.
NACCHO Australia National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services
NAHS Australia The 1989 National Aboriginal Health Strategy
NGO Non-government organisation
NNADAP Canada National Native Alcohol and Drug Addiction Program, funds 
alcohol and drug counsellors on-reserve
NNDSS Australia National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System
Northern 
Territory 
Department of 
Health
Australia This means to signify the Northern Territory Territorial' 
Health Services as it was called until November 2001, and 
the Department of Community and Health Services, its new 
title.
NT Australia Northern Territory
OATSIH Australia The Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health, 
which is part of DHAC.
Pakeha New Zealand The non-indigenous population, generally of European 
origin.
PBS Australia Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme
PHCAP Australia Primary Health Care Access Program
rohe New Zealand District / land
Rimanga New Zealand Assembly
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Tino
rangatiratanga
Whaiti 
Whakapapa 
Whanau 
Whanau ora
Terms/
Abbreviation
Country of Definition 
use
New Zealand Tino rangatiratanga is the term used most often as the 
expression of Mâori self-determination. Tino roughly 
translates as self. Rangatiratanga roughly translates as 
“evidence of breeding and greatness” Williams, H. W. 
(2002). Dictionary of the Maori language. Wellington, 
Legislation Direct. Mâori traditional governance structures 
were based on whanau, the extended family
New Zealand Board of directors
New Zealand 
New Zealand 
New Zealand
Genealogy
The extended family in the Maori language Te Reo. 
Family health and well-being
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the emergence of “by indigenous for indigenous” 
primary health care organisations in the Australian, New Zealander and Canadian 
health care systems. The health care literature generally acknowledges the 
government, the private sector and non-profit, non-government organisations (the so- 
called ’’third sector”) as the three sectors involved in the delivery of health care 
services. “By indigenous for indigenous” services have now emerged with distinctive 
features. They are primary health care services tasked with providing services to an 
indigenous constituency that is invariably considered high risk. This is generally 
attributed to socio-economic marginalisation resulting from colonial interventions. Like 
other third sector organisations, indigenous services are involved in the delivery of non­
commercial social goods. In addition, indigenous health services are often tied to an 
indigenous governance structure, are primarily designed by indigenous groups to serve 
the needs of that group, and are used by indigenous people to promote their political 
aspirations involving a renegotiation of their relationship with the nation-state. Other 
key features include increased responsiveness to local indigenous needs and 
increased opportunities for employment and cultural expression in service delivery, 
including health care. This sector developed over the past thirty years and is now 
endorsed and actively promoted by all three governments as a mechanism to increase 
indigenous participation in health care, improve access and reduce inequities.
Indigenous people appear to have seized upon the opportunity to become 
primary health care providers. In Australia, Hill et al (2001) report that the number of 
Aboriginal controlled health organisations has grown to over 120 since they first 
emerged in 1971. Health Canada reports that seventy-one (71) percent1 of eligible 
communities, representing nearly one half of the eligible First Nation population, are 
now engaged in delivering on-reserve primary health care services. Another thirteen 
(13) percent are exploring this possibility (Health Canada 2002). In New Zealand, the 
sector grew from 23 providers in 1993 to 240 in 1998 (New Zealand Te Puni Kôkiri 
2000) . '  '
In all three countries, policies have emerged validating “by indigenous for 
indigenous” health services and public funding has been allocated specifically to 
support these organisations. These policies have become understood as an 1
1 This figure includes 46 percent of communities under the Health Transfer Policy, 23 
percent under the Community-based Health Services Agreements and another 2 percent under 
the Self-Government agreement for a total of 427 communities (2000 figures).
endorsement of indigenous self-determination. The words vary slightly: self- 
government in Canada, self-determination in Australia, and tino rangatiratanga in New 
Zealand. The discourses however are similar. Self-determination is to replace earlier 
policies of assimilation, by promoting indigenous participation in policy development 
and in service delivery. Although there is some discomfort with the idea of providing 
what can be seen as preferential support for services on the basis of ethnicity, and 
shifting levels of political commitment, all three countries defend their support of “by 
indigenous for indigenous" health services as the preferred mechanism for alleviating 
the health inequalities experienced by indigenous people in contrast to their national 
counterpart. The need to promote indigenous participation in policy and program 
design, as well as service delivery, is constantly emphasized (Lavoie 2004). It is a step 
towards the ideal of self-determination, the new ideal all countries now claim to be 
striving for.
The ideal of self-determination is at times at odds with public perception and 
government’s administrative needs. Self-determination evokes choice and flexibility in 
indigenous organisations pursuing local priorities. Contracting in health has emerged 
as the main implementation mechanism for self-determination. However, the current 
Canadian government's accountability framework demands well defined contractual 
agreements, with standardised performance indicators that can be aggregated 
regionally and nationally to ensure appropriate performance monitoring (Deloitte & 
Touche & Health Canada 2001, Health Canada 2003). Securing additional funding for 
indigenous health from Parliament, and by extension the tax payer, is more readily 
achieved by identifying nationally-defined health gains that elicit sympathy (the 
elimination of Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disease, for example) than by suggesting 
additional funding to be used by indigenous communities as they see fit. In the 
Canadian context, flexibility in contractual arrangements appears to go counter to 
prevailing ideas of accountability in public administration and public perception of 
appropriate interventions. As a result, the sphere over which choices may be 
exercised, and the right of the state to rule on the appropriateness of certain choices, 
remain matters of debates. These tensions have been reported in Australia (Rowse
2002) and in New Zealand (Durie 1998b). Self-determination thus remains an ideal with 
blurred and constantly redefined boundaries that builds on conceptual paradoxes 
rather than clear objectives. It remains a difficult concept to integrate into a public 
administration framework.
This study is informed by a period of twelve years working for and reflecting on 
Canadian indigenous-run health organisations. The earlier years were spent pursuing 
a Master’s degree in Medical Anthropology (McGill University, 1993) and studying the
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Nunavik Inuit primary and secondary health care structures that had emerged as a 
result of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, the first 'modern Treaty’ in 
Canada’s history (Lavoie 1993). This was followed by three years living in what is now 
known as Nunavut, the newly formed Inuit territory, and working as a Health Promotion 
Officer for the Keewatin Regional Health Board, one of the three Inuit Regional Health 
Boards then in existence in the region. The more recent period included six years spent 
working for First Nation health organisations operating their own on-reserve primary 
health care services as a result of the Health Transfer Policy. The debate that 
dominated these years centred around indigenous aspirations for self-determination, 
the government’s interpretation and translation of these aspirations in administrative 
terms, and the predictable distance between the two. Both Canadian indigenous 
communities and the federal government appear to share a discourse that promotes 
indigenous control over indigenous health through indigenous control of primary health 
care. This discourse echoes the Alma-Ata declaration and international debates on 
community participation in primary health care. While both sides appear to converge on 
a common goal in their words and writings, on-going debates are taking place over 
indigenous control over priority setting, policy, programme definition and 
implementation, and appropriate indicators of performance and accountability (O'Neil et 
al 1998). The historical relationship that exists between First Nation and Inuit 
communities and the Canadian government often polarises debates and complicates 
relationships. One is left to wonder whether the result, a contractual environment, is 
optimally developed or whether other constraints overshadow appropriate decision­
making. These issues are not unique to Canada. What is of interest and yet to be 
documented is how other countries with a similar history, such as Australia and New 
Zealand, manage these tensions.
The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the thesis. The first section 
provides a summary of the purpose and aims of the overall thesis. The second section 
explores the rationale for pursuing this study in the three countries selected. Section 
three provides a synopsis of the methods used in the research, and an overview of the 
overall structure of the thesis. The fourth section explores some of the key concepts 
used throughout the thesis.
1.1 Purpose, Aims and Objectives
This thesis focuses on the context and process of policy formulation, and 
analyses the resulting content of indigenous health policies in terms of the contractual 
environment that has emerged to support indigenous health providers. The main 
objective of this thesis is to investigate how governments balance the ideal of
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indigenous self-determination with other pressures, such as current trends in public 
administration and accountability, pressures on the health care system, issues of and 
sensitivities around minority rights, equity in health and cost-efficiency. More 
specifically, the objectives are as follows:
1. To describe the historical and political context of state-indigenous relations, as they 
relate to questions of access to and delivery of health care services;
2. To analyse indigenous health policies, including the values they convey and 
mechanisms and processes they identify to implement their stated objectives;
3. To document the level of decision-making authority being transferred to Indigenous 
PHC services, including opportunities and contingencies; and
4. To assess the extent to which there is convergence between policy objectives and 
implementation mechanisms.
This enquiry thus involves analyses at four distinct levels. At the policy level (second 
objective), the analysis aims to identify what is being valued, pursued, and how. It must 
necessarily be nested in a discussion of the forces that shaped indigenous health 
policy development, which includes an overview of the national health care system 
(first objective). At the implementation level, which is the main focus of this enquiry 
(objective three), the analysis aims to document the space over which indigenous 
providers exercise control, a key term in the context of self-determination. The final 
analysis aims to evaluate the level of coherence between policy and implementation 
(objective four). These objectives will be explored in light of the literature reviewed in
chapter 2 to develop specific study questions.
The indigenous environment has been fertile in international comparative
analyses. Examples include,
On the political • Paine and Dyck's edited books on Canada, Australia and
location of Norway (Dyck 1989, Paine 1985);
indigenous people
within the nation • Tremblay’s report on self-determination and legislative 
state frameworks in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United States (Tremblay 1993);
• Havemann’s edited book on indigenous rights in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (Havemann 1999c);
• Thornberry's volume on indigenous rights (Thornberry 
2002);
In matters of 
jurisdiction and 
infrastructure 
development
Crough’s and Kaufman's reports on the funding, 
organisation and accountability frameworks for indigenous 
organisations in Australia, the United States (Kaufman only) 
and Canada (Crough 1997, Kaufman Thomas and 
Associates 2001);
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On history and 
social policy
Armitage’s comparison of policies of assimilation in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (Armitage 1995);
On health care 
organisation and 
policy
• Kunitz’s comparative work on health policy and indigenous 
mortality (Kunitz 1990,1994, Kunitz & Brady 1995);
• Brady’s and Gray’s articles comparing addiction programs in 
Australia and North America (Brady 1995, Gray et al 1995); 
and
• Gray’s comparison of access to health care in Australia and 
Canada (Gray 1998).
The analyses are invariably motivated by the need to look beyond one's national 
boundaries and compare histories, policies, strategies and outcomes. The 
methodology is generally that of the case study, although the precise methodology is 
not always disclosed. Scrimgeour’s reports on participation and funding for indigenous 
run health care services in Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand (Scrimgeour 
1995, 1996) remain the only references closely related to the focus of this thesis. 
Although his studies are valuable, they are based on a relatively short time in the field 
and limited number of interviews. They provide a good overview.
A number of national policy analyses have also been conducted. In Canada, 
analyses have focused on the context of policy development (Brant Castellano 1982, 
Culhane Speck 1989, O’Neil 1995), or localised case studies of implementation (Bird & 
Moore 1991, Gregory et al 1992, Warry 1998). In Australia, a few macro policy 
analyses have been published (Anderson 1997b, HealthlnfoNet 1999). New Zealand 
has been somewhat more fertile in policy analyses (Cooper 2000, Dow 1999, Durie 
1998b, 2001). Of all three countries, only Kiro provides a detailed link between health 
policy and implementation (Kiro 2001). These contributions are discussed in chapters 4 
and 6. At this point, it suffices to note that indigenous health policy and implementation 
environments have remained remarkably unscrutinised. This is the gap in the literature 
that this study attempts to address.
It has to be noted that this thesis does not attempt to speak to the effectiveness 
of “by indigenous for indigenous” health services in addressing health inequalities. 
Although international comparative analyses of health inequalities are at times used to 
situate debates (see Table 1.1 for example), the comparative quantitative data needed 
to assess the effectiveness of “by indigenous for indigenous" services in contrast to 
other services is simply not available. It appears that in all three countries under study, 
the indigenous sector emerged in environments where baseline data was not collected. 
Indigenous health organisations do gather health information, but this information is not
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collected following standard methods, nor channelled centrally for aggregation. The 
First Nation environment is the only one that provides some information. First Nations 
are required to gather health information and to undertake an evaluation every five 
years. Some of these documents were reviewed for evidence (Angees et al 1999, First 
Nations and Inuit Regional Health Survey National Steering Committee 2001, Martens 
et al 2002, Young et al 2000), but the organisations are small and the data scant. 
There is no equivalent process in Australia or New Zealand, where reporting 
requirements are limited to activity reports. These studies will be mentioned where 
appropriate, but lie largely outside the scope of this thesis, which focuses on policy and 
implementation.
Another limitation of this study is that it does not attempt to fully explain the 
forces that shape policy implementation over time, but rather focuses on the 
contractual environment that emerged as a result. Grindle and Thomas (1991) Identify 
that policy adaptations may occur as a result of reactions in the public, the bureaucratic 
and the political arena. In the context of this research, the indigenous arena could be 
added to this list. Efforts were made to document the context in which policies emerged 
and shifted over time. The literature provided valuable insights (Anderson & Sanders 
1996, 1997b, Durie 1998a, 1998b, Griew et al 2003, Rowse 1996), which were 
supplemented with interviews wherever possible.
In summary, the aim of this thesis is not to answer the question, "are indigenous 
health services able to improve indigenous health?" Or "under what conditions can 
policies of self-determination be successfully implemented?" The aim is rather to 
explore the question, "is the contractual environment implemented in a way that 
capitalises on the opportunities offered by ‘by indigenous for indigenous* services, as 
defined in the policies, namely local priority setting and responsiveness, cultural 
appropriateness and relevance in service delivery?”
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¡¡Table 1.1, Health Inequalities in Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
I Canada jAustralia
i Life expectancy
¡Age standardised Death Rate
| Infant mortality rate
FN Male (non- 
iindigenous male)
L  ,_6 6 -9 ( 756)2 
' 12.71 (8.49)2
FN Female (non- ^ Ig in a l  Male 
indigenous female) £ nef b0" 9lnal
Aboriginal Female
|(non-Aboriginal
female)
ew Zealand
74 (80.9)2 56.9 (75.6)3
7.95 (5.28)2
12.3 (6.4)2
20.87 (8.39)4
18.7(6.05)5
jVläori Male (non- 
Mäori male)
61.7(81.3)3
16.86 (5.42)4
17.3(4.95)5
ï % population below 15 years of ;
¡'age ' :■ 34.4 (20.6)2 39(21)3
Mäori Female (non- 
jMäori female)
67.2(71.6)2 72.3 (77.6)2
11.89 (9.33)2 8.4 (6.05)2
14.1 (7.1)2
33.1 (22.2)2
2 For 1991. (Trovato & Werner-Leonard 1991)
3 For 1991-96. (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2001)
4 For 1992-94. (Anderson et al 1994)
5 For 1995-97, (Cunningham & Paradies 2000)
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Despite these limitations, the questions explored in this thesis are of 
significance to three, although not necessarily distinct groups: indigenous communities 
and nations, policy makers and researchers. Ever since contact with Europeans, 
indigenous communities and nations have sought to retain and regain control over 
areas of their life. For the past thirty years, indigenous communities have advocated to 
take control of government services offered in their community. This research 
addresses the mechanisms set in place In three countries to facilitate the transfer of 
publicly funded government responsibilities to indigenous authorities. Indigenous 
organisations have expressed a keen interest in this research. This interest appears to 
stem largely from wanting to extend the benefits that resulted from international pan- 
indigenous comparisons in the fields of indigenous rights, land, resource management 
and law, to issues of contracting in health care. Pan-indigenous comparisons have 
played an important role in providing indigenous groups with information they feel has 
intrinsic relevance to their circumstances (Armitage 1995, Crough 1997, Dyck 1989, 
Havemann 1999c, Tremblay 1993). New research agreements have emerged to 
ensure continued collaboration between Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Policy 
makers find themselves tasked with recommending mechanisms to engage indigenous 
minorities. While community control has become a leading ideology in primary health 
care delivery (World Health Organisation 1978, 1986), the transfer of government 
funding to indigenous organisations is not without challenges. Implementors are 
concerned with identifying the most cost effective and responsive way to structure the 
contractual environment with indigenous health providers in order to achieve the 
priority health gains identified by government, while managing political and financial 
risks. Researchers involved in indigenous health have so far focused on determinants 
of health, history, issues of power, cultural appropriateness of interventions, and health 
service utilisation. While many have suggested that community control may be the 
most appropriate mechanism to ensure responsiveness, a literature exploring the 
optimal contractual environment to ensure responsiveness has yet to emerge. This 
research will only go part way in answering these interests.
1.2 Choice of countries
For this study, Australia and New Zealand were selected as counterpoints to 
the experience garnered in Canada. Although significant differences exist, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand share much in terms of history, interests and debates. First, 
indigenous people in all three countries self-identify as such and are internationally 
recognised as indigenous by United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations because of their priority in time; the voluntary perpetuation of their cultural
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distinctiveness; their self-identification as indigenous; and their experience of 
subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion, and discrimination by the 
dominant society (United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations 1996). 
Second, each country shares a history of conquest by Britain and a permanent 
settlement by a majority of people who shared similar values. Third, in each country, 
an imposed political economy turned land and natural resources into commodities, and 
incorporated them into an increasingly wider network of international trade that is 
expected to undermine national government’s ability to respect its own laws and 
agreements with their respective indigenous population. Fourth, in each country, 
English common law prevails, along with the Westminster model of majority 
representative democratic government, and these approaches displaced traditional 
forms of governance, at least at the official level. Fifth, each country adopted some 
policies inspired by social Darwinism that were eventually displaced by post- 
assimilationist accommodations (Armitage 1995, Havemann 1999c). Sixth, the history 
of conquest and of governmental response to deal with the indigenous "problem" show 
important parallels (Havemann 1999c). These themes are explored through the 
following three country-specific vignettes.
1.2.1 Indigenous people in Canada
In Canada, the collective term Aboriginal people (an umbrella term 
encompassing First Nations,6 Inuit and Métis) entrenched in the Constitution as 
amended in 1982, glosses over cultural, legislative and administrative complexities. 
Table 1.2 shows the overall demographic situation? The term First Nations is the 
preferred self-referent used by the indigenous peoples of Canada historically known as 
“Indians,”7 to replace the word “Band”8 used for the political and administrative unit that 
emerged as a result of the Indian Act of 1876. The collective term First Nations veils a 
multiplicity of nations, including Nisg’aa, Cree, Ojibway, Salish, Mohawk, Micm’ac, and 
Innu, to name a few. In administrative terms, there are currently 627 First Nations
6 In Canada, the use of the term nation is deliberate, and somewhat unique. First Nations 
see themselves as sovereign nations, engaged in negotiations with another sovereign nation, 
namely Canada. This understanding is entrenched in the Treaty process of the turn of the 
century.
7 In the North-American context, the term “Indian" emerged out of colonial confusion 
(Columbus believe that he had arrived in India), but has become a bureaucratic construct 
defined in the Indian Act, first adopted in 1876. An updated version of the Act remains in place 
to day, and defines who can and cannot claim to be an Indian (meaning a member of a First 
Nation), a label to which is attached eligibility to live on reserve, and certain individual-based 
benefits.
8 The equivalent to the better known word “tribe" which is rarely ever used in the Canadian 
context.
recognised by the federal government (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2002). 
These are political and administrative organisations that emerged to satisfy the 
requirements of the Indian Act. They may or may not be members of one of the 79 
regional Tribal Councils. These numbers do not represent the whole of indigenous 
organisations, nor the number of indigenous cultures: Inuit and Métis are excluded. 
Further, it was the practice of the federal government at the turn of the century to divide 
large cultural groups into more “manageable" administrative subgroups, thus there are 
in fact considerably less cultural groups than there are First Nations.
i Table 1.2, Indigenous Population in Canada, Statistic Canada Census 1996 (Statistics Canada $ 
1996)9 J
Total Canadian
28,528,125
First Nations j Non-Status Indians 
461,510 [  92,780
1.6% I 0.3%
Métis j Inuit
210,190 i 41,080
i 0.7% l 0.1%
I
Inuit is also a collective self-referent that refers to the Arctic people previously 
known as Eskimos.10 1 Inuit themselves recognise local groups with different names 
(Pallurmiut, Inuvialuit, etc.) reflecting the complexity of Arctic history and subtlety in 
cultural differences glossed over by outsiders. Finally, Métis refers to the descendants 
of French or Scottish traders and Cree women who settled on the Red River area, 
north of what is now Winnipeg, Manitoba, developing their own blended culture and 
their own language, Metchif. After Confederation, the Métis were not entitled to sign 
Treaties. Like non-status11 Indians, themselves descendents of status Indians and 
non-Aboriginals, Métis do not benefit from the special provisions made by the federal 
government for economic development, health care, etc. The Métis were for the first 
time recognised as Aboriginal people in the Constitutional reform of 1982 (Sawchuk 
2000).
The Canadian information presented in this thesis relates to health services 
provided by First Nations themselves with funding from the federal government, for 
First Nations living on-reserve. The expression on-reserve refers to Indian reserve 
land held in trust by the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs for Bands who were signatory of 
Indian Treaties at the turn of the century, in exchange for a surrender of Aboriginal 
rights over their ancestral territory. Simply put, the British Crown issued the Royal
9 Participation in the Canadian census is not mandatory, and it is generally acknowledged 
that it underestimates the Aboriginal population .
10 The term is still in use in the United States.
11 A status Indian is a person registered as an Indian under the terms of the Indian Act. 
Status ensured the right to live on-reserve and access to Treaty and policy defined benefits.
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Proclamation in 1763, following the 1759 conquest of what was known as New France 
(Eastern Canada), which had been under French rule since the early 1500s. The 
Royal Proclamation was an attempt to create an alliance between the Crown and the 
indigenous population in order to ensure the sovereignty of the British Crown. The 
Royal Proclamation essentially stated that the indigenous peoples of Canada were not 
conquered and retained title to their ancestral territory. Any encroachment on the part 
of settlers was to be approved by the Crown, negotiated through the Treaty process 
and duly compensated (King George 1763). Following Confederation (1867) and the 
push to create a sustainable agrarian economy, the Crown engaged in Treaty 
negotiations with First Nations throughout the prairie provinces. The 11 numbered 
Treaties, as they are known, are land surrenders agreed to in exchange for reserve 
land, calculated at 128 acres per family of four at the time of signature, as well as other 
provisions such as rations in time of famine, medicines, and agricultural implements.12 
The Royal Proclamation still has currency today. Modern Treaties, such as the James 
Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975), the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement 
(1995) and the Nisga’a Agreement (1997) were motivated by the need to clarify (and/or 
legalise) the Crown’s access to land and resources.
1.2.2 Aborigines in Australia
Like the concept of First Nation, the term Aborigine is a category born out of the 
need for an umbrella term to contrast with the term "white" used to signify "the others", 
the newcomers of European origin. Such sharp contrasts are obviously literary 
constructs that mask a much more complex situation. Australian Aborigines identify 
themselves with a variety of collective self-referents linking them to a specific linguistic 
affiliation and geographical area: Murris in Queensland, Nungas in South Australia, 
Pallawah in Tasmania and Nyoongas in Western Australia. In recent years, the 
collective term Koori has gained popularity among Aborigines in parts of New South 
Wales and Victoria. Although well established in Australian English, it has not gained 
Australia-wide acceptance. These seif-referents add a layer of complexity to the term 
Aborigine, but in themselves hide other layers related to experience, locality, self- 
concept and history (see Holland 1999). They also gloss over an amazing diversity of 
cultures and languages. ATSIC reports that 200 to 250 distinct languages, and many 
more dialects existed prior to contact (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission 1998). More recently, AIATSIS has documented 390 distinct cultural
12 First Nations signed the Treaties to ensure that some compensation would be received 
for the new settlers’ inevitable encroachment on their ancestral territory.
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groups (Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies 1999). In 
Australia, the terms language groups or clans are used to designate culturally specific 
groupings. In legal terms,
An Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander is a person of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
descent who identifies as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander and is accepted as 
such by the community with which he or she lives (National Health Data Committee 
1998).
Torres Strait Islanders are considered a distinct and relatively small group from 
Aboriginal people, located on the most northern tip of north-eastern Queensland, They 
are historically and culturally affiliated to Papua New Guinean people. Historically, the 
term Aborigines included Torres Straight Islanders. More recently, it has become 
customary to distinguish between the two groups. Recent official document titles now 
spell out Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islanders, and the abbreviation ATSI adopted 
in this thesis is widely used.
In contrast to the Canadian situation, the Australian government is satisfied with 
ATSI self-identification. This is however a change from earlier times when ATSI 
identity was defined by government in terms of full-castes, half-castes and quadroons. 
As mentioned above, the Canadian case study applies only to a selection of Canadian 
Aboriginal people as a result of jurisdictional issues introduced in the Constitution, In 
contrast, the two Australian case studies presented in this thesis can apply to all ATSI 
communities. The Australian inclusiveness has less to do with a more benevolent 
attitude, and more to do with the fact that unlike Canada, Australia has never allocated 
individual benefits to ATSI people on the basis of Treaty rights or policy. Thus Australia 
has never needed to define inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Contrary to Canada, Australia adopted a doctrine of terra nullius from the 
earliest days of contact, thereby denying the original inhabitants any rights to land 
(Reynolds 1982). The creation of Australia was really a coming together of separate 
colonies who wished to retain considerable autonomy. Aboriginal affairs thus remained 
the realm of the states, rather than the Commonwealth. In theory, each state had its 
own approach to ATSI health. In effect however, the practices ranged from benign 
neglect to coercive public health measures (Briscoe 1996, Harrison 1997, Hetzel 2000, 
Hunter 1993, Jebb 1984, MacLeod & Denoon 1991, Maguire 1991, May 1991, Reid 
1990, Reynolds 1982, Ring & Elston 1999, Saggers & Gray 1991). By the 1960s, 
attitudes were shifting at all levels of the Australian society, leading to legislative 
changes to end discriminatory practices. Voluntary voting was extended to Aborigines 
in 1962. Constitutional changes in 1967 gave the Commonwealth government the 
authority to make laws in relation to all ATSI people. By the same token, the 
Commonwealth government was given the authority to enumerate Aborigines in the
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yearly national census, a power that had been constitutionally denied since 1901 
(Thomson 1984).
Table 1.3 shows the breakdown of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders across 
the country. As with Canada, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders make up for 
between 2 and 3 percent of the overall Australian population. As a result, ATSI people 
cannot hope to be heard through the democratic process alone, and must opt for 
alternatives. They have sought to find mechanisms for political self-expression since at 
least the turn of the last century (Bennett 1989). In many ways, a lack of access to 
health care associated with co-payments but also a lack of governmental commitment 
in ensuring access to services in rural and remote environments, provided a 
meaningful impetus for mobilisation.
Table 1.3, Estimated distribution of indigenous/non-indigenous populations, 1995-96 (Deeble et 
al 1998) ____________ _______
State/Territory Indigenous
(000)
Non-lndigenous
(000) Total (000) % Indigenous j
New South Wales 105.0 6,058 6,163 1.70 |
Victoria 22.3 4,516 4,538 0.49 i
Queensland 99.3 3,202 3,301 3.01
Western Australia 53.5 1,696 1,750 3.06
South Australia 21.0 1,451 1,472 1.43
Tasmania 14.5 460 474 3.05 j
ACT 3.1 303 306 1.01 j
Northern Territory 49.1 131 180 27.29
Australia 367.8 17,817 18,184 2.02 |
It is worth noting that access to services has been and somewhat remains 
problematic in the Northern Territory (Bartlett et al 1997, Bartlett & Duncan 2000, 
Wakerman et al 1997). This is partly due to the Australian government’s satisfaction 
with relying on market forces to direct the deployment of general practitioners. As a 
result, sparsely populated areas and regions with higher ATSI concentration are less 
likely to receive services.
1.2.3 The Maori of Aotearoa (New Zealand!
According to Cheater and Hopa (1997), the term Maori is a colonial construct 
dating to the first week of February 1840, and created by missionaries tasked with 
translating the Treaty of Waitangi. They chose the term Maori instead of New 
Zealanders as they had been called before, to designate the 70 plus tribes of 
indigenous residents. "Maoridom" (Cheater & Hopa 1997) has undergone significant 
changes since contact, With 80 percent of Maori living in urban centres, Maori identity
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appears to be no longer associated with a rural base. It is therefore not surprising to 
find 30 percent of Maori no longer identifying with iwi [tribe] or hapu [sub-tribe]. In 
recent years, Government's compensation and economic schemes have validated 
certain Maori forms of political organisations, while ignoring and invalidating others, 
leading to tensions within the "Maori" community. This thesis utilises the collective self­
referent "Maori" and its mirror image term " pakeha",^ while recognising that both are 
themselves artifices of the colonial experience.
In many ways, the relationship of Maori with the Crown is very different to that 
of First Nations and ATSI. To begin, Maori share a common historical origin and a 
common language, Te Reo. Although divided into 70 plus iwi and hapu, with significant 
differences in protocol and practices, Maori nevertheless share more between 
themselves than do their Australian and Canadian counterparts.
As well, the Maori population nears 550,000 in total. The First Nation population 
is estimated at around 600,000. ATSI people are estimated at around 450,000. 
Although the population sizes are comparable in absolute numbers, Maori are in a 
different position compared to their First Nation and ATSI counterparts. As shown in 
Table 1.4, Maori amount to nearly 15 percent of the overall New Zealand population. 
Maori have the opportunity to influence New Zealand’s development through the 
democratic process.
| Table 1.4, New Zealand Population as of 2
Pakeha (non-indigenous New Zealanders)
Maori ■•
Pacific Islanders 
Others
Total population
Like their Canadian counterpart, Maori entered into a historical Treaty 
relationship with the Crown. Much is made of this commonality. In fact however, the 
background and context leading to the Treaty of Waitangi is very different from the 
Canadian experience. Although Maori experienced the sustained presence of 
missionaries from 1815 onward, New Zealand was in fact the last of the dominions to 
be annexed and settled. European presence did not amount to more than two 
thousand when Britain officially claimed sovereignty in 1840. According to Nicolson 
(1988), by the 1830s and 1840s, it was widely acknowledged in Europe than contact 13
13 The term pakeha is widely used as a substitute for the term European, to refer to New 
Zealanders of European origins. Both terms have their followers.
1001 (Statistics New Zealand 2001) 
___ _  Percent
■ ■" ~  147 " “
............. ' 6 ,5......
_  _ ___4 .6 ■
3,737,277
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with indigenous cultures had detrimental effects on their health. While the reasons for 
such effects were debated, the experience of frontier violence by settlers in Australia 
left little doubt as to some sources. It appears that it was the British Government's 
intention at the onset to minimise the horrors experienced in its other colonies. The 
Treaty of Waitangi was signed from February until May of 1840 between the Crown, 
the Governor and around 500 Maori Chiefs. It was a requirement to New Zealand 
being granted self-rule. Moon contends that from the Crown's perspective, the impetus 
for the Treaty was the need to regulate and protect its British citizens living in New 
Zealand, and to exert territorial sovereignty. Discussions leading up to the Treaty 
made no mention of extending the protection of British common law to Maori. Maori 
were to retain their sovereignty:
"the Crown would not simply seize New Zealand unless there was full, free and
intelligent consent from the natives to do so" {Moon 1999).
From Governor Hobson's perspective, there was no need to extend British rule to Maori 
since he expected their demise at a pace that would not interfere with the settlement of 
New Zealand. He nevertheless presented the Treaty to Maori as an instrument of 
protection that would not affect their sovereignty. It appears that Maori understood the 
Treaty as such, this despite the inclusion of three articles which could be interpreted as 
a surrender to British rule.14
Whereas First Nations benefit from their Treaty relationship with the Crown 
mainly if living on-reserve, Maori benefit from a more broadly defined recognition of 
their rights. In 1975, the Treaty of Waitangi Act was passed by parliament, thereby 
removing the implementation of the Treaty from the realm of policy, and providing an 
advisory mechanism, the Waitangi Tribunal, to assist in resolving disputes. The 
Tribunal was later to rule that Treaty of Waitangi apply to both iwi and other Maori 
(urban, pan-/'w/) communities, as long as they could demonstrate their exercise of tino 
rangatiratanga (self-determination] (New Zealand Waitangi Tribunal 1998).
The Treaty of Waitangi remains the core of the Maori-Crown relationship in New 
Zealand. It is brought forth in every discussion, and cited in all policy documents. What 
the Treaty actually means however, is a matter of debate. For a large segment of 
Maoridom, New Zealand is a coming together of two distinct nations that can co-exist, 
but as separate entities. The request for a separate parliament, which emerged in 
1837, continues. The New Zealand Government has historically and appears to remain
14The Treaty was written in both languages, but it appears that both versions were not 
equivalent in meaning (Durie 1998b).
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uncomfortable with the idea of differentiated citizenship, and continues to favour 
integration.
1.3 Overview of Methodology and Thesis
This research relies on case studies conducted in indigenous primary health 
care organisations located in two countries. The questions explored In this thesis are 
based on experience in the Canadian context. These are then probed through case 
studies undertaken in Australia and New Zealand.
Chapter 2 explores the literature and key concepts relevant to the objectives of 
this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical context for the study from 
an international and broader perspective. The Canadian experience is also explored to 
provide the theory building required for this study. The Canadian situation was chosen 
for a number of reasons. First, the Health Transfer Policy has been in place since 
1989. In contrast, “by indigenous for indigenous” policies in New Zealand and Australia 
are more recent. Second, administrative and organisational issues have been fairly well 
documented over the past 15 years. Third, the Health Transfer Policy has been the 
object of two national evaluations since its implementation, and is currently the object 
of a third. The specific study questions are derived from this analysis.
Chapter 3 describes the approaches, strategies and methods used in carrying 
out this study. The aims of this chapter are to explore the strategy developed to answer 
the study questions, justify the case study site selection, explain why a case study 
methodology was adopted and provide an understanding of how results were 
generated. The exploratory approach developed by Yin (1994) was found particularly 
well suited to accommodate the complexity of this study.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the findings of this study. Chapter 4 discussed the 
emergence of “by indigenous for indigenous* health policies in both Australian and New 
Zealand. For each country, the discussion begins with an overview of the health care 
system in place in the country. This is followed by a chronological overview of the 
development of health services for ATSI and Maori respectively. The discussion of the 
health care system and chronology serve as a backdrop to a detailed exploration of 
ATSI and Maori health policy development. In Australia, this development occurred in 
parallel to state and territorial health services until very recently. In New Zealand, Maori 
and non-Maori health services have always been more or less integrated. Differences 
in context and resulting policies are highlighted and contextualised with the Canadian 
material presented in chapter 2, Chapter 5 provides an overview of the case study 
sites. Chapter 6 analyses the contractual environment that emerged as a result of “by 
indigenous for indigenous" health policies in Australia and New Zealand respectively.
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This chapter draws on the case studies conducted in both countries, and revisits the 
Canadian experience. The strengths and challenges associated with each model are 
explored.
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter of this thesis. It reviews the findings of 
chapters 4, 5 and 6, and explores the connection between policy and implementation. 
This is contextualised with a discussion of the international literature. Its objective is to 
summarise key findings, highlight policy implications and identify areas of priority for 
future research.
1.4 Terminology
This thesis includes research conducted in three countries. Each country has 
developed its own lexicon to refer to some of the issues discussed in this thesis. Some 
use the same word to mean somewhat different concepts. In New Zealand in particular, 
Maori terminology is preferred over English terminology to signify concepts that 
emerged from Màori culture and have gained currency in national policy. Some 
conventions were adopted throughout the text to facilitate reading.
Government Health Departments: All Departments of Health are identified not 
by their current names, but rather as countrv/state/territorv Department of Health. This 
convention has been adopted throughout the text to facilitate a reading by people who 
may not be unfamiliar with the country or region being discussed. This convention also 
side-steps the issue of name changes, a prevalent feature of the Australian political 
domain.
“By indigenous for indigenous* health services: 'The issue of what precisely 
constitutes a “by indigenous for indigenous" health services, and the challenge 
associated with identification are explored in more details in chapter 3. Suffice to say 
for now that each country has developed its own terminology, and that the cross­
national analysis presented in this study requires the development of a pan-indigenous 
expression, thus the adoption of the expression “by indigenous for indigenous" health 
services. This expression is meant to include the following categories of organisations:
• In Australia, Aboriginal controlled clinics emerged in the 1970s under the label 
Aboriginal Medical Services or AMSs. They have since become known as 
Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services or ACCHS. These labels 
however generally reflect membership with the National Aboriginal Community 
Controlled Health Organisation NACCHO. Other organisations may be “ATSI 
controlled" but have opted not to become a member of NACCHO. These, such as 
the Tiwi Health Board, are understood as “by indigenous for indigenous" health 
organisations.
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• In New Zealand, Maori health services may be /'w/-based or pan-/'w/ [tribe]. Models 
have included MAPOs (Maori Purchasing Organisations), MICOs (Maori Integrated 
Care Organisations) and more recently MDOs (Maori Development Organisations).
• In Canada, First Nations have assumed a role in governing on-reserve affairs since 
the implementation of the Indian Act in 1876. Existing health services that have 
been transferred to First Nation administrative authority are included.
The expression primary health care services is used to signify community- 
based and community driven comprehensive primary health care services that span 
curative, preventive, promotive and rehabilitative health services. For the purpose of 
this thesis, these services may have a doctor on staff, or access to doctor services 
through partnership or referral. In the indigenous context, these services are not 
usually doctor-centred.
A list of abbreviations that recur in the text is provided at the beginning of this 
thesis. The list also provides definitions for technical terms used in the text and of 
Maori words. In New Zealand, Maori terminology is widely used to describe Maori- 
specific issues and concepts. This has been respected. A translation has been 
provided in [ ] when Maori words are first introduced to ease reading.
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CHAPTER 2, REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This thesis focuses on the relationship between official policies, the 
compromises related to implementation, and the reality of practice. At the theoretical 
level, this topic is informed by a number of key contemporary debates. The general 
backdrop of these debates is the international discourse on human rights and the 
equitable distribution of social goods, such as health. Since (and perhaps before) the 
Alma-Ata Declaration (World Health Organisation 1978), engaging marginalised 
populations in primary health care delivery has been core to the pursuit of equity. What 
constitutes “community" and “participation” however remains a matter of debate. In the 
context of the countries selected for this study, the chosen mechanism has been the 
government-supported development of indigenous health organisations, because it 
satisfied the conditions of participation, and echoed the concept of self-determination 
advocated by indigenous people. This choice is related to debates over the 
appropriate division of responsibilities between levels of governments and the non­
government sectors in the provision of health services to vulnerable populations. The 
mechanisms set up to implement the transfer of responsibility over health care, the 
contracts, can be examined from a strictly administrative perspective, or can be 
contextualised in light of the larger debates already mentioned.
While all themes raised above have received considerable attention in the 
literature, they are at best loosely linked. The relationship between these layers of 
analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The figure distinguishes between policy formulation, 
which is the process by which policies are developed, from the point of identifying 
issues to be addressed, to the point where an official policy position is taken. Policy 
makers are not necessarily the actors tasked to implement policy. Here, adaptation 
may be required to make the policy objectives fit within an existing context. Different 
interest groups within the system may influence implementation. As a result of 
interpretations and accommodations, the values reflected in practice may show 
considerable compromises from the values initially expressed in policy statements.
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Figure2.1, Concenti!al Framework
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This chapter will review the literature to answer three inter-related questions:
• What is the larger context and debates influencing indigenous health policies;
• What is the link between, and the factors influencing, the relationship between 
policy formulation and policy implementation; and
• What options exist in contracting in health, and how do there options relate to the 
needs of public administration and accountability, health care system management 
and local priority setting, and cost-efficiency.
This chapter does not provide a comprehensive review of all debates, but rather 
focuses on the themes explored above, drawing on four large bodies of literature. The 
organisation of this chapter echoes the map provided above. The first body of 
literature focuses on indigenous-state relations. This is a key body of literature for this 
study, as it raises and relates to issues of individual and collective representation, and 
participation in primary health care. It is part of the broader context informing 
indigenous health policy development today. Second, the literature on the processes of 
policy formulation and implementation is reviewed with a more specific focus on the 
linkages between the two. This body of literature provides the backdrop for exploring 
the relationship between a policy that promotes indigenous participation in policy, 
planning and delivery, and the actual mechanisms implemented to fulfil policy 
objectives. The third body of literature relates to practice and explores options in 
contracting in health, with a more specific focus on issues of health system 
management, accountability, public administration and cost-efficiency. A fourth section 
organises the findings into a theoretical framework. The final section summarises the 
key points explored and uses them to formulate the study questions. The Canadian 
literature and experience provides a backdrop for this study and is used throughout to 
illustrate points. The international literature is used to explore alternatives.
2.1 Context: Debates shaping indigenous health policy
This section reviews the debates shaping indigenous health policies. The 
endorsement of the ideal of self-determination by Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
reflects current international and theoretical debates in four key areas. First, there is 
increased recognition in international and theoretical debates of the need for neo-liberal 
societies to recognise and accommodate collective identities and collective rights. 
Second, in the case of Canada and New Zealand, the concept of collective rights is 
entrenched in historical documents and increasingly echoed in international covenants. 
Third, implementing self-determination is a complex matter, because there is no 
consensus as to the meaning of the principle. The term also implies the establishment 
of a parallel system, for a relatively small and sparsely distributed indigenous
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population in the case of Canada and Australia, and for a larger and geographically 
integrated Maori population in the case of New Zealand. And fourth, alternatives to the 
establishment of parallel systems include varying degrees of participation in existing 
systems, each with strengths and challenges. Each theme will be addressed in turn.
2.1.1 Collective identity
The issue of minority and group rights has generated an impressive number of 
publications in the last decades. Indeed, the international and national human rights 
forums, while emphasising individual freedom, have nevertheless called for increased 
tolerance and frowned over homogenising policies promoting a one-dimensional 
“national character”. Groups claiming specific rights include,
• National minorities, such as stateless nations and indigenous peoples;
• Immigrant minorities, whether voluntary immigrants or refugees;
• Religious groups; and
• Sui generis groups, for example, African Americans or Roma (Kymlicka & Norman 
2000).
The way in which indigenous peoples or nations understand and define their sense of 
identity, and their place within the nation-state, is key to this thesis. A central issue is 
the expression of collective identity and protection of cultural identity.
Strangely, 7 do not define myself as a New Zealander except when the New Zealand 
national teams are playing the British Lions in rugby, or the Australians in netball or the 
Pakistanis in cricket. At times such as those I am fiercely a New Zealander, But as a 
general rule the term has no significance for me primarily because it denies my 
Maoriness [sic] and that of my peoples [sic]... No, New Zealander Is not a label which 
has any real significance to me or my life except in the international arena. I mean, for 
example, I probably couldn't move through passport controls with a passport issued by 
Ngati Hine, which is the main nation with which I identify (Rika-Heke 1997, p. 137).
Rika-Heke’s comment provides a concise summary of the complexity of the issue.
Essentially, she defines a sense of identity that is layered:
1. A citizenship that defines her within an international landscape and has pragmatic 
implications, but that has limited meaning otherwise;
2. A sense of belonging to a national pan-indigenous constituency: the terms Indian, 
Aborigines and Maori were created as a result of the colonial encounter;
3. A local connection with a tribe(s) or community(ies): 627 different First Nations in 
Canada, 70 plus tribes or iwi in New Zealand, and between 200 and 390 different 
language groups in Australia; and
4. An individual,
Each layer complements the other. It is definitely the connection to a community, tribe, 
or pan-indigenous collectivity rather than the individual that defines the relationship with 
the non-indigenous majority and the nation-state. The importance given to each layer in
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expressing a sense of identity is a matter of context. The sense of collective identity is 
more readily expressed in terms of the connection with the tribe or community, than at 
a national or pan-indigenous level.
Pan-indigenous and tribal identities are of particular interest for this study and 
are often misunderstood, or glossed over. As explored in the introduction, the collective 
terms indigenous, Aborigines, Indians, Aboriginal peoples, First Nations and Mâori 
have emerged as a result of colonialism and have been rather vulnerable to 
reconstruction following the vagarities of the colonial imagination, and the demands of 
its administration. Until the 1940s or so, the theoretical narrative informing 
ethnographies and policies assumed that indigenous people were destined to 
disappear. Shortly after the Second World War, this discourse shifted to that of 
survival and resistance (Bruner 1986).15 A new discourse emerged in the late 
seventies, with international discourses of cultural protection and participation.
This reshaping of pan-indigenous referents mostly serves governmental 
administrative purposes and occurs in realms distinct from where local indigenous 
identities operate, Local identity confers a sense of belonging to a community. It exists 
outside the realm of this pan-indigenous construct, changing as all cultures do, as a 
result of individual responses to new opportunities and demands, as well as outside 
pressures. While changes in mainstream cultures are understood as evidence of 
“progress,” changes in indigenous cultures, whether due to the integration of foreign 
technologies or participation in the market economy, are often portrayed as a sure sign 
of the imminent disappearance of indigenous cultures as distinct identities, or worse, as 
confirmation of the superiority of the colonial culture.16 This shifting governmental 
conceptualisation has at times been used to validate claims of illegitimacy, assimilation 
or improved socio-economic conditions, thereby justifying further erosion of rights and 
limiting differential access to resources and services.
Cultural distinctiveness is a key value and indispensable political resource for aboriginal
peoples in Canada (Scott 1993, p. 311).
As integration occurs, the place of cultural expression is expected to shift from public 
and institutionalised, to private and informal.
Legitimacy of identity is central to negotiating the political locality of indigenous 
peoples in their respective nation-state/ Legitimacy of identity, when based on 
“tradition" and “authenticity” has been repeatedly challenged. Specific provisions, when
15 Although Bruner speaks of the United States, similar shifts in narratives are reported in 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
16 See Sahlins (1999) for a brilliant exposé on this matter.
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based on deprivation or needs, also have their limitations as needs change and 
deprivation may be construed as self-induced. Treaties, international covenants and 
debates on indigenous rights have provided indigenous people a measure of cultural 
protection that is less vulnerable to shifts in national popular and political discourses.
2.1.2 International support for indigenous collective identity
Anaya (1996) suggests that in the past three decades,, international law has 
shifted its focus from acting as an instrument of colonialism to providing support for 
indigenous demands. All three countries first signed and then ratified the United Nation 
Declaration (1963) and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1966). The 1966 International Covenant on Economics, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) further affirmed indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination and control 
over natural resources in their territory (United Nations 1965, 1966a, 1966b). The 
covenants came into force in 1976. Article no. 27 states,
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to these minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members 
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language (cited in Magallanes 1999).
This article has been used by indigenous peoples to remind their nation-state of its duty
to uphold and protect their culture. Since the 1970s, international law has produced
standards that nation-states are required to abide by, such as the right of indigenous
peoples to exist as distinct peoples. A Special Rapporteur on indigenous issues was
appointed in 1972. As a result, a series of reports on The Problems of Discrimination
against Indigenous Populations were delivered in 1981-82, leading to the formation of
the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations.17 The role of the Working Group is
to act as a world-wide monitor and to draft standards. It is in this capacity that the
Working Group began its draft of the Declaration of Principles of Indigenous Rights in
1985, a project that was completed in 1993. While not yet ratified, indigenous peoples
have succeeded in getting the notion of a right to cultural protection onto the
international human rights agenda.
International covenants have validated the continued relevance of historical 
documents such as the New Zealand Treaty of Waitangi and the numerous Treaties 
signed in Canada. They have supported a concept of indigenous rights stemming from
17 The original name of the group, Working Group on the Indigenous Peoples, was changed 
to Populations in answer to protests. Anaya mentions that the United States in particular 
remains firmly opposed to the use of the term people, preferring "persons belonging to 
indigenous groups", thus reaffirming its commitment to individual over group rights (Anaya 
1999).
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the continuous occupation of the land and surviving colonialism, as in the Mabo case in 
Australia (Magallanes 1999). It is worthy to note that governmental and legal 
recognition of these historical documents has become more noticeable since the 
1970s.
2.1.3 Local and pan-local self-determination
The term self-determination is widely used by indigenous people and their 
supporters. It however remains an ambiguous term. In debates, the term continues to 
be used loosely to signify an array of options, which vary considerably in scope and 
complexity. On the one side, governments seem to gravitate towards systems of self­
administration. Sectors of activity such as health services, child protection, economic 
development, housing, education, etc. are being "transferred" to indigenous 
organisations with quasi-municipal authority or as service delivery agencies. The terms 
of reference for the programs, the Act(s) that define parameters, and terms of 
accountability may remain largely under Government control. In this context, self- 
determination may be limited to measures of self-administration and local participation. 
On the other side, indigenous authorities argue in favour of land claims, compensation, 
larger power and control over definitions, funding, jurisdiction and structures. These 
aspirations reflect a commitment to continued autonomy that can only be served by 
differentiated citizenship.
Scott suggests that the Canadian government shifted its position on self- 
government, from one defined in legislation with constitutional guarantees, to 
community-based piecemeal self-government arrangements. In the process, he 
argues, “First Nations” have been pruned back to "Indian communities" (Scott 1993, p. 
319). The shift occurred mainly in relation to implementing self-government. The issue 
is complex. While most indigenous nations continue to exist with local forms of 
governments, there is, in all three countries discussed, a substantial number of 
indigenous peoples who use the collective self-referents Aboriginal (used in Australia 
and Canada) or Maori to define their identity, but who do not or cannot connect back to 
a local or tribal identity. Although cultural connections may be strong, one can assume 
that some may have severed ties voluntarily for a spectrum of reasons, while others 
are likely the descendants of children taken into custody for assimilative or 
compassionate reasons (Australia National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Children 1997, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
1996b). Locating self-determination at a national level will include these people, but will 
necessarily gloss over cultural and ethnic differences, and generate substantial 
discomfort with some local nations. Locating self-determination at individual nations’
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level risks excluding urban indigenous peoples altogether, but also placing serious 
limits on the potential transfer of responsibilities. As mentioned in the introduction, 
there are currently 627 different First Nations, with populations from a few dozens to
10,000 members, of which 30 to 40 percent may live off reserve. Keeping this in mind, 
self-determination necessarily requires addressing both levels, but the division of 
powers between national and local indigenous governments remains contentious.
In the Canadian context, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 continues to be used 
as the rationale for First Nation and Inuit to claim compensation for their loss of land, 
restricted access to natural resources for subsistence activities and economic 
development, and cultural loss associated with policies of assimilations. As shown in 
Table 2.1, comprehensive land claim settlements, or modern Treaties as they are 
sometimes called, are still being signed. The Inuit of Labrador ratified their Agreement- 
in-Principles on May 24th, 2004. These agreements make provisions for land and 
financial restitution. They also make provisions for the appropriation and delivery of 
publicly delivered health, educational and social services. In each case, it is the local or 
tribal group that has received compensation. There is no movement for similar 
processes at the national pan-indigenous level.
Table 2.1, Modern Treaties in the Canadian context (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
2004a)
Agreement Year Population Provisions
The James 
Bay and 
Northern 
Quebec 
Agreement
1975 19 000 Cree, 
Inuit and 
Naskapi of 
northern 
Quebec
$230 million in compensation, ownership over 14 000 
square kilometres of territory, and exclusive hunting and 
trapping rights over another 150 000 square kilometres
The
Inuvialuit
Final
Agreement
1984 2 500 
Inuvialuit in 
the western 
Arctic
91 000 square kilometres of land, $45 million to be paid 
over 13 years, guaranteed hunting and trapping rights, 
and equal participation in the management of wildlife, 
conservation and the environment, a $10 million 
Economic Enhancement Fund and a $7.5 million Social 
Development Fund
The
Nunavut
Land
Claims
Agreement
1993 17 500 Inuit 
of the 
eastern 
Arctic
350 000 square kilometres of land, financial 
compensation of $1.17 billion over 14 years, the right to 
share in resource royalties, hunting rights, and a greater 
role in the management of land and the environment. The 
final agreement committed the federal government to a 
process which divides the Northwest Territories and 
creates the new territory of Nunavut by 1999
The Sahtu 
Dene and 
Metis
Agreement
1994 Sahtu Dene 
and Metis
41 437 square kilometres of land (of which 1 813 square 
kilometres will include mineral rights), a share of resource 
royalties from the Mackenzie Valley, guaranteed wildlife 
harvesting rights, participation in decision-making bodies 
dealing with renewable resources, land-use planning, 
environmental impact assessment and review, land and 
water use regulations, and $75 million over 15 years
The
Nisga'a
Agreement-
in-Principle
1996 Nisga’a of
British
Columbia
$190 million cash settlement and the establishment of a 
Nisga'a Central Government with ownership of and self- 
government over 1 900 square kilometres of land in the 
Nass River Valley. It also outlines the Nisga'a ownership 
of surface and subsurface resources on Nisga'a lands 
and their entitlements to Nass River salmon stocks and 
wildlife harvests
2.1.4 Marginalised populations’ participation in health
Cultural diversity is now the hallmark of most countries, and poses a challenge 
to liberal democracies. Diversity in health needs is simply another expression of this 
situation, and a concern for policy makers in an age where inequities in health are 
understood as a human rights issue. Healy and McKee write,
The health care system of a country should take account of increasingly diverse 
populations, particularly since this diversity is growing with greater movements of 
people between countries in an increasingly globalised world, and where people may 
have particular needs and expectations with regard to health care (Healy & McKee 
2003a).
Healy and McKee equate cultural diversity with diversity of needs, and argue that 
health care services need to be both accessible and responsive to diversity. Canada is
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now engaged in supporting parallel primary health care services for First Nation and 
Inuit. This is only one option that countries have pursued to meet the need of
marginalised populations. The alternatives they proposed are itemized in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2, Service delivery models and examples (adapted from Healy & McKee 2003b)
Service delivery 
models
Principles Examples
Mainstream
(collective)
Services available to everyone without specific 
provisions being made for specific populations.
Multicultural health care in 
Britain
Refugees in Sweden
Integrationist Specific provisions made to ensure that 
accessibility to mainstream services can be 
extended to specific populations with 
recognised greater needs.
The poor in Britain
Participatory Services within mainstream health care system 
that offer avenues for particular groups to have 
more say in policy-making and management.
M3ori in New Zealand
Alternative Services that exist in addition to mainstream 
services, providing an alternative that is 
intended to be more responsive.
ATSI Australians
Parallel
services
Services that exist as substitute to mainstream 
services, and that cater exclusively to the need 
of a defined constituency.
Native Americans 
Canadian First Nations 
ATSI Australians 
Maori in New Zealand
A gradient is apparent in the Table above. As one moves from mainstream to 
integrationist, through participatory, alternative and finally parallel services. 
Accommodating differences may require significant investment. The shift to separate or 
alternative services may also require some trade-offs. Healy and McKee identify both 
advantages and disadvantages to separate services. This is summarised in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3, Advantages and disadvantages of separate services (Healy & McKee 2003b) j
Advantages Disadvantages
Self-determination Undermining of social solidarity
More control Less state responsibility, vulnerability of 
funding
Greater consumer choice More limited choice of scope and scale
Better access for some Limited availability to whole population group
Greater quality in terms of responsiveness Possibly worse quality in terms of clinical 
effectiveness
Better targeted services Higher cost to state
Higher political profile Greater stigma
Participatory, alternative and parallel services provide opportunities for 
increased participation. For the past thirty years, community participation has played a 
major role in the international discourse on public health and primary health care. In
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May 1973, the World Health Organisation's 26th Assembly in Geneva drew attention to 
the cost and ineffectiveness of on-going health care intervention, leading 
WHO/UNICEF to recommend a new strategy, based on primary health care, which 
entailed:
providing the populations with easily accessible health services that are simple and
effective as regards to cost, techniques and organization (Berthet 1979, p. 34),
Community participation constitutes the very core of the primary health care concept. 
Many have also noted that this commitment is largely based on a number of 
problematic assumptions. First, it assumes a finite and defined community, imagined 
as a coherent, harmonious and/or natural whole.18 Drawing extensively from Cohen 
(1985), Jewkes and Murcott (1996) suggest that the term is at times defined in 
aggregational terms, as a geographically located entity, and sometimes in relational 
terms, meaning in relation to the “other" or “outsiders". The debates echo concerns 
raised in the context of self-determination. The boundaries are fuzzy and defined 
symbolically as well as geographically, linguistically or politically.19 The Alma-Ata did 
not include an explicit definition of a community. Implicitly, community was presented 
as,
a locality-bound aggregation of people who share economic, socio-cultural and political 
characteristics, as well as problems and needs. A community was assumed to be a 
coherent unit, whose members could operate together for shared purposes, for example 
expressing their health needs and planning services (Jewkes & Murcott 1996, p. 558).
The Ottawa Charter further developed this concept to include the hierarchy of
individual, family, community and country (World Health Organisation 1986). Their
empirical investigation of the concept of community showed a plurality of meanings
being juggled simultaneously (Jewkes & Murcott 1996). They noted that “members"
tended to define community in relational terms.
Second, governments seek participation for different purposes. Rifkin (1996)
identifies that the literature generally cites two frames of reference allegedly used by
health planners and managers.
18 See Anderson (1991) for a critical analysis of the concept.
19 For example, who is and who is not indigenous is an interesting question. The terms of 
inclusion and exclusion are alternatively been defined on the basis of genetic, race, ethnicity or 
culture. Lately, relational terms have been validated in Australia: an ATSI person is one 
recognised as such by other ATSI peoples. Maori are able to self-identify. First Nations may 
also do the same, but the bureaucratic construct of “Indian" to which is attached some individual 
and Treaty benefits, is closely guarded by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada’s Registry. The "Indian status" is inherited based on the status of parents, and can 
become diluted and indeed extinguished based on mixed ancestry (Lavoie 2003b). It is not 
necessarily a fair proxy for cultural affiliation, language use or health care need.
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Target-oriented frame: Health planners may decide on program objectives, and 
then attempt to convince community people to actively accept these objectives; or
• Empowerment frame: Community people may be encouraged to make decisions 
about resource allocation and priorities.
She suggests that neither have produced the anticipated magic bullet because they 
construct participation as “linear, causal and contributing to a system which is viewed 
as the sum of all its parts" (Rifkin 1996, p. 86). Following Uphoff (1992), she proposes 
a combined frame of reference which implies a continued dialogue between community 
and planners.
Finally, others have argued that the relationship between community, 
representation and participation is not well defined. Abelson et al (1995) showed that 
community members’ willingness to take responsibility in health care decisions varied 
considerably. Community members tended to differ to traditional decision makers such 
as elected officials, experts and the provincial government on contentious decision, but 
remained willing to play a consultative role. In a subsequent study reporting four case 
studies, Abelson (2001) differentiates between styles of participation, friendly and 
informal as opposed to highly organised and sophisticated, depending on the socio­
economic characteristics of the community. She shows that institutions are more 
receptive to participation that is sought and that operates following a carefully defined 
script. She also reflects that formal engagement is more likely to occur in communities 
of higher socio-economic status. Some authors have argued that in fact, the rhetoric of 
community participation became a pillar of the new strategy because it satisfied 
political-ideological needs informed by "bourgeois principles of self-reliance and 
individual responsibility" (Morgan 1990, p. 212). It presumed democracy, while 
allowing governments to reach out and extend their control over their rural country.
The rhetoric of participation can be a convenient way for a government to perpetuate 
the illusion of democracy, while large segments of the population are systematically 
denied access to the political process. This is not to say that government elites 
conspire to deceive their constituents, but the competing agendas of different social 
classes often result in policies that enhance elites' control (Morgan 1990, p. 212). ;
Aside from individual participation through employment, what participation
means in the Canadian context is a matter of perspective. First Nations’ participation in
non-indigenous organisations, whether governmental, private or voluntary, is generally
associated with reserved seats on the board of directors or advisory/consumer
committees. Appointments to these seats may dovetail with indigenous processes of
governance, thereby ensuring that appointees can speak to their constituency's
interest. Alternatively, appointments to these seats may come directly from the
Minister, and by-pass tribal/community governance structures. In either case, individual
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First Nation representatives often find themselves caught in between their commitment 
to representing their own community, while being asked to participate as an individual 
in decision-making process where a variety of interests are to be balanced. The tension 
is between representation of the collective through the individual, versus representation 
as an individual with specific experience to contribute. This logic appears nebulous to 
many, leading to frustration that indigenous representatives cannot be found, remain 
silent at meetings, or retain their allegiances and advocate for their community/tribe 
rather than as an agent of the Board. The clash is at the level of governance and 
representation, and is central to perceptions of fairness (Azzi 1993, Azzi & Jost 1997).
The second model of community participation is through the establishment of 
separate organisations and services. This process implies the establishment or the 
validation of an organisation that is owned and managed by indigenous people with 
self-defined governance mechanisms. A core motivation for pursuing separate services 
is the need to secure control over decision-making processes, and to ensure that 
culturally appropriate decision-making protocols are observed both in intra-community 
affairs and in relation to government.
2.1.5 Summary
Three main points can be drawn from the above discussion. First, indigenous 
people define their identity in collective terms and claim the right to exist as distinct 
cultures or nations at the local or tribal level. This position is supported by Treaties and 
international covenants, but is also promoted for other reasons. Whether at the 2000 
Sydney Olympics or a visit by British Royalty of the MSori Queen Dame Te 
Atairangikaahu Te Arikinui,20 the importance and distinctiveness of the indigenous 
populations of Australia and New Zealand are now more than ever recognised and 
highlighted.
Second, the concept of self-determination underlines aspirations for equitable 
collective processes of participation that go beyond a simple implementation of pre­
defined programs and encompasses instead participation at all levels of decision­
making. Implementing self-determination however is a complex matter. A localised or 
tribal-based version of self-determination limits powers and risks further marginalizing 
indigenous people living in urban areas or those unable to reconnect their indigeneity 
to a local group or community. National approaches to self-determination will gloss 
over local cultural differences and perhaps more importantly, local governance
20 Dame Te Atairangikaahu Te Arikinui is broadly recognised as Queen of the Tainui tribe. Her 
legitimacy as the Queen of the collective Mâori is contentious.
structures. There is no consensus on how to define self-determination and how to 
implement it in practice.
Third, aspirations for culture-specific participation create discomfort in countries 
where the provision of health care services is largely seen as a governmental 
responsibility, and where a dominant liberal ideology collides with the idea of 
differentiated citizenship. At the governmental and popular levels, the focus on 
indigenous participation in health can be confused with arguments in favour of 
indigenous people having preferential, thereby inequitable, access to and control over 
health resources and decision-making processes. There is no consensus on the 
appropriate or optimal level of participation required to ensure that marginalized 
population have access to the services they require.
The tensions explored above are reflected in debates surrounding indigenous 
health policy formulation. Once policies are formulated, indigenous people largely 
depend on government’s goodwill to oversee and monitor implementation, in order to 
ensure that the stated goals are being achieved. Canadian and Australian indigenous 
populations both account for between 2 to 3 per cent of the national population and as 
such, cannot hope to secure a voice through the democratic process alone. In contrast, 
Maori constitute nearly 15 per cent of population of New Zealand, and to some extent, 
can hope to protect their interest through the Parliamentary system.
2.2 From policy formulation to practice
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate how governments balance out 
the ideal of indigenous self-determination with other pressures, such as current trends 
in public administration and accountability, pressures on the health care system, issues 
of and sensitivities around minority rights, equity in health and cost-efficiency. The 
above debates provide a necessary backdrop.
Policy analysis is a well-established field of inquiry. Walt (1988) differentiates 
between two types of policy. High politics policies, otherwise known as macro or 
systemic policies, are generated by national or state governments, and include broad- 
based reforms or regulation of health services. Macro-policy formulation is generally 
highly influenced by political context. Low politics policies, also known as sectorial or 
micro-policies, are generated closer to the ground. They may be offsprings of local 
governments or hospitals, and deal with the implementation of programs The policies 
explored in this research are considered macro or systemic policies, mainly because 
they address issues that remain controversial in all three countries: the relationship 
between the nation-state and its minority indigenous constituency. This section focuses
44
largely on the context and process of policy formulation and its relationship to 
processes of implementation.
The literature on health policy analysis took a turn in the late 1980s, from a 
focus on the technical content of policies to the investigation of the role of actors in 
policy development. Many authors have highlighted the importance of key actors in 
influencing or determining the process of policy formulation and implementation. For 
example, Grindle & Thomas analysed twelve processes of policy and institutional 
reforms in developing countries (Grindle & Thomas 1991). Their analysis highlights the 
role of policy elites in shaping and directing formulation and implementation of macro­
policies. Walt (1988) and Walt & Gilson (1994) have argued that actors are at the 
centre of the policy process influencing the choice of policies and the values they 
reflect, while reflecting the context of policy formulation (historical, political, economic 
and sociocultural). They offer the framework shown in Figure 2.2 and suggest that 
technical considerations may be superseded by political considerations (see also 
Carlisle 2001, Davis & Howden-Chapman 1996).
Figure 2.2, Policy implementation, cponceptual framework
Context
highlighted in this thesis. Just as in any text, policy documents are textual constructions 
imbedded in a historical, political and social context. It is therefore not surprising to find 
that the language and content of policy documents may be more likely to reflect the 
need to mediate the political landscape than to truly outline how policy statements and 
objectives are translated into practice. Apthorpe writes,
Policy language... is itself a form and source of policy power. Policy discourse tries 
more to persuade than describe; genre and style are integral to policy paradigms, not 
adornments to be dispensed with if  they do not please. It Is not through its language
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alone that the general nature (if there is any such thing) of policy or a policy analysis 
can or ought to be comprehended (1997).
The formulation of macro-policies and the processes of implementation are likely to 
involve different actors, and reflect different agenda.
Policy statements and the debates they generate are important areas of inquiry, 
but it is in the implementation processes that they really take their full meaning. While 
the content of the policy may not change, the understanding of what this content 
means in terms of implementation may very well shift across actors and over time. Walt 
states,
Policy making is interactive, with formulation and implementation two elements of a 
continuous loop, and both as political as the other (Walt 1988, p. 156-57).
Drawing from Hogwood and Gunn (1984), Walt draws a list of ten characteristics of
perfect policy implementation:
• The circumstances external to the agency do not impose crippling constraints;
• Adequate time and sufficient resources are available;
• The required combination of resource is available;
• Policy is based on a valid theory of cause and effect;
• The relationship between cause and effect is direct;
• Dependency relationships are minimal;
• There is an understanding of, and agreement on, objectives;
• Tasks are fully specified in correct sequence; '
• Communication and coordination must be perfect; and
• Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance.
She cautions that these characteristics are useful mostly as a checklist. Few policy 
implementation processes meet these requirements. Further, it is unlikely that systemic 
policies can match these standards, because they typically are broad-based, complex, 
implemented over a long period of time and involve a large number of stakeholders 
with varying levels of commitment and understanding.
In their attempt to develop a conceptual framework for policy implementation, 
Van Meter et al (1975) review three large bodies of literature, spanning organisational 
theory, the impact of public policy and selected studies on intergovernmental relations. 
As others have done (Nicholson 1994, Shore & Wright 1997, Walt 1988), they readily 
challenge the classic Weberian legal-rational model that holds policy implementation to 
be a linear process where subordinates faithfully implement the decisions of their
46
superiors (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975). They suggest instead that policy 
implementation is greatly influenced by the bureaucracy tasked with implementation. 
They highlight two factors: the amount of change involved and the extent to which there 
is goal consensus among participants in the implementation process. Atkinson’s 
research on the decentralisation of health system management in northeast Brazil 
shows that informal constraints such local political culture, management style, 
commitment and continuity of staff, source of funds, use of information impact the 
implementation of decentralisation policies. In other words, the context of policy 
implementation influences a great deal the process, extent and outcome of policy 
implementation (Atkinson et al 2000, Atkinson 2002). She concludes that formal 
reforms are invariably renegotiated by the political culture in existence at the 
implementation level. While policy formulation may include perspectives and 
accommodate influences situated outside the bureaucracy (Grindle & Thomas 1991), 
cycles of implementation more closely reflect the context in which policies must 
integrate themselves. The two processes are not necessarily closely linked.
In summary, and according to the literature, the processes of policy formulation 
and of implementation are subject to different pressures, some contextual and some 
related to actors involved. Policy implementation is more likely to align with the original 
intent of the policy where,
• The policy is evidenced-based and there is consensus on the objectives, and cause 
and effect;
• The policy requires a limited amount of change;
• External circumstances do not collide with the realisation of the initial intent of the 
policy;
• Resources remain available; and
• Policy makers retain a great deal of control over the implementation process.
The following section reviews the context and process of First Nation health 
policy formulation in Canada. As will be shown, the policy formulation process was 
borne out of divergent perspectives, pressures exercised by First Nations for increased 
engagement in matters that affect them, and decisions accepted within the Federal 
government to various degree. The level of consensus was and remains poor. First 
Nations’ Interest in the policy has revolved around its potential as an avenue to recover 
control over policy decisions that affect their every day lives. In contrast, government 
actors have had to balance this consideration with matters of public administration, 
health services delivery and personal values, in a manner that remains palatable to the 
Canadian electorate. As a result, implementation has shifted considerably over time.
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2.2.1 The Health Transfer Policy
In the Canadian context, the Constitutional Act o f 1867 defined health care as 
a provincial jurisdiction and Indian affairs as a federal jurisdiction, thereby beginning a 
jurisdictional debate over Indian health that remains current over one hundred years 
later. The Canadian health care system is a publicly financed, publicly administered, 
and at least partially privately delivered national health care system. This has been the 
case since the early nineteen-seventies. As shown in Figure 2.3, primary, secondary 
and tertiary care is entirely funded through progressive income tax garnered at the 
provincial and federal levels. Poorer provinces benefit from equalisation payments 
generated from taxation revenue.
Figure 2.3: Canadian Health Care Financing
Taxes
Municipal 
Governments
Health
Services
Transfer
Taxes
Provincial
Transfer Governments
Individuals
Premiums Premiums
Employers -----------------
Private
Insurers
Additional Health Benefits
Insured Health Benefits__________________________^  Providers:
Hospitals, Other 
institutions,
Health Physicians.
Workers’ Services Other Health
Compensation ---------------- ► Professionals
Board
Non-Insured Health Benefits
Out of Pocket Non-Insured Health Benefits
All off-reserve services are the responsibility of the provinces. Public health, 
primary, secondary and tertiary health care services can be accessed at no direct cost 
to the individual,21 via Medicare, the publicly funded health insurance scheme (Health 
Canada 1999b). Further, the Canada Health Act 1984 guarantees “reasonable access" 
for all Canadians, including the indigenous population. This promise can be 
challenging, given the sparse population and geographical spread.
The original impetus for the development of health services for First Nations 
came from the settlers who arrived at the turn of the century to farm the land. They 
found themselves neighbouring Indian reserves where appalling health conditions
21 Co-payments and access fees were made illegal in 1984.
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prevailed. It was the fear of epidemics, mostly tuberculosis, that led the federal 
government to invest funding in health services, with the hiring of a General Medical 
Superintendent in 1904 and a mobile nurse visitor program in 1922 (Maundrell 1942). 
The first federally funded on-reserve nursing station was set up at Fisher River, 
Manitoba in 1930. The formation of the Department of National Health and Welfare in 
1944 led to the establishment of the Indian Health Branch, and a sustained expansion 
of health services to First Nations (Waldram et al 1995). Currently, nearly all First 
Nation reserves have access to services delivered by a health centre located on- 
reserve.22 These facilities offer public health and treatment services, delivered by 
nurse-practitioners and local Community Health Representatives (CHRs). Other 
services include addiction counselling and transportation. Physicians funded by the 
province visit these communities on a regular basis. Patients requiring secondary or 
tertiary care in between visits or in emergency situations are transported to the nearest 
referral centre, which is under provincial jurisdiction.23 Thus, on-reserve primary health 
care services have always been parallel services to off-reserve primary health care 
services, largely for historical reasons.
The Health Transfer Policy was announced in 1986. Its goal was to allow on- 
reserve First Nation governance structures to take over the planning and delivery of 
existing on-reserve services, with funding from the federal government. The 
emergence of the Health Transfer Policy is linked to a series of events that reshaped 
relations between First Nations and the nation-state. One of the events that may have 
acted as a catalyst was the Hawthorn Report (1966), the first comprehensive survey of 
on-reserve social and economic conditions that emphasised the dismal living 
conditions on Indian reserves, and recommended a shift from care taking and 
management to economic development. The Hawthorn Report was followed by a 
study of health services accessible to Canadian Indians completed by Booz*Allen & 
Hamilton Canada Ltd (1969). They noted that:
1. The federal-provincial responsibilities in matters of Indian health and health related 
services had not been fully clarified. It emphasised the need for clarification in the 
areas of environmental and economic conditions, medical and dental treatment, 
and public health education;
2. The Indian health programs delivered on reserve were broad in scope, but failed to 
involve Indians in the planning and evaluation of programs. They also emphasised 
the need for prevention. And;
22 On reserve funding is the exclusive or nearly exclusive domain of the federal 
government,
23 See Waldram for a more extensive discussion of the system (1995).
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3. The shortage of highly trained health professionals hampered [Health Canada] 
services.
They recommended the development of programs to address priorities in service 
delivery, the recognition of Treaty Rights, a clarification of federal-provincial jurisdiction, 
and increased participation of First Nation in health service delivery with emphasis on 
public health.
The Trudeau liberal government was elected in 1968, having fought a campaign 
couched in liberal ideology under the slogan The Just Society, which advocated for 
equality and human rights on an individual basis. The Trudeau government’s position 
on Indian affairs was articulated in what became known as the 1969 “White Paper,” 
calling for the repeal of the Indian Act, the dismantling of the Department of Indian 
Affairs, the elimination of the Indian reserve system and the inclusion of First Nation 
people in fabric of Canadian society on an individual basis (Government of Canada 
1969). This proposal was met with strong opposition from First Nations, eventually 
leading to the formation of the National Indian Brotherhood (now the Assembly of First 
Nations) and the withdrawal of the White Paper (Weaver 1981). Thus the historical 
jurisdictional divide was retained and later reaffirmed in the Constitutional revisions of 
1982.
The mobilisation of the nineteen-sixties and the formation of the National Indian 
Brotherhood (now the Assembly of First Nations) led to numerous debates over “the 
Indian problem” between the federal government and First Nations. This eventually 
resulted in the formulation of the Indian Health Policy, tabled on September 19, 1979 
(Crombie 1979). The policy was a two page document that could be best portrayed as 
a statement of values with one broad based objective:
the goal of Federal Indian Health Policy is to achieve an increasing level of health in 
Indian communities, generated and maintained by the Indian communities themselves 
(Health Canada 2000a).
The policy, which is still in place today, builds on three pillars:
The first, and most significant, is community development, both socio-economic 
development and cultural and spiritual development, to remove the conditions of 
poverty and apathy which prevent the members of the community from achieving a 
state of physical, mental and social well-being.
The second pillar is the traditional relationship of the Indian people to the Federal 
Government, in which the Federal Government serves as advocate of the interests of 
Indian communities to the larger Canadian society and its Institutions, and promotes the 
capacity of Indian communities to achieve their aspirations.
The third pillar is the Canadian health system. This system is one of specialized and 
interrelated elements, which may be the responsibility of Federal, Provincial or 
Municipal Governments, Indian bands, or the private sector. But these divisions are 
superficial in the light of the health system as a whole. The most significant federal roles 
in this interdependent system are in public health activities on reserves, health 
promotion, and the detection and mitigation o f hazards to health in the environment.
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The most significant Provincial and private roles are in the diagnosis and treatment of 
acute and chronic disease and in the rehabilitation of the sick. Indian communities have 
a significant role to play in health promotion, and in the adaptation of health services 
delivery to the specific needs of their community. Of course, this does not exhaust the 
many complexities of the system. The Federal Government is committed to maintaining 
an active role in the Canadian health system as it affects Indians. It is committed to 
promoting the capacity of Indian communities to play an active, more positive role in the 
health system and in decisions affecting their health (Health Canada 2000a).
The policy made no distinction between First Nations living on and off-reserve.
The policy formulation process The Indian Health Policy did not lead to the
formulation of an implementation strategy with short, medium and long term objectives,
either under the Conservative or the subsequent Liberal governments. The adoption of
the Indian Health Policy was followed three months later by the release of an Indian
Health Discussion Paper that presented the results of a study on Indian Health
Services conducted by the Indian Health branch of Health Canada (then called the
Medical Services Branch or MSB), which made four broad recommendations:
• The achievement of effective communication between Indian people and National 
Health and Welfare through the development of mutually acceptable 
communication strategies;
• Sharply increased efforts to reduce environmentally related disease and to promote 
a health social environment on Indian reserves;
• The achievement of self-determination in the health field by Indian communities; 
and
• The encouragement of community development through the creation of a National 
Institute of Indian Health and Social Development.
The paper spoke to a number of issues, notably the transfer of existing health services 
to Indian communities (National Health and Welfare 1979). By May 1981, the national 
Health Minister tabled a document exploring the possibility and complexities of 
transferring existing services to First Nations (Bégin 1981). By 1982, the Community 
Health Demonstration Program was in place to allow First Nations to experiment with 
different models of community based service delivery (Garro et al 1986).24 Thus, 
implementing the Indian Health Policy became equated with the transfer of on-reserve 
services to First Nations. As a result, plans to deal with off-reserve services, and 
services to Métis, virtually disappeared from the national agenda.
Alongside the demonstration program, MSB established two Sub-Committees in 
March 1985, a first on Community Health and a second on the Transfer of Health 
Services.The Sub-Committee on Community Health's mandate was
24 Only 31 of such projects were funded, and only for two years. Only seven dealt with 
issues of governance and local priority setting in health (Garro et al 1986, p. 282).
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“to formulate preferred options for the implementation of appropriate strategies for 
supporting Indian/lnuit communities to optimise their health status recognizing the 
objective of Indian/lnuit control of health services" (Health and Welfare Canada (MSB) 
1986a).
The report supported a shift from MSB being the sole provider of services to MSB 
becoming a funding and development Branch “that supports Indian Bands in their 
operation of their own services” (Health and Welfare Canada (MSB) 1986a). The report 
recommended,
• The need for multi-year agreements;
• The use of aggregated First Nation and Inuit community health plan as the basis for 
regional and national planning;
• The removal of program-specific restrictions so as to permit the aggregation of 
resources in the communities; and
• A refocus of the role of MSB in the context of the progressive control of Indian 
Health Services by the Indian people.
The Sub-Committee on the Transfer of Health Programs to Indian Controfs 
mandate was to propose policy options for the control and provision of health services 
by Indian people. The report recommended a developmental approach to health 
transfer. Funding of existing services was expected to come from existing funds. The 
committee also recommended annual adjustments for price and other relevant cost 
factors to be included in transfer agreements (Health and Welfare Canada (MSB) 
1986b). The vision of the committee was a balance between flexibility in community 
allocating resources in locally defined priority areas and the respect of nationally 
defined minimum program requirements in key areas such as immunization, 
communicable disease control, environmental health and curative services.
The objectives of transfer and administrative intricacies were outlined in the 
Health Program Transfer Handbook, a first version of which was made public in 
September 1987 in anticipation for the November 1987 conference (Assembly of First 
Nations 1987). The transfer process was presented as entirely voluntary and 
progressive. Under the Health Transfer Policy, First Nations and Inuit were 
encouraged to apply for funding for the first stage, the Pre-Transfer study, where 
communities were expected to engage in a community-based needs assessment 
leading to a community health plan. The second phase was that of negotiations with 
Health Canada. The third phase was implementation. Here contracts may be signed 
for three or five years depending on the First Nation’s previous experience with 
program administration. The agreements allowed for the retention of surpluses and 
budgetary line flexibility in order to promote local priority setting and responsiveness.
It is difficult to estimate to what extent the National Indian Health Transfer 
Conference helped shape the subsequent submission to the Treasury Board which 
was required for Health Canada to secure the transfer of authority to enter into 
contracts with First Nations. The process was already well underway, with 279 Indian 
communities located in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia and Québec 
engaged in pre-transfer activities as early as 1988 (Health and Welfare Canada 1988). 
The first agreement was signed in Montreal Lake Saskatchewan in 1988, apparently in 
anticipation of the Treasury Board’s approval. As Bird and Moore relate, the signing of 
an agreement with the Montreal Lake Band was delayed because of the lack of tools, 
including formulae for financial allocation and sample contracts (Bird & Moore 1991). 
Health Canada’s submission to Treasury was eventually approved (National Health 
and Welfare & Treasury Board of Canada 1989), and Regional Directors advised of the 
transfer initiative’s approval in June 1989 (Nicholson 1989).
According to the Treasury Board submission, the Health Transfer Policy had 
three broad objectives:
To enable Indian Bands to design health programs, establish services and allocate 
funds according to community health priorities.
To strengthen and enhance the accountability of Indian Bands to Band members. And,
To ensure public health and safety is maintained through adherence to mandatory 
programs (National Health and Welfare & Treasury Board of Canada 1989).
The submission also stated that,
The Health transfer initiative is consistent with self-government... and serves to 
reinforced federal policy to increase Indian control of programs for Indian people 
(National Health and Welfare & Treasury Board of Canada 1989).
As was the case for the Indian Health Policy, the Health Transfer Policy was and
remains defined in a two page document that most closely resembles a statement of
intent.
The Health Transfer Policy envisioned the transfer of existing community-based 
and regional services to a single commumty/Band or a group mandated by 
communities/Bands (Health and Welfare Canada 1989). The majority of transfers has 
occurred in single communities that range from less than 200 to 10,000 residents, with 
the average being around 500 (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2004b). The 
services targeted for transfer included community-based basis, including nursing, 
Community Health Representatives and addiction counselling. Communities were also 
offered to take on zone or regional services on a pro-rated services, including: nutrition, 
health education, dental services provided by dental therapists (where provinces 
recognise and license dental therapists), Environmental Health and professional 
supervision for health professionals. The transfer of these positions meant the attrition
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of employment opportunities with the federal government, and the transfer of these 
opportunities to First Nation employers. The onus was placed on smaller communities 
to demonstrate that zone and regional services could be provided based on the funding 
allocated (which at times amounted to as little as 0.014 of a person year) (Lavoie et al 
2004).
All services chosen by the community were block funded under a single flexible 
agreement for a period of three to five years. Although mandatory public health and 
safety programs (i.e., immunization, communicable disease control, etc.) were to be 
delivered based on pre-established albeit only loosely defined standards, all other 
services were to be based on a Community Health Plan targeting local priorities with 
locally defined programs.
As of December 2000, Health Canada reports that 67 percent of eligible First 
Nations have taken over the administration of their health services and that another 14 
percent are engaged in pre-transfer discussions (Health Canada 1999a, 2000b). 
Sixteen years after it was first announced, it is obvious that the policy has had some 
relevance in meeting indigenous communities’ aspirations. The implementation of the 
policy has however shifted over time for a number of reasons.
Implementing transfer By 1994, a federal priority shift towards balancing the 
national budget and debt reduction seriously began to limit access to implementation 
resources. As shown in Table 2.4, new programs introduced since 1994 have been 
outside the scope of the health transfer. They are instead funded through yearly 
contribution agreements. This shows a shift in perspective within the federal 
government. Many new programs are nation-wide and under the stewardship of Health 
Canada program officers that work outside the First Nation and Inuit Health Branch. 
The resistance to move programs within the First Nation-specific branch may show 
discomfort with the reality of separate services and with the initial commitment to 
flexible services and its associated loss of government control. Perhaps more 
importantly, it is apparent that the federal government is increasingly unwilling to 
allocate significant funding for First Nation health services, and rather prefers or 
perhaps finds it easier to justify allocating public funding to proposal-driven targeted 
programs designed to address nationally-defined priorities. It is noteworthy that the 
funding provided to transferred communities has not keep up with population growth,* 
price increases and inflation (Lavoie et al 2004).
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iTable 2.4, Programs and Transferability (Health Canada 2003) |
¡ ’PROGRAM NAME
Addictions
Alcohol and drug - Community-Based ogram
.Solvent Abuse Program
.Tobacco Control Strategy
Children
Aboriginal Head Start On-Reserve
Canada Prenatal Nutrition Program
FAS/FAE Initiative
Chronic diseases
Aboriginal Diabetes Initiative 
Communicable diseases
Communicable Disease Control
HIV/AIDS Strategy
Tuberculosis Elimination Strategy
Community Health Services
Brighter Futures
Building Healthy Communities
Community Health Prevention & Promotion 
Community Health Primary Care __ 
Community Nutrition
|Dental/Oral Health Strategy________ _
|:Home and Community Care Program 
^Environmental Health
Ëironmental Health Programironmental Contaminants Program
n i l . Created in Transferable
-  -4 ......-
1984 yes
..............  ..............I 1994 yes
I 2001 .......................................................
T 1998
---,.. --------
j 1994 yes
I 1999
2000 ....F ~ ~ " ..................
j
1979 yes
n . .  . . . 1997
1992
— — ----- ---------
" " i ....... 1993 yes
.........i ........_
1994 yes
1979 yes
t 1979 yes
i1
.... 4 - ..
1979 yes
1997 j
1999 Under review
1979 . [ . yes ;
1 1990
In 1997, a report from the Auditor General of Canada (1997) severely criticised 
Health Canada’s lack of follow up to ensure accountability by First Nations under 
transfer. This report has also contributed to invalidate the vision of a total transfer of all 
responsibilities for health services to First Nations (Health Canada (MSB) 1995), and 
instead promotes a reinvestment in government-based human resources tasked with 
the close monitoring and auditing of First Nation organisations. As a result, the 
reporting requirements have multiplied to an extent that is now deemed excessive, 
expensive and counterproductive by the same Auditor General (Auditor General of 
Canada 2002). She was quoted in newspapers stating:
"There is not much point in first nations [sic] exchanging data for dollars with the federal 
government when the information is of no real benefit to either party (Auditor General 
Sheila Fraser, cited in Kruzenga 2002).
From a national perspective, the reporting burden yields around 20,000 paper-based 
reports focusing on financial reporting of program-specific expenditures, activity 
reports, and some limited public health/service delivery indicators. The focus of the 
reporting system has been on government administrative officers monitoring individual
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agreements, rather than on collecting information to ensure an oversight of the overall 
performance of the system. The system as it stands does not have the resources to 
collate the information submitted to produce an overall performance report (Lavoie et al 
2004).
For the past decade, Health Canada has had to periodically approach Treasury 
Board to secure additional funding to cover the increased cost of services it continues 
to provide. These costs are associated with population growth, inflation, additional 
demands for services associated with improved responsiveness, the increased 
dependency on costly computerised systems with a short life span, the sharp increase 
in liability insurance that resulted from 9/11, etc. Requests have not always been 
successful and communities that have taken transfer have seen their budgets frozen in 
light of growing costs. This lack of support, political pressures by First Nations, the very 
public Auditor General of Canada’s flip-flop on reporting and accountability, as well as 
a shift in government, have to some extent eroded the government’s commitment to 
the initial vision. A new policy statement is expected in 2005. While Health Canada is 
unlikely to go backward and deploy government human resources to provide direct 
services to communities as it did before the Health Transfer Policy, it is unclear 
whether the historical commitment to flexibility and local responsiveness may be 
renewed, or replaced by prescriptive programs that may be evidence-based at a 
national level.
2.2.2 Summary
The Canadian example explored above echoes findings from the literature. The 
Canadian policy formulation environment bears the mark of the First Nations’ advocacy 
processes of the 1970s. This culminated in the formulation of the broad-based Indian 
Health Policy, which spoke of improving the responsiveness of the overall health care 
system. In contrast, the subsequent pruning of this policy to a focus on the less 
controversial on-reserve services likely reflects provincial reactions to a federal policy 
encroaching on their jurisdiction. It also shows a shift within the federal government in 
the manner in which self-government is spoken of.
Further, although the objectives of the Health Transfer Policy remain 
unchanged on paper, the way in which the policy has been implemented has changed 
as a result of shifting understanding and outside pressures. To draw from criteria 
discussed above:
• Consensus on objectives and theory of cause and effect The policy was based 
on a debated theory of cause and effect, where causality between participation and 
improved health could not be demonstrated. There never was a consensus
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between First Nations and Health Canada as to the scope and purpose of the 
policy.
• Amount of change The policy required a substantial amount of change, including 
the elimination of employment opportunities within the government, and the 
relocation of these opportunities to First Nation employers.
• Availability of resources, external pressures and continued commitment The
early 1990s’ shift towards cost containment impacted the sustainability of the policy. 
Public criticisms by First Nations and by the Auditor General as to the management 
of accountability further eroded the bureaucratic commitment to the policy.
• Policy makers’ control over the implementation process The implementation of 
the Health Transfer Policy occurred at the regional level, where employees have a 
long established and closer relationship with First Nations than Ottawa-based policy 
writers. Maintaining these relationships, the complexity of the First Nation 
environment and political pressures cumulated in compromises. Over time and 
through increased participation in service delivery, First Nations have gained a 
stronger voice at the national and regional level, leading to some shifts in power. 
This, coupled with pressures from Cabinet and the Auditor General, have 
contributed to shifting the objectives of the policy towards vertical strategies to re­
establish a higher level of government control.
As a result, the implementation of the policy has diverged from its initial focus on 
financing on-reserve services in a flexible manner to ensure local responsiveness, to 
the funding of pre-defined programs designed to address national priorities and 
accessible mainly through proposal writing. In the Canadian context, the divergence 
from policy to implementation could have been predicted, at least to some extent, 
based on the literature.
The above discussion and review of literature'suggests that, where macro­
policies are concerned, formulation and implementation are subject to different 
pressures and may diverge, depending on the level of consensus that existed at the 
time of formulation and competing pressures colliding with the implementation of the 
policy over time. Tracking changes made to policy in the process of implementation 
can provide insight on context and levels of commitments. It is however an imprecise 
reflection of what may be occurring in practice. The next section will explore an 
analytical avenue to map out policy implementation from the perspective of practice.
2.3 Options in health care contracting
Health care systems being complex systems, decision-making is amenable to 
fragmentation into components to be managed by different levels of authority. The 
Health Transfer Policy is simply an example of this. A commitment has first to be made 
by a government to endorse some measure of indigenous self-determination, and to 
allow for an expression of this principle in health care. Then, policy makers are left to
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make choices as to how, in what context and to what extent will indigenous 
participation in decision-making and service delivery be implemented.
The options exercised under the Health Transfer Policy are possibilities among 
a range of other possibilities. This section explores the literature on health care 
decentralisation, on the role of the third or non-profit sector, and on contracting in 
health and accountability. The objective of this section is. to develop an analytical 
framework for exploring the opportunities and contingencies generated by the 
indigenous contractual environment.
2.3.1 Decentralisation
Decentralisation is best understood as a movement of responsibilities between 
different organisations. As shown in Table 2.5, Mills et al (1990) identifies four types of 
decentralisation: déconcentration, devolution, delegation and privatisation. 
Déconcentration refers to the régionalisation of administrative functions without a 
significant transfer of autonomy. It implies a shift of responsibility within an existing and 
presumably governmental authority. Devolution involves a transfer of administrative 
functions coupled with a régionalisation of some decision-making power. Again, 
devolution is expected to result in a shift of power within an existing and presumably 
governmental authority. Delegation implies a transfer of responsibilities to an arm- 
length organisation with some level of autonomy. Privatisation relates to the transfer of 
responsibilities to independent and politically autonomous organisations.
Table 2.5, Models of Decentralisation (Mills et al 1990)
Deconcentration Devolution Delegation Privatisation
Operational
Definition
Administrative
decentralisation
Political
decentralisation
Transfer of specific 
functions to a 
commission or 
corporation
Transfer of 
functions to private 
and voluntary 
agencies
Potential
Advantages
Some local 
discretion, removal 
of pressure on the 
centre
Sensitivity to local 
issues, greater 
coordination of 
services
Greater flexibility in 
the management of 
these functions; 
some political 
independence
Greater flexibility 
and political w 
independence
Potential
Disadvantages
Lack of
coordination and of 
sensitivity to local 
needs
Central funding 
necessary in high- 
cost health 
services, and 
hence central 
control
Lack of
coordination with 
other departments 
and agencies
Need for regulation 
and control 
mechanisms
This typology reflects ideal types. Many have noted that is focuses on who receives 
new decision-making authority and does not really provide an analytical tool to explore 
how decentralisation operates in practice (Mills et al 2002, Fielder & Suazo 2002,
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Wang et al 2002, Bossert et al 2003a). In the case of First Nations, indigenous 
organisations are politically independent organisations that nevertheless depend on 
public funding. Conceptually, they straddle categories as they generally function as 
private organisations in terms of processes of decision-making. Their decision-making 
is nevertheless highly constrained by the conditions related to access to public funding.
The complexity of the First Nation situation is not unique and poses specific 
methodological challenges mainly because, in this case, decentralisation is 
implemented through a contractual environment. In the context of this study, it is more 
useful to look at models of decentralisation from the point of view of how they operate 
in key sectors of decision-making. Table 2.6 shows a framework developed by Bossert 
(1998). This framework focuses on the level of decision-making power (space) and 
autonomy an organisation can exercise in the key areas of financing, service 
organisation, human resources and governance. These areas relate to the goals for 
improved performance through health reforms developed by Berman (1995).
The framework is intended to facilitate an analysis of the functions over which 
local decision-makers can exercise authority. Each criterion is explored from the 
perspective of the range of choices it provides. Bossert developed his initial framework 
to analyse the impact of decentralisation, and explores whether the planned reform 
implies innovations, changes or no changes in key area of health systems in 
developing countries. He has used this framework to assess the impact of reform on 
local authorities’ increased ability to make choices (before and after), for comparative 
international studies of intergovernmental health system decentralisation and to advise 
governments on alternatives (Bossert 2002, Bossert et al 2003a, Bossert et al 2003b).,
There are two main limitations to the framework as it stands. First, the 
measures and the differences in the range of choice are quite subjective. And second, 
the criteria do not neatly fit the analytical needs of First Nation, indigenous or NGO 
contractual environments and require validation or adaptations. The literature on the 
NGO sector, on contracting in health and the Canadian context will be reviewed to 
identify principles that can be used to adapt the framework developed by Bossert to 
better fit the purpose of this study. Each will be explored in turn.
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, Table 2.6, Decision Space Analysis Bossert (1998). j
i Function Indicator
Range of choice j
Narrow moderate wide j
j  Finance I
i Sources of Revenue Intergovernmental transfers as % of total local health spending High % Mid % Low % |
I Allocation of expenditures Intergovernmental transfers as % of local spending that is explicitly earmarked by higher authorises High % Mid % Low% |
! Fees Range of prices local authorities are allowed to choose No choice or narrow range Moderate range No limits j
' Contracts Number of models allowed None or one Several specified No limits |
• Service Organisation j
! Hospital autonomy Choice of range of autonomy fo r hospitals Defined by law or higher authority Severed models for local choice No limits
; insurant* plans Choice of how to design insurance plans Defined by law or higher authority Several models ter local choice No limits
! Payment mechanisms Choice of how providers will be paid (incentives and non-salaried) Defined by law or higher authority Several models for local choice No limits
• Required Programmes Specificity of norms for local programmes Rigid norms Flexible norms Few or no norms
; Human Resources I
; Salaries ' ■. Choice of salary range Defined by law or higher 
authority Moderate salary range defined No limits j
I Contract Contracting non-permanent staff None or defined by higher authority Several models for local choice No limits I
■ Civil Service Hiring and firing of permanent staff National public service Local civil service No civil service j
i  Access Rules j
i Targeting
f ■
Defining priority populations Law or defined by higher authority Several models for local choie* No Knùts j
’ Governance Rules i
; Facility Board Size and composition of boards Law or defined by higher authority Several models for local choice No limits j
! Districi offices , Size and composition of local offices la w  or defined by higher authority Several models for local choice No limits
[ Community participation Size, number, composition, and rote of community participation Law or defined by higher authority Several models for local choice No limits
2.3.2 The non government sector in primary health care delivery
The non-government or third sector is defined as “a body of individuals who 
associates for any of three purposes:
• to perform public tasks that have been delegated to them by the state;
• to perform public tasks for which there is a demand that neither the state nor for- 
profit organisations are willing to fulfil; or
• to influence the direction of policy in the state, the for-profit sector, or other non­
profit organisations (Dobkin Hall 1987).
These organisations are generally managed by a Board of Directors of elected 
community members. Salamon et al. have conducted extensive research to create a 
scholarship of the non-profit sector (Salamon & Anheier 1996b, Salamon 1998). Their 
review shows that the term NGO applies to an eclectic range of organisations 
(Salamon & Anheier 1996a, 1997).
The relationship between the government health authority (Ministry of Health, 
its delegate or technical term, “the purchaser”) and the third sector (“the provider”) 
hinges on two key elements: the conduct of the relationship through contract and the 
separation of service recipient and the provider.25 These two elements constitute what 
Stewart (1993) calls “governing by contract." Considerable attention has been paid to 
the role the non-profit sector can play in meeting the needs of vulnerable populations 
(Crampton et al 2001, Frank & Salkever 1994, Needleman 2001, Tollman 1991). The 
non-profit sector is best able to play a positive role if, first, the organisation does have a 
close relationship with its client population; and if, second, the learning that occurs as a 
result of this relationship can be shared back with the purchaser (i.e., the government) 
and incorporated in the contractual relationship to ensure that services are responsive 
to needs. This is most likely to occur when the contractual relationship is based on 
trust. These are important qualifications.
Matthias and Green’s review of the evidence suggests that assumptions that 
NGOs are more efficient and effective than their government counterparts, that they 
are more innovative, and that they are more able to reach the grass roots largely 
depend on the contractual environment in which they operate (Matthias & Green 2000).
25 The terminology adopted here has currency in international health system and economic 
literature, and defines the system in terms of role and money flow. The purchaser is often the 
Ministry of Health, but that role can also be delegated to Health Boards if they are fund holders 
tasked with paying independent service providers like general practitioners. Providers can be a 
medical practice, an indigenous health organisation, a private hospital, and are contracted by 
the purchaser to deliver specific services. The terminology remains useful as it separated roles 
and clearly reflects asymmetries in power. See Fougere in the topic (2001).
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They review Gilson et al (1997) study of the practices of church-run health services in 
Zimbabwe, Ghana and Tanzania, concluding that church hospitals equate or in the 
case of Zimbabwe can outperform their governmental counterparts. Reviewing the 
contractual relationship between governments and NGO, they recommend a mix of 
increased management flexibility, increased specifications of responsibilities in terms of 
outputs required of the NGO, and tighter control over government financing. Having 
said that, they also recommend that agreements remain broadly defined to ensure that 
NGO can retain their flexibility and non-profit motivations, but also minimise 
administrative burdens. Their conclusion illustrates the tensions that exist between the 
need of the state to monitor NGO performance in health versus the risk of developing 
inflexible and administratively cumbersome mechanisms that hamper rather than 
capitalise on the advantages of an NGO run services. They suggest that more tightly 
formalised contracts go against a relationship based on trust and flexibility, and 
undermine the benefit of NGO involvement. This responsiveness may be aided or 
hampered by the contractual relationship. The work of Gilson et al (1994) suggests that 
the NGO-client relationship is contingent on a number of issues, including the 
relationship between the local NGO and its parent organisations, government and 
funders.
Frank and Salkever write “Government appears to both promote and mistrust 
non-profit organizations in the health sector" (1994). From the government perspective, 
the mistrust is based on having limited control over the provider, while remaining 
accountable for the appropriate expenditure of public funding and the overall quality 
and effectiveness of the services delivered. From the provider’s perspective, the 
mistrust comes from a limited ability to influence or structure the contractual 
environment to access resources in a way that better fits the population served and 
service delivered. This mistrust can undermine working relationships, and limit the 
funder’s willingness to adapt the contract based on the provider's experience.
Most research on NGO engagement in the health sector has been pursued in 
third world and middle income countries, where limited competition in the health care 
market and weak public sector capacity leave large services gaps (McPake & Hongoro 
1995). Turshen (1999) speaks of health care throughout the African continent, noting 
that the NGO sector is often promoted as a mechanism to advance civil society, good 
governance and democracy, thus a mechanism to lessen the grip of government. 
NGOs are said to fill gaps left open by government services and the private sector. The 
commitment to NGOs is associated with the ideal of depoliticising civil society. She 
notes that international pressures in favour of a growing NGO sector carry the 
interesting paradox of side stepping the very mechanism of democracy. At the national
62
level, NGOs are not immune to national politics, may align themselves with local or 
national governments to further their own interests, and/or may align themselves to 
specific ethnic groups in order to further their interests within the country. Turshen, who 
argues that accountability is generally weak in countries where democracy is weak, 
also questions the ideal that NGOs are intrinsically more accountable to the 
constituency they serve.
The Canadian First Nation “sector” exhibits similarities and differences with the 
NGO sector. The sector plays a counter hegemonic role that is more akin to the role 
the NGO sector plays in developing countries. As with the NGO sector, the government 
relations with the First Nation sector show a balancing act between stewardship, risk 
management and autonomy. Although not immune to politics or poor management, 
First Nation organisations are necessarily closer to their constituency: by virtue of being 
local cultural organisations, they operate with intricate knowledge of their 
constituency’s history, culture, language and community dynamics. In this context, the 
relationship is one of trust and linked with identification (Gilson 2003). The purchaser- 
provider’ mistrust highlighted by Frank and Salkever (1994), and its predicted impact, is 
also apparent in that environment.
This section suggests that in the indigenous contractual environment, access 
rules and targeting should be aligned with the provider’s constituency. The principles 
also suggest that contract provisions should be negotiable to ensure that the provider’s 
knowledge of their constituency’s needs is reflected in the contracts they sign. Finally, 
these principles validate Bossert’s criterion regarding flexibility in programming.
2.3.3 Contracting in Health
Contracts define the relationship between the purchasing authority and 
providers. The neoclassical economic literature frames the contract as the purchasing 
of discrete, well-defined transactions in a market-like environment, where both parties 
enter into an agreement freely, and In which the purchaser controls the power to 
define, and the provider competes for the mandate to provide. Its main contribution has 
been to study the role of competition and markets. This focus has generally side­
stepped the context in which purchasers and providers operate and assumed 
transactions to be costless. Deakin and Michie note that this approach has led to the 
development of an extensive and formal theory of exchange, but that a corresponding 
theory of contract has yet to emerge (Deakin & Michie 1997).
In the context of this study, contracts between the Crown and indigenous health 
organisations build on either a long-term relationship between a single or primary 
purchaser and a single provider in a non-competitive environment, or at the least a
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quasi-market like-environment that is constrained by the legal framework that informs 
the relationship between the state and indigenous nations. In this context, contracting 
in health is used not as a mechanism to promote competition, choice and 
effectiveness, but rather to promote participation and responsiveness.
In that context, it is not possible or particularly productive to isolate the 
contractual environment from its larger context of production. Here, Williamson’s New 
Institutional Economics provides valuable insights (Williamson 2000). Institutional 
economics is interested in the larger context in which economic activities occur. This 
requires broadening the theoretical base drawing from legal and organisational 
theories. Wlliamson describes four layers of social analysis that provide the larger 
context in which contracts occur, including,
• Embeddedness: the context in which informal institutions, customs, traditions, 
norms and religion;
• Institutional environment: formal rules in which institutions operate, including the 
legal framework;
• Governance: the regulatory context of transactions, especially the contract; and
• Resource allocation and employment (Wlliamson 2000).
He suggests that the fourth level is where neoclassical analysis is most relevant. In 
contrast to neoclassical contract theory, Williamson defines the contractual 
environment as being constrained by bounded rationality, being the expression of 
limited cognitive competence and access to information,; with a resulting 
incompleteness, and governed by opportunism. The “human factor* is thus central.
Building on Wlliamson’s work, Macneil formulated a theory of relational 
contracts that reframes the contract as “relations in which exchanges occur” (Macneil 
2000, p. 878).26 This approach is gaining support in health contracting research as a 
framework for analysis (Allen 2002, Palmer & Mills 2003). What Macneil acknowledges 
is that contracts do not occur in a social and relational vacuum. Rather, contractual 
relationships are best understood as extensions of social relationships. In this context, 
the contract becomes a microcosm of the overall relationship between the funder and 
the provider. This relationship is generally articulated through contractual provisions for 
accountability. Accountability is about visibility in public administration. But it is also 
about power and the discharging of responsibility between stakeholders, in this case 
the state and indigenous organisations.
26 gee Eisenberg (2000), Feinman (2000), Gudel (1998), Lees (2001), Macaulay (2000), 
Macneil (1985, 2000) and Speidel (2000) for a comprehensive overview:.
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Recent developments show that funding arrangements are not simply administrative 
means for transferring federal moneys to First Nations and related organizations; they 
are a centrally important forum through which the policy, administrative and financial 
roles and relationships of the Canadian parliament government, DIAND27 and First 
Nations are being worked out (Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1993, p. 14).
Mills and Broomberg provide an extensive review of the literature on contracting 
options in health. Table 2.7 summarises options. Eligible contract bidders may be 
selected through tendering or as is the case in Canadian First Nation environment, the 
contracting may be between a single funder and a single provider. The contract 
specifications may be outcome-based or method-based, with each method shifting the 
risk between funder and provider. The alternative, which is more prevalent in health 
care contracting, is a contract that is more broadly defined to accommodate shifting 
needs and unforeseen situations. Price specification options include block payment or 
capitation as fixed payment options that shift the risk to the provider, or cost/volume 
and fee-for-service payment that shift financing risks on the funder. Non-performance 
may be met with sanctions, usually a financial penalty, or remedied cooperative. The 
latter is most evident in environments where alternative providers are unlikely.
27 The Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
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I Category Options
i
I Eligible 
1 bidders
Bidders 
determined by 
tendering 
(open or close)
Contracting
without
competition
Contract
specification
!
i
Outcome-
based
contracting
Method-based
contracting
Extent of 
specification
Price
specification
Block payment 
contracts
Cost and 
volume 
contracts___
Capitation
payment
I—
j Sanctions 
I for non­
performance
Fee-for-
service
payment
Fix bid 
contracts
Punishment-
based
(Mills & Broomberg 1998) 
Characteristics
Encourages new entrants, increases competition and reduces 
prices
Potentially high administrative and monitoring costs
Appropriate where a close contractual relationship can be of 
mutual benefits
More prevalent with the non-profit sector
Higher risk for the contractor and higher priced as a result.
Less risk for the contractor
Depends on the services, generally health services contracts are 
broadly defined (relational contracts)
Access to a defined range of services is paid through a flat 
annual fee. Places financial risks on the contractor as 
unanticipated demand may increase costs.
The provision of a defined number of treatments or cases at an 
agreed price. Provisions exist for additional cases. The open- 
endedness places risks on the funder.
Common for primary health care services, but carry financial risk 
for the contractor that may be addressed through the selection of 
clients with less onerous needs (cream-skimming)
Less desirable as it carries an incentive to provide care to 
maximise gain.
Attractive to budget-limited organisations as it ensure that 
contractors will bid to deliver the maximum standard they can 
afford. Tends to promote low quality providers.
Generally applies to simpler services and where entry in service 
provisions is easier.
Co-operative . Generally apply to more complex services because monitoring 
approaches non-performance is complex and contractor replacement difficult
The literature identifies two broad categories of contracts: classic and relational. 
The vocabulary varies considerably depending on authors. Classic contracts are often 
called short term (Lane 2001), explicit and transparent (Cumming & Scott 1998), or 
complete (Allen 2002). Relational contracts are at times described as complex, 
cooperative or trust-based contracts (Goddard & Mannion 1998). Table 2.8 
summarises the possible characteristics of each model.
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fable 2.8, Contract characteristics (adapted from Goddard & Mannion 1998, Lane 2001)
Classic contracts Relational contracts
Description
Transaction
costs
Priority setting
Efficiency
li Organisational 
i issues
I  Monitoring
I  Risk
li Dispute 
$ resolution
Based on a single funder engaging 
multiple providers in competing for 
contracts.
Contract drafting requires careful 
definitions of requirements and 
outputs, as well as contingencies
Higher transaction costs associated 
with contract drafting and renewal
No incentive for the provider to invest 
in long term interventions
Tends to focus interventions on 
individuals
In the case of vertical strategies, 
allows for the testing of new 
approaches across many providers
Promotes competition between 
providers and potentially efficiency
May create instability in organisations 
as a result of lack of commitment for 
continuous funding
Promotes the deployment of 
resources based on contractual 
obligations
Explicit output requirements facilitate 
contract monitoring
Provider performance assessed 
through contract outputs
For purchaser, mediated through 
choice of provider
For provider, mediated by focusing on 
short term strategies
Based on a single funder and a single 
provider engaged in a long term 
cooperative contractual relationship
Contract drafting broader and more 
flexible
Reduced transaction costs (drafting 
and negotiating)
Promote long term planning and 
intervention
Promotes population approaches
Possibility of improved 
responsiveness
May result in organisational 
inefficiency and substandard 
performance
Short term contract may act as a 
disincentive for the purchaser to settle 
dispute
Stable funding facilitating recruitment 
and retention of staff
Facilitates the strategic deployment of 
human resources as needed
Contract monitoring more challenging y 
and costs may offset transaction cost i  
savings.
Possibility of provider performance 
assessed through outcomes
Considerable for purchaser, may be 
mediated if purchaser can choose 
between providers (tendering 
process)
For provider, minimal for the length of 
the contract, but considerable at the 
time of renewal
Mutual interest in settling disputes 
amicably
Based on these authors, it appears that both models carry advantages and challenges. 
Classic contracts require extensive drafting and negotiation. The resulting specificity 
however facilitates their monitoring. They tend to promote and therefore are more 
appropriate for individual-focused and short-term interventions (Howden Chapman & 
Ashton 1994), As a result, they are useful for testing the effectiveness of varied or 
competing approaches. The lack of continued funding can create recruitment and
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retention challenges for organisations. Because of their short lifespan, they lack 
incentives to settle dispute, and purchaser-provider conflicts may be addressed by 
changing provider.
Relational contracts generally broadly define service provisions, making them 
easier to draft, flexible and more appropriate for funding continued services. They have 
the potential to improve responsiveness to local priorities. Long-term contracts promote 
population-based, longer term strategies that can be evaluated on the basis of their 
impact on health. Stable funding may facilitate the recruitment and retention of more 
qualified staff. The security attached to the funding may also lead to complaisance and 
the delivery of substandard services. The lack of specificity in service description may 
also cause monitoring challenges. According to Lane, long term contracts inherently 
carry “massive moral hazard” for the purchaser (Lane 2001, p. 35), as they hinge on 
long term purchaser-provider relationships. Considerable risk also exists for the 
provider, who may feel compelled to accept contractual provisions or risk losing the 
contract and a substantial part of its budget. As a result, both the funder and the 
provider may feel compelled to seek an amicable resolution in times of dispute.
Evidence suggests that the above classic-relational dichotomy is to some extent 
an over-simplification of the reality. For example, Goddard et al (1998) note that even 
in the context of yearly contracts, purchaser and providers invest in the development of 
long term trust-based relationships as a way to minimise risk. Thus, the potential anti­
competitive aspect of long term contracting is not absolute. They however note that 
from the purchaser’s perspective, trust can only occur where there is a choice of 
provider. Without choice, long term contracts between a single potential purchaser and 
a single potential provider are instead based on dependency and hope (Goddard & 
Mannion 1998).
Well-defined contracts with clear role, responsibilities and deliverables have the 
advantage of clarifying stakeholders’ roles. Holding both parties to their specified role 
will be more evident. Classic contracts however have many limitations: neatly defined 
deliverables are inherently inflexible. Creating a seamless health care system through 
highly specific contractual agreement will necessarily require lengthy and complex 
contract writing processes. Dividing the responsibility for the health care system 
between competing providers will also require extensive performance monitoring, 
Transaction costs will necessarily rise (Ashton 1998, Goddard & Mannion 1998). The 
choice thus seems to be between designing and managing a complex single contract, 
or designing and managing complex contractual environments resulting from a 
collection of simple contracts.
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Lane (2001) contextualises the 1990 shift from long to short term contracting in 
the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, Australia, New Zealand and Canada to the pursuit of 
increased efficiency in public administration. According to Lane, long-term contracts 
have historically been used for the provision of tax-financed “soft” social goods, such 
as health care, education and social care. In contrast, short-term contracts have been 
used for services may be partially financed through taxation and partially through user 
fees. The literature suggests that this trend is now being reversed (Goddard & Mannion 
1998). Koperski et al (1999) suggest that factors such as fragmentation, increased 
administrative costs and inequitable distribution of providers are leading the NHS back 
to adopting a collaborative system based on long term contacting partnerships.
While helpful, the literature does not entirely meet the theoretical needs of this 
study, mainly because authors tend to focus their discussions on purchaser-provider 
relations in the context of a single contract. This study instead focuses on the 
contractual environment for a single provider, whether simple or complex. The 
contractual environment is likely to vary depending on the types of contract(s) preferred 
by the purchaser(s), whether comprehensive and flexible or discrete and tightly 
defined. In the Canadian context, the contractual environment has shifted from a single 
long term contract in 1989, to 60 percent of income being derived from the single long 
term transfer agreement and a residual 40 percent of funding derived from short term 
program-specific and inflexible contracts. The fragmentation of the contractual 
environment has increased transaction costs and failed to yield the increased 
accountability promised (Auditor General of Canada 2002, Lavoie et al 2004). To date, 
no other study has focused on the contractual environment from the provider’s 
perspective.
Evidence from the literature shows that flexible, comprehensive, long-term 
contracts carry significant advantages for providers. This suggests that one of 
Bossert’s indicator, which focuses on the type of contract the provider is allowed to 
engage in, should be refocused to document the number and type of contracts in place. 
Second, the payment structure is an important feature of the contractual relationship. A 
fee-for-service or volume-based funding provides the most flexibility, and thus the 
greatest range of choice for providers.
2.3.4 Stewardship and Accountability
Accountability is about social relations, and in the indigenous context, about 
social relations inscribed and informed by a legal framework, macro-policy statements, 
history and localised understanding. Hughes Tuohy (2003) suggests that accountability 
requires three things: the identification of responsibility, the provision of information,
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and the availability of sanction. She discusses how through much of the twentieth 
century, the role of the state has been that of a “principal" in a trust-based principal- 
agent relationship. Decisions over the provision of care by non-government providers, 
mainly physicians, were based on trust and the delegation of authority. The shift to 
contract-defined relationships has reshaped the role of the state from a trust-based 
delegation to that of contract monitoring first focused on deliverables (outputs) and 
increasingly on the reporting of a variety of performance indicators (results and 
outcomes) that can be audited to ensure quality in care provision. In the process, the 
state is increasingly defining how care should be provided.
This shift is associated with a number of changes, including, first, growing 
expectation in the role of the state in ensuring that the health care system produces 
equitable health. Stewardship has been defined as “a function of a government 
responsible for the welfare of the population, and concerned about the trust and 
legitimacy with which its activities are viewed by citizenry” (Saltman & Ferroussier- 
Davis 2000). The 2000 World Health Report (World Health Organisation 2000) 
squarely placed the responsibility for the performance of the national health care 
system onto the shoulders of national governments. In the context of a contracted out 
system, the stewardship over the performance of that system rests with the 
government.
Second, the growth of government in the funding of health services has 
increased over the past thirty years. In systems where taxation funds providers, 
oversight of the use of public resources requires a formalised accountability framework.
Third, Hughes Tuohy (2003) argues that globalisation has led to a change from 
a trust-based management of service delivery, where norms were assumed to be 
shared, to a system of written and enforceable norms. The development of formal 
contractual relationships has raised the question of monitoring in terms of performance, 
quality, outputs and outcomes. The ideal of provider monitoring, especially for 
outcomes and quality, has been made possible, or at least imaginable, by advances in 
information technologies.
Table 2.9 highlights four dimensions of accountability. The purchaser requires 
accountability for the use of public funding. The purchaser also requires performance 
accountability. An aggregation of providers' performance may be used to inform 
government on the performance of the overall system, assuming that the performance 
data available to or produced by providers is standardised and can be aggregated in a
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cost effective manner.28 Clients are also interested in provider accountability. 
Measures of reciprocal accountability ensure that both parties can be held to the terms 
of the contract. Finally, political accountability is related to the broader context of 
credibility and trust, carries intangible indicators and is more closely related to the
culture, context, history and tensions influencing decision-making in health care.
Table 2.9, Dimensions of accountability (adapted from Cumming & Scott 1998, Hughes Tuohy 
2003}
Definition ¡Dimensions
Political , . . . , ¡Purchaser to GovernmentRelated to the broader context of credibility and L . ,  .
accountability ¡trust, and carries intangible indicators ¡Provi er °  Purchaser
;i _____ ' __j__  ^ _ __ __ Provider to clients __
Reciprocal ¡Ensured through an appropriate dispute Between purchaser and
accountability -resolution process and third party monitoring..f ............. - " - .....—... - • •
[¡Performance
¡¡accountability
'provider 
Purchaser to Government¡Monitoring of contracted output based on 
¡established standards where stated, and resulting Provider to purchaser 
¡impact on outcomes Provider to clients
¡¡Financial
¡¡accountability ¡Appropriate and prudent use of public funding ¡Provider to purchaser
Reporting requirements are pragmatic extensions of accountability, and 
generally defined in contracts. Reporting is required to ensure that the purchaser can 
continue to have oversight over single contracts. The link between accountability and 
reporting is poorly articulated in the literature. Only three analyses of accountability 
frameworks have surfaced. Crough (1997) provided a comparative analysis of the 
diversity of contractual arrangements available to Canadian First Nations and 
Australian ATSI through central indigenous-specific government agencies (all sectors  ^
except health). The analysis focused mainly on political accountability, in that possible 
contractual arrangements were analysed to shed some light on policy positions in each 
country. His analysis provided no information on the link between accountability and 
reporting, or on indicators. Kaufman Thomas and Associates (2001) compared First 
Nations’ to the accountability framework of other Canadian quasi-governmental 
institutions, such as Regional Health Authorities, municipalities and schools. There, the 
accountability framework was typically governmental in nature, with clear legislative 
and policy frameworks. They noted that quasi-government institutions generally receive 
broad authority and control. The performance of layers of government is not relevant to 
the analysis being pursued here, as governments generally report on their performance
28 Electronic submissions are more amenable to cost-effective manipulation than paper- 
based reports, but the option to submit reports electronically Is expensive and not necessarily 
available to all providers.
;» ,
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in programming as a unique entity. The third study was performed from the Auditor of 
Canada (1996), and aimed at investigating accountability practices from a First Nation 
perspective. This is the only report that considers accountability in the context of 
reciprocity, discusses the importance of transparency for both parties, and looks at 
obligations as a mechanism to foster better understanding and trust. The report 
highlights the distinction between performance and financial reporting to serve 
government’s needs and the same to service community needs, noting that the format, 
if not the message, is necessarily different. It also suggests that responsibility in 
reporting should be aligned with capacity, but does not define the relationship between 
governments’ needs for accountability and reporting requirements. The report was 
exploratory in nature and did not attempt to make pragmatic conclusions.
Current trends in accountability seem to require the elaboration of information 
systems that can inform on the performance of individual providers and, once 
performance indicators are aggregated, on the overall performance of the system. The 
realisation of this objective is however complex and costly (Light 2001). To date, it 
appears that little work has been done on developing meaningful and theoretically 
informed provider performance indicators, which can also inform on the performance of 
the overall system once aggregated. Crampton et al write,
We contend that a theoretical foundation is absolutely necessary In the formulation of 
performance indicators. A theoretical framework provides answers to questions such 
as: why do we need indicators? What should they measure? How should they be 
constructed? In the absence of clear answers to these questions, performance 
indicators can be used variously as a means to unjustifiably punishing primary care 
providers, or as a tool for shifting funding in response to political or lobby group 
pressures (Crampton et al 2004).
The slim but growing literature on quality in health care purchasing appears to support 
the development of provider-driven and therefore provider-appropriate standards of 
quality in service delivery (Buetow 2004, Crampton et al 2004, Gross 2004, Ovretveit
2003). This is recommended as a cost-effective and appropriate answer to purchasers' 
concerns that also protects the need for services to remain responsive to local needs in 
service delivery. Provider-specific standards may not resolve the need for the funder to 
monitor the performance of the overall system.
Gilson’s (2003) extensive review of the role of trust in health care suggests that 
classic contracts are costly to implement and monitor, and reflects that trust can assist 
in reducing transaction costs and enhance the possibility of managing complexity. This, 
she suggests, requires the development of relational contracts that contain effective 
sanctions.
The information reviewed in this section suggests that reporting requirements 
focus on indicators that are evidence-based and meet the accountability needs of the
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purchaser. Failing this, the reporting requirements should be streamlined. In this case, 
contractual provisions should include effective measures of reciprocal accountability to 
ensure that both parties can be held accountable for their responsibilities.
2.3.5 Exploring Bossert’s framework in light of the Canadian experience and 
the literature
This section explores each of Bossert’s criteria in light of the Canadian 
experience and the literature discussed above to assess relevance, identify gaps, 
formulate new indicators and criteria reflecting range of choices.
Finance Bossert focuses on sources of revenue, allocation of expenditures, 
fees and contracts. Bossert assumes that a dependency on government funding, as 
opposed to the opportunity to raise funds from fees and through other means, leads to 
a reduction in the range of choices for providers. In the case of First Nations, 100 
percent of funding comes from public funding allocated to the Band, either through the 
transfer agreement or through a collection of optional program-specific yearly 
contribution agreements (see Table 2.4, shown earlier). Some First Nations secure 
funding through agreements with their respective provincial or regional health authority 
(for diabetes or urban services), but this is still public funding, and minor in terms of 
total revenue. Contrary to Bossert’s assumption, reliance on government funding 
provides stability to First Nation providers. The situation is somewhat complex.
Transfer affords First Nations some flexibility in programming that is however 
matched only to a limited extent with flexible resourcing. The initial financing formula 
was based on historical expenditures that were to some extent workload and 
population related, with an additional allocation for administration. For zone and 
regional positions, funding was allocated on a per capita basis. The community could 
choose between hiring the services of a health professional from an outside agency or 
to purchase back services from Health Canada (Health and Welfare Canada 1989). 
Concerns over the level of financing have been repeatedly expressed. No baseline 
existed at the onset to ensure some level of equity. A recent analysis shows that 
inequities have cumulated over time (Lavoie et al 2004). First Nations have argued that 
the current allocation formulae challenges the long term sustainability of on-reserve 
services (Assembly of First Nations 2002). The transfer agreements include a 3 
percent indexation per year. But it also includes a non-enrichment clause, whereby 
First Nations signing a five-year agreement fail to receive any adjustment for increased 
on-reserve population whether due to population increase or a movement back to the 
reserve as a result of improved infrastructure, The on-reserve First Nation population 
continues to grow at a rate ranging from 2.8 to 3.5 per year (Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada 2000). Thus, First Nations are seeing their health resources spread thinner 
year after year. The contractual environment has also become progressively atomised 
over the past decade. Until 1995, First Nations had budgetary line flexibility over 100 
percent of their health program budgets, which was block funded. Surpluses could be 
retained. New programs are now being introduced through yearly contribution 
agreements outside of transfer, accounting for 30-40 percent of First Nations health 
budget. These agreements are standardised and their provisions non-negotiable. Each 
new program is generally funded for short-term initiatives with specific targets for 
expenditures and no budgetary line flexibility. Surpluses cannot be retained.
This analysis suggests that a 100 percent dependency on government funding, 
which is a feature of the indigenous health environment is not necessarily problematic, 
provided that the funding is commensurate with the cost of providing care and that 
budgetary line flexibility is permitted. Payment structure thus needs to be added to the 
framework. As discussed above, a fee-for-service or volume-based funding minimises 
the risk to providers. The analysis also justifies the validity of allocation of expenditures 
as an indicator. The issue of fee is not relevant, as First Nation, and indeed indigenous 
providers, were set up to ensure access to services and do not charge fees.
The literature also validates the need for new indicators. In terms of contract, 
the focus should not be on the number of models First Nation organisations are 
allowed to engage in, but rather on the level of fragmentation existing in the contractual 
environment and on the type of contract preferred by the provider. Length of contracts 
also correlates with stability in funding. Finally, fair negotiation in contracting would 
require the ability for all parties to access information to ensure that contractual 
obligations and the funding provided is evidence-based.
The literature emphasises the importance of capitalising on providers’ 
knowledge of their constituency, where a close relationship exists, to ensure 
responsiveness. This can be best reflected in a number of indicators. First, providers' 
ability to negotiate contractual provisions should be documented to ensure that their 
knowledge of their constituency’s needs is reflected in the contractual obligations. In 
the Canadian context, agreement provisions are standard and non-negotiable. Second, 
flexibility in programming is also validated as important indicators, which Bossert 
located under the category Service organisation Bossert’s focus on hospital 
autonomy, insurance plans, payment mechanisms for providers as indicators under the 
same category are however not relevant to the First Nation or indigenous provider 
environment. Third, access rules should align with the indigenous provider’s 
constituency to ensure that the benefit of this relationship can be reflected in service 
delivery. Service provision, funding and access rules should align. This is not the case
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in the Canadian context, where First Nations may provide services to a broader 
constituency if they so desire, but must provide services to and are funded exclusively 
for First Nations living on-reserve. In reality, the First Nation population is highly mobile 
and may periodically leave the reserve as a result of housing pressures, education or 
employment opportunities, or health care needs. The permanent on-reserve population 
does not take into account First Nations that live periodically on and off-reserve. The 
funding also fails to recognise that First Nation health organisations may also be 
providing services to non-indigenous populations living off-reserve because of the 
unavailability of alternative providers, especially in rural or remote environment.
Human resources Bossert’s framework was developed to meet the needs of 
health systems decentralisation from one layer of government to another. His criteria 
include salaries, contract payment for non-permanent staff and responsibility over the 
hiring and firing of staff. These criteria are not relevant to a situation where 
governmental responsibilities are being contracted out, since limits on management of 
human resources would interfere with the employer-employee relationship. These 
criteria were deleted.
Governance Bossert’s framework speaks to the size and composition of facility 
boards and local offices as well as the role of community participation. As in the case of 
human resources, these criteria are not relevant in a contractual environment, They 
instead speak more readily to the context of decentralisation between layers of 
government.
One important gap in Bossert’s framework in the context of this thesis is that it 
does not include a criterion for accountability. This is an important issue in the First 
Nation-Health Canada relationship. The literature remains vague on the relationship 
between accountability and reporting. It does however suggest that until evidence- 
based indicators are available, monitoring relations should be streamlined and trust- 
based. Another theme emerging from the literature is that of the need for contracts to 
reflect provider’s experience and circumstances. This suggests that contracts should 
include a dispute resolution mechanism. In the Canadian context, although a dispute 
resolution mechanism exists on paper, any decision emerging from that process is not 
binding on Health Canada and has led to frustrations, especially when issues challenge 
provider sustainability (Adams & Brown 1999).
Table 2.10 shows the final framework. Indicators have been regrouped under 
three rather than the original five categories: finance, governance and service 
organisation, and accountability. The range of choices for each category is derived 
from the above discussion. This framework allows for mapping out what policies, and 
the compromises associated with implementation, actually mean in practice.
75
Table 2.10, Decision Space Analysis (adapted from Bossert 1998)
Function Indicator Range of choice
Narrow Moderate High
Finance
Sources of Revenue Public funding as % of total local health spending
Substantial funding raising 
expected to cover the cost of 
health services
Public funding represents a 
substantial portion of the budget 
for health services
The budget for health services 
comes from public funding
Allocation of 
i expenditures
Intergovernmental transfers as % 
of local spending that is explicitly 
earmarked by higher authorities
High percentage Moderate percentage Low percentage
I
! Contracts
!
Number, type and level of 
fragmentation
High degree of fragmentation 
(many classic contracts)
Moderate degree of fragmentation 
(a complement of larger and 
somewhat flexible contracts)
One more comprehensive 
contract.
j Length of contracts Short versus long term Short term contracts Short and longer term contracts 3 to 5 year contracts
i
! Payment structure Block, volume, fee-for-service, partial funding
Partial funding, 
Outcome-based funding • Block, flexible funding
Volume or fee-for-services j 
Method-based funding j
Fair negotiations
Disclosure on all parties of 
financial basis for funding. Equal 
access to information.
No negotiation
Some opportunities for 
discussions and contractual 
amendments led by the provider
Full negotiations !
Governance and Service Organisation j
Access Rules and 
; Targeting Defining priority populations
Access rules do not match the 
Indigenous provider's constituency
Some level of compromise 
between access rule and 
indigenous constituency
Access rules match constituency i
: Required Programmes Specificity of norms for local programmes Programs rigidly defined
Some flexibility in priority setting 
and programming, and some 
define programs
Flexibility in priority setting and i 
programming j
. Accountability
Measures of reciprocal 
! accountability Provision for dispute resolution
Purchaser-driven sanctions 
No effective dispute resolution 
mechanism
A somewhat effective dispute 
resolution mechanism, possibly 
based on mutual goodwill
Cooperate dispute resolution j 
process j 
An effective and mutually binding ] 
dispute resolution mechanism 
exists j
| Reporting Reporting required of the provider
Reporting requirement elaborate 
Activity reporting Moderate reporting requirement
Streamlined reporting requirement j 
Evidence-based indicators !
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2.4 Linking policy, implementation and practice
Implementation and practice necessarily require compromises on the ideals 
expressed in policy objectives. When applied to the Canadian Health Transfer Policy, 
the framework outlined in Table 2.10 highlights key areas where the policy, as 
implemented, has resulted in compromises. This is explored in Table 2.11. First, 
although all funding comes from government, a significant proportion of this funding is 
now earmarked. The funding provided under the comprehensive transfer agreement 
was based on historical expenditures rather than evidence and has not kept up with 
population growth and increased costs. Inequities have grown. The system does not 
provide a mechanism to address this issue. Contracts are renewed without 
negotiations and an effective dispute resolution mechanism does not exist to address 
important issues. Another key compromise relates to providers’ ability to meet the 
health service needs of their First Nation constituency. Services are block funded, 
taking loosely into consideration the population living on reserve. Block funding does 
not take into account service volume associated with diversity of needs from one 
community to the next, the high mobility associated with First Nations leading 
individuals from remote or rural communities to relocate to semi-urban reserves to 
improve access to care, education or employment. Program-specific funding does not 
take into account diversity of needs and poorly matches the first objective of the policy, 
which was to enable Indian Bands to design health programs, establish services and 
allocate funds according to community health priorities (National Health and Welfare & 
Treasury Board of Canada 1989).
Whether the compromises shown here are the logical consequences of 
contingencies associated with practice, as opposed to policy pressures associated with 
other interests, may be a matter of debates. This is a very difficult question to answer 
without a basis for comparison. This approach developed here will be used in chapter 6 
to explore the decision-making autonomy provided to indigenous providers in Australia 
and New Zealand. This will be compared to indigenous polices discussed in chapter 4, 
to produce an analysis similar to the one undertaken in this chapter.
This chapter began with three questions:
• What is the larger context and debates influencing indigenous health policies;
• What is the link between and the factors that influence the relationship between, 
policy formulation and policy implementation; and •
• What options exist in contracting in health, and how do there options relate to the 
needs of public administration and accountability, health care system management 
and local priority setting, and cost-efficiency.
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i Table 2.11, Decision Space Analysis as it applies to the Health Transfer Policy (adapted from Bossert 1998)
i Function Indicator Range of choice, Canadian Health Transfer Policy
Range Rationale
I Finance
j Sources of Revenue Public funding as % of total local health spending Moderate
The budget for health services comes from public funding, which may however 
be insufficient and has built-in inequities.
i Allocation of 
; expenditures
Intergovernmental transfers as % of local 
spending that is explicitly earmarked by 
higher authorities
Moderate 40% of First Nations’ health budget comes from separate program-specific 
contribution agreements that are inflexible, and 60% comes from a single 
flexible contract.
¡Contracts Number, type and level of fragmentation Moderate
; Length of contracts Short versus long term Moderate to high Mix of short term and one longer term contract
| Payment structure Block, volume, fee-for-service, partial funding Moderate Block, flexible funding
: Fair negotiations Disclosure on all parties of financial basis for funding. Equal access to information.
Narrow to 
moderate
No negotiation, services being transferred are those previously offered by 
Health Canada.
| Governance and Service Organisation
! Access Rules and 
¡Targeting Defining priority populations Moderate Access rules match constituency as long as they live on reserve. I
I - .
: Required Programmes Specificity of norms for local programmes Moderate
New programs are inflexible, and attached to specific health gains. The single j 
comprehensive agreement is flexible, but funding provided under this j 
agreement is not sufficient to ensure sustainability. |
! Accountability I
i Measures of reciprocal
j accountability
I
Provision for dispute resolution Narrow to moderate
A somewhat effective dispute resolution mechanism based on mutual goodwill j 
exists to deal with minor issues. Major issues such as equity in financing and | 
sustainability have remained unaddressed. j
; Reporting Reporting required of the provider Narrow Extensive reporting requirements focusing largely on activity reporting. j
The literature and Canadian experience suggest that implementation is more likely to 
align with policy where policies are based on a recognised theory, where the level of 
consensus is high, and where the change required by the policy is limited. Clearly 
assessing the impact implementation may be best pursued through the framework 
developed in section 2.3.
The objective of this study is represented in the conceptual framework, shown 
below. This framework identifies eight questions that will be the focus the analysis:
1. What are the historical factors that impacted the development of indigenous health 
policies?
2. What values are apparent in policies?
3. Do policies more readily reflect indigenous aspirations, indigenous-state’s historical 
relationship or other interests?
4. What are the apparent compromises made in the process of implementation?
5. What factors led to compromises?
6. Are indigenous providers able to exercise some control over key areas of decision­
making?
7. What are the constraints on operations? And,
8. Is the contractual environment an accurate reflection of indigenous health policies 
or of the state practices in health contracting? Are compromises made to respect 
indigenous aspirations?
The first five questions are explored in chapter 4. Questions 6 to 8 are the focus of 
chapter 6. Chapter 7 is a synthesis of all questions.
2.5 Conclusions '
A number of forces have converged to inform indigenous health policy in Canada. 
These forces include international covenants and national historical documents. Other 
forces include current debates over health inequalities, ideology that defines the role of 
the private sector in health care, indigenous aspirations for self-determination, 
stewardship, accountability and risk management. These forces may be weighted 
somewhat differently in Australia and New Zealand. The Canadian case study and 
literature presented above sets the stage for chapters 4, 5 and 6, looking at the 
relationship between policy, implementation and practice.
Figure 2.4, Conceptual Framework with Research Questions
National Health Indicators
C O M PO N EN TS O B JE C TIV E S  R ES EA R C H  Q U ES TIO N S
a Central Government
(R egional Governments)
Context
To describethe historical and political
context of state-indigenous relations, as ______ r-- 1. W hat are the historical factors that impacted the development of indigenous
they relate to questions of access to and health policies?
delivery of health care services
Policy
formulation
Government Department responsible fo r Indigenous health
L
To analyse indigenous health policies, 
including the values they convey and 
mechanisms and processes they identify to 
implement their stated objectives
fot-,::. ; >
2. What values are apparentin policies?
3. Do policies more readify reflect indigenous aspirations, indigenous-state's 
historical relationship or other interests?
Government Depart merits responsib le to  implement indigenous health po lic ies
Policy *— 
Implementatio
Practice
To track changes and compromises 
made in the process of implementing 
indigenous health policies overtime
Community-based Indigenous PHC Organisations
To document the level of decision-making 
authority being transferred to Indigenous 
PHC services, including opportunities and 
contingencies
* Health care consumers
IDI----------->
4. W hat are apparent compromises, if any, made in the process of 
implementation?
5. Whatfactors led to compromises?
6. Are indigenous providers able to exercise some control over k ey areas of 
decision-making?
7. What are the constraints on operations?
8. Is the contractual environment an accurate reflection of indigenous health 
policies or of the state practices in health contracting? Are compromises 
made to respectindigenous aspirations?
Health
Inequalities
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CHAPTER 3, METHODOLOGY
Policy formulation and implementation are not linear processes, but rather 
processes that are shaped by social relations reflecting larger debates. The information 
presented on the Canadian experience was largely based on the literature. Similar 
analyses will be pursued in Australia and New Zealand. This chapter describes the 
approaches, strategies and methods used to conduct these analyses. The aims of this 
chapter are to explore the strategy developed to answer the questions raised in chapter 
2, explain why a case study methodology was adopted, and provide an understanding 
of how results were generated.
The chapter is divided into five main sections. A first section outlines the 
methodological framework adopted for this study and describes its scope. Section two 
discusses issues associated with accessing the field. Section three describes the 
process adopted to select the study sites. The fourth section describes the process of 
data collection and analysis. A final section explores the relevance of this study and its 
generalisability. As stated in the introduction, the objectives of this study are,
1. To describe the historical and political context of state-indigenous relations as they 
relate to questions of access to and delivery of health care services;
2. To analyse indigenous health policies, including the values they convey and 
mechanisms and processes they identify to implement their stated objectives;
3. To document the level of decision-making authority being transferred to Indigenous 
PHC services, including opportunities and contingencies; and
4. To assess the level of convergence and congruence existing between policy
objectives and implementation mechanisms. . ,
This research does not take a position on the superiority or effectiveness of indigenous
controlled health services. It rather wants to contextualise their existence and how they
operate within their larger historical, policy, relational and administrative context. ,
3.1 Methodological choices
An exploratory multiple case study design was adopted for this study. Case 
study methodology has been used by a broad spectrum of researchers and in many 
different ways. The methodology spans the single, anthropological, in-depth case study 
approach founded by the Chicago School at the turn of the century (Hamel et al 1993, 
Stoecker 1991, Dyer & Wilkins 1991) to a positivistic multiple case study approach that 
focuses on testable propositions and sampling strategies (Dyer & Wlkins 1991). Lately, 
case study methodology has effectively been used to explore the connection between 
policy and health services (Bentley 1989, Jacobson et al 1989, Yin 1999), Although the 
methodology has been criticised for its limited generalisability, the criticisms generally
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apply to single case study design (Eisenhardt 1989). Critiques of multiple case study 
designs argue that the approach necessarily sacrifices depth for breath, generally as a 
result of time and resource constraints (Dyer & Wilkins 1991).
Undertaking multiple case studies in two different countries presents 
methodological and logistical challenges. Havemann (1999d) provides a detailed 
comparative analysis of indigenous rights in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. He 
suggests that international comparative analyses are fraught with difficulties and must 
consider:
• The need to justify all choices of units and themes, and to be explicit about the 
focus of comparison and the standpoint of the writer;
• The historically contingent nature of events, processes, and practices, which take 
place in linked but unique historical eras, of which they are both a product and a 
cause;
• The salience of contextual specificity: the significance of unique historical, political, 
economic, and sociological factors, which combine to structure action and reaction - 
of which indigenous rights jurisprudence, for example, is an outcome and an 
agency;
• The interdependence of internationalised discourses about indigenous peoples - 
concerning human rights, for example, or the fiduciary obligations owed by the 
settler Crown; •
• The phenomenon in which apparently similar concepts may have different 
meanings and significance in different jurisdictions - for example, indigenous rights 
(Havemann 1999d, p. 3-4).
He suggests that any analysis must be appropriately contextualised.
In the context of this study, detailed case studies of indigenous health 
organisations were undertaken. Health policies are necessarily informed by the 
historical relationship existing between indigenous people and the state, and the legal 
framework that informs indigenous rights within each country. Case studies were 
therefore contextualised within their policy, historical and political milieu. A great deal 
of energy and time was spent reviewing the historical context of health policies and 
primary health care development in each country. This process required the 
development of a detailed chronology of key events (Treaties and other legal 
documents, legislations, history of state-indigenous reflections, shifts in political 
ideology, etc.); and a comparative spreadsheet of policies with their time of 
implementation, stated objectives and mechanisms. Policy and related documents on 
indigenous health were collected for a period of 20 years and contextualised through a 
review of the literature and interviews.
The exploratory approach developed by Yin was found particularly well suited to 
accommodate the complexity of this study. Yin defines a case study approach as "an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident" (Yin 1994, p. 13). To Yin, each individual case study is in fact a distinct 
experiment, in which a theory is to be tested (Yin 1994). If supported by two or more 
case studies, replication has occurred. Each case study must generalise to theory, not 
across case studies. Multiple case studies are selected to ensure that either they 
produce the same results for the same reasons, or produce different results for 
predictable reasons. Herriot et al argue that the intent of multisite qualitative policy 
research is to optimise generalisability and description, while recognising the tension 
that exists between the two (Herriot & Firestone 1983). They argue that the balance 
between generalisability and description can be achieved if the study design is mindful 
of four key issues: structured data collection, number of case studies, length of time 
spent at each site for data collection, and site-specific as opposed to issue-specific 
reporting (Herriot & Firestone 1983). Each will be explored in turn.
1. Structured data collection: Each case study was conducted by a single 
investigator. The data gathering was structured along indicators outlined in the 
decision-space analysis framework developed in chapter 2. The methods utilised are 
explored in section 3.4.1.
2. Number of case studies and length of stay: Decisions on the number of 
case studies and the length of stay at each were constrained by delays in ethical 
approval and trust (see section 3.2). Given the historical relationship between 
researchers and indigenous organisations, it was felt that a smaller number of case 
studies and longer time for data gathering would foster the development of 
relationships leading to improved access to documentation, and improved accuracy in 
interpretation. Four case studies were conducted, two in Australia and two in New 
Zealand. The Australian sites were Katherine West and Danila Dilba. The New Zealand 
sites were Te Raukawa O Raukawa and Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Inc.
3. Site-specific versus issue-specific reporting: Each participating 
organisation was guaranteed that a case study report would be provided to senior staff 
and to Board members for their review. Each organisation was assured that the 
information collected would not be considered data until approval of the case study 
report had been granted by the Board. In all cases, the case study report was 
discussed with senior administrators to ensure validation. The results of the case 
studies are presented in chapter 6. The reports cannot be reproduced in this thesis 
because of space constraints. They were reproduced as approved for publication by
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the Board of their respective organization, in a report on indigenous primary health care 
financing (Lavoie 2003a).29
As shown in Table 3.1, Yin has developed a number of criteria to ensure that a 
research design maintains validity and reliability (Yin 1994). Construct validity is 
assured when the correct operational measures are used to study the concepts under 
study. In the context of this study, multiple sources of evidence were used to ensure 
triangulation. In the case of policy analysis, a primary document analysis was 
supplemented with interviews and a review of literature. In the case of organisational 
case studies, senior staff and board members were given the opportunity to read over 
the case study report and comment.
Reliability is assured through transparency of research process. In the case of 
this study, the sources of information, whether contracts, minutes, correspondence or 
interviews, are referenced in the case study reports. Finally, external validity involves 
ensuring that the study’s findings are commensurate to the study conducted, and are 
generalised within a like-context. In the case of this study, the conceptual and 
methodological frameworks borrow from the literature on policy implementation, health 
services decentralisation and third sector engagement. The findings of this study 
compare to other studies looking at third sector engagement in health service delivery 
explored in chapter 2. Issues related to generalisability are explored briefly in section 
3.4. A comparison between the findings of this study and others appears in chapter 7.
Documents on history, policy, institutional arrangements and analysis were 
collected in both Australia and New Zealand. These documents provided the broader 
context. Data collection focused on policy themes, funding arrangements for 
indigenous primary health care organisations, and relationships between indigenous 
providers and the government. Interviews were conducted whenever the information 
collected left important gaps. The next section explores how this methodological 
framework was implemented.
29 Available at http://www.umanitoba.ca/centres/centre_aboriginal_health_research/cahr- 
research/research_publlcations_reports.html ”  ”  ”
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I Table 3.1, Ensuring quality in research design (Yin 1994, p. 33)
Construct validity:
Establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied
Reliability;
Demonstrating that the operations of a study -  such as the data 
collection procedures can be repeated, with the same results.
External validity; establishing the domain to which a study's 
findings can be generalised
C
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• A broad and comprehensive review of literature was 
conducted on the history of indigenous-state relations, the 
health care system over the past 30 years; the history of 
health services to the indigenous population; national and 
indigenous positions on Indigenous and Treaty nghts; and 
salient events. .
• Actors were conceptualised as the national and regional 
governments, indigenous groups and organisations, and 
key stakeholders in the health care system.
• Sources were diversified to ensure validity.
• This component is largely drawn from the literature, and 
contextualised with interviews only when gaps in 
knowledge or understanding occurred. All written sources 
are disclosed.
» Evidence of international debates: a review of international 
covenants and their influence on indigenous health was 
conducted and is provided in Appendix i.
• The broader context documented in this study, that of ! 
indigenous state relations in three relatively wealthy 
countries, and how this context has informed policy and j 
implementation cannot be generalised broadly. This 
research draws on the published literature on cross- j 
national comparative analyses of indigenous policies 
(Armitage 1995, Dyck 1989, Fleras & Elliot 1992,
Havemann 1999c, Scrimgeour 1995). This work has 
generally been pursued to explore alternatives to national 
options.
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reviewed the draft case stud 
asked questions. The finaJ re 
publication by the Board.
faff and board members 
report, made comments, 
port was approved for
« Detailed analysis of current policies is provided in Appendix 1. • Findings on the convergence and congruence of policy versus implementation inform and add to these debates.
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S ® ; * Test: Senior administrative staff and board members 
j;: Z. ■■■ i renewed the draft case study report, made comments, ° i asked questions. The final report was approved for §* j publication by the Board.r '"T’ ^ ■■■' ' V "1 • '
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» The decision-space analysis framework was used to
structure data gathering. It created categories and themes 
around which the data was structured for cross-case study 
analysis.
* The source of information was disclosed in case study 
reports, whether from interview, correspondence, internal 
communications or reports.
* Quotes were cleared with each participants and permission 
secured.
* Triangulation between sources was done to ensure that 
single source biases were balanced out by other sources.
• Findings on contracting may provide Insights to health care ; 
contracting in general.
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3.2 Access to the Field and Ethical Considerations
As McDonnell et al (2000) point out, methodological theory and carefully laid 
out plans often collide with the reality of fieldwork. Internationally, access to indigenous 
study sites has been repeatedly portrayed as difficult for a number of reasons 
(Kowalsky et al 1996, Tuhiwal Smith 1999). Indigenous peoples and communities have 
increasingly defined protocols to limit access and constrain the use and publication of 
information (Hop! Cultural Preservation Office n.d., Indigenous Peoples Council on 
Biocolonialism 2000). A main goal is to prevent research that either produces no useful 
information for the community, or results in dissemination strategies that side-step the 
community altogether. Another goal is to ensure that communication protocols are 
respected and that sensitive information is treated as such (Australian National 
University 1993, Collins & Poulson 1991, Ford n.d., Health Research Council of New 
Zealand n.d., Humphery 2000, Johnstone 1991, Todd et al 2000). Active participation 
by the community, which may include capacity building, is also emphasised. Collective 
and individual consent is required, and collective and individual protection is demanded 
(Wyatt 1991). Here, the idea of protection goes beyond confidentiality and extends to 
the concept of cultural protection (Tuhiwai Smith 1999). Although some researchers 
have been concerned that this may introduce biases in research, or serve to prevent 
“useful" research from taking place, the potential for validation of interpretation should 
not be overlooked.
Community-based protocols and local indigenous ethics committees have 
emerged to help researchers adopt culturally appropriate processes. At the same time, 
no mechanism has yet emerged to facilitate pan-indigenous international research 
(Kaufert & Lavoie 2003). This gap, as well as local concerns, were raised and 
negotiated both at the ethical committee and organisational levels, following a process 
similar to the one documented by Kaufert et al (1999) for Canada.
This study secured ethical approval from the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine in May 2001. This approval was conditional to local approval. Ethical 
approval in Australia caused some delays and much confusion. Early consultation 
appeared to suggest that ethical approval from the Australian National University 
Aboriginal Ethics Committee may be sufficient. The national guidelines do indicate that 
single university studies require approval from a single university-based committee 
(available at http://Www.health.gov.au/nhmrc/issues/index.htm), Ethical approval from 
the Australian National University was secured in September 2001.
This process however appeared unacceptable to ATSI providers and to ATSI 
Ethics Committees geographically located where the research was to take place. Upon
arrival in the Northern Territory, the Top End Ethical Committee made it clear that 
ethical approval was required from them. This was pursued and secured by the end of 
November 2001. A submission was also made to the Central Australian Human Ethics 
Committee for a possible case study in Central Australia. As a result of delays in 
response, the possibility of undertaking a case study in Central Australia was dropped. 
By that time, two sites in the northern part of the Territory, had already consented to 
participate in the study, and it was clear that the delays incurred made it impossible to 
line up a third case study in Australia.
In contrast, the New Zealand process was much clearer, with a national 
process dividing the country into 13 regions, all relying on a single form and 
coordinated process. An application was submitted in October 2001 to all thirteen 
committees. The choice to submit to all committees was motivated by the fact that sites 
remained to be selected, and historical players may need to be interviewed in different 
parts of the country. Approval was secured in September 2002. However, one 
committee suggested that the timing for this type of study was less than ideal for 
political reasons. Sites from this region were not selected. Massey University, which 
housed the researcher for the length of fieldwork in New Zealand, did not require a 
separate process.
Securing ethical approval required evidence of prior support from indigenous 
organisations in both countries. Ethical approval was secured on the strength of letters 
of support in both Australia (from two study sites and an Aboriginal MLA) and New 
Zealand (from Professor Mason Durie, a prominent Maori health researcher).
3.3 Selecting sites
Site selection was highly constrained by three main factors:
• The complexity and lack of documentation of the field;
• Ethical approval; and
• Fortuitous contacts within key organisations, trust, local priorities and acceptability. 
These will be explored in turn.
3.3.1 The scope of the phenomena
Although both Australia and New Zealand support the development of 
indigenous health providers, the scope and profile of the indigenous health sector has 
not been documented. This led to some challenges early in the field, as there was 
really no mechanism to identify,
• The number of existing indigenous health organisations;
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• The different funding models in place;
• The scope of services being delivered by indigenous health providers; and
• The number and type of organisations that may be potential sites for the study.
A first task was to develop two databases, one for each country, to help define the
scope of the phenomena and what was known about it. These tools were set up:
• To identify the prevalence and geographical distribution of the phenomena;
• To explore issues and definitions of governance, community control, financing 
models for sampling, set up analytical categories; and
• To geographically locate sites in both countries to facilitate conversations and data 
gathering.
A listing of financing models emerged including:
1. Competitive access to funding: This is the most prevalent contractual arrangement 
both in Australia and New Zealand. It refers to funding provided by multiple or 
consolidated relatively small grants with the Central government (Australia 
Commonwealth Department of Health or the New Zealand Ministry of Health) 
and/or regional governmental authorities (the Australian State/Territory 
governments or the New Zealand District Health Boards).
2. Regionally-based comprehensive primary health care. In Australia, this refers to the 
Primary Health Care Access Program (PHCAP). This model is comparable to the 
Canadian Health Transfer Policy. Although a “Whole-of-Health” model is under 
discussion in New Zealand, no site has yet been implemented.
3. A Grant-in-Aid model existed in the Northern Territory of Australia. This model was 
used to set up a service contracts between the Northern Territory Health and an 
Aboriginal Council, to deliver health services at a local clinic. It included no funding 
for administrative skill development, recruitment, capacity building, or 
administration. The grant covered only service delivery. Most Grant-in-Aid 
communities have now terminated these agreements, and the model is being 
phased out. It has been severely criticised (Scrimgeour 1997).
4. The New Zealand Màori Purchaser Organisations (MAPO) are funded to purchase 
services from providers and may opt to purchase from Màori providers only. These 
organisations were created as a result of the implementation of the 
purchaser/provider split in the early 1990s. This policy is now being abandoned by 
New Zealand. Only three MAPOs exist, all located in the north of the North Island, 
and no new MAPO is being set up. The future of the MAPO model was somewhat 
uncertain at the time of fieldwork.
5. The Màori Development Organisations (MDOs) emerged as an alternative to 
MAPOs around 1998. They are funded umbrella organisations tasked with 
supporting existing small Màori providers with contract negotiations, organisational 
and service development. Although limited in numbers, the MDO movement is 
growing.
6. Finally, the “Whole-of-Govemment" model is currently under discussion in New 
Zealand, and a few agreements have been signed. These are cross-sectorial 
funding contracts all brought under the umbrella of an iwi (Màori political unit, 
serves as administrative body) which receives all funding (health, economic
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development, education, etc.) under one single contract. This model comes closer 
to the Canadian “self-government" model. Although interesting, these models are 
too young and thinly deployed to be included in this study.
This process helped narrow the site selection process. Since the grant-in-aid model is
no longer being pursued, it was eliminated from the list. So was the whole-of-
government approach, which was just being developed. At the time of fieldwork, the
future of the MAPO model was also uncertain. The following models were therefore 
selected (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2, Number of Cases per Category30
Competitive access to 
funding
Regionally based 
comprehensive primary 
health care
Alternative models
Australia 1 1 Not available
New Zealand 1
This remains under 
discussion or early 
implementation
1
A second process required the development of key selection criteria for site selection. 
These are shown in Table 3.3.
30 Australian database (Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care 
Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Health Services 1998, 2001, National Aboriginal 
Community Controlled Health Organisation 1998, Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal 
Corporations 2001). New Zealand database (Crengle 1999, Health Care Aotearoa 2001, 
Malcolm et al 1999, New Zealand Health Funding Authority n.d., 1998b, 1999, New Zealand 
Ministry of Health Maori Health Department 2000, Tuhi Tuhi Communications 2001).
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I  Table 3.3, Selection criteria 
! Criteria
Must be in operation for 
more than 2 years with the 
primary funding 
structure/arrangement being 
studied;
Must have some (historically) 
stable funding (no pilot 
projects);
4. Must offer at least primary 
health care services at the 
community level or itinerant 
services;
3. Must be an indigenous 
health care organisation (as 
opposed to a state or private 
organisation with an 
indigenous component, or an 
indigenous organisation 
operating a short term, small 
health project);
Rationale
Many organisations spring out as for the length of one 
contract, and then disappear. Since this study relies on 
organisational documentation produced over time, 
including contracts, minutes and correspondence, it was 
thought preferable to focus on organisations with a track 
record.
This criterion reflects policy commitment to “indigenous 
controlled organisations". As explored below, identifying 
such an organisation can be a challenge.
5. Must want to participate; and
6. Must accept my ownership of 
data.
Primary health care was defined as curative, rehabilitative, 
promotive and preventive services. The first two are 
individual-based, the last two are population based. The 
criterion was meant to differentiate between addiction 
counselling and treatment services, health training 
organisations, hospitals, etc. Although the expression 
“primary health care" is often associated with services 
delivered by general practitioners, the presence of a 
general practitioner on staff was thought unnecessary, as 
many indigenous organisations use referral processes.
For obvious reasons.
Despite a successful narrowing of the potential sites, the above approach left too many 
choices to assumptions rather than facts. It was obvious early in the process that a 
more subjective approach was to be the only alternative for the final site selection.
3.3,2 Access to Study Sites
All study sites were recommended by indigenous health researchers who 
understood the research and agreed to provide introductions, or at least to allow the 
use of their name in initiating contact with the organisations. All indigenous 
organisations contacted approved access, following the same process. An initial 
meeting occurred with senior administrative staff. A formal request was subsequently 
conveyed to the Board of Director by either myself (three organisations) or by the Chief 
Executive Officer (one organisation). The processes varied in length, from a six week 
to six months turn-around from initial contact to approval.
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In all cases, the same protocol was followed. Information about the study was 
provided in writing and a commitment was made that: (1) the senior staff and Board 
members would be given the opportunity to review and comment on the draft case 
study report to ensure accuracy and ascertain that sensitive information was not being 
unduly disclosed; and (2) that a technical report summarising all findings would be 
produced in a timely manner and distributed to them. Some sites requested that copies 
of any publications be made available for their information.
3.3.3 The selected sites
For Australia, both case studies were located in the Northern Territory. This is a 
possible limitation of this study. The choice was made as a result of delays and 
complexities in dealing with ethical approval. Having said that, the issue of geography 
is not seen as a major limitation because the main source of funding and the 
government department having responsibility for funding ATSI health providers is the 
Commonwealth Department of Health. In New Zealand, each case study was 
conducted in a separate region.
3.4 Data collection and analysis
Most data were collected from July 2001 to June 2002 in Australia and July 
2002 to April 2003 in New Zealand. Funding for fieldwork was provided by the 
Canadian Fondation Ricard (http://www.fondationricard.com/boursiers.html).31 In both 
countries, the process for data gathering followed a similar path. The collection and 
analysis of policy document was conducted first. This was done to provide some 
context for the case studies. It also ensured an efficient use of fieldwork time, while 
awaiting approval for ethics and participation in case studies.
For each case study site, data collection occurred during a period of six weeks 
to two months spent on site. Sources of data included the minutes of every Board 
meeting since incorporation, minutes of health committees, participation in meetings 
(where possible), and the review of all funding contracts for a sample fiscal year, from 
July 2001 to June 2002 (the fiscal year in both Australia and New Zealand). Interviews 
and informal discussions provided additional context.
In general, and depending on the availability of the files to be reviewed (which 
may be used by others at the case study site), the process began with a detailed
31 la  Fondation Ricard provides funding for secondary and tertiary education to French 
Canadians living in a minority situation. Although it favours recipients whose project is 
supported by the/a community, it was not engaged in defining the project, and had no vested 
interest in the results.
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review of Board meeting minutes and detailed note taking. The purpose was two fold: 
first, minutes of meeting provided a detailed history and helped provide an orientation 
to the organisation, names of historical players and current Board and staff members, 
as well as developmental milestones. Since negotiating access to contract information 
and interviews are generally somewhat more sensitive, the process of reviewing 
minutes gave time for the researcher to get known which generally facilitated the 
process of trust building. Contractual information was generally reviewed second. Once 
a clear picture of the organisation emerged, gaps were identified and explored in 
interviews. Interviews were also used to explore themes that may have emerged in the 
policy review, and to identify their significance for the organisation.
A list of documents reviewed for the policy analysis and the case studies is 
provided in Appendix IV.
3.4.1 Data Gathering Plan
This research relies on a number of data sources. The relevance of each 
source, their selection and the process for analysing, are shown in Table 3.4, and 
explored in the following sub-sections. How the data sources related to the conceptual 
framework explored in chapter 2 is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Table 3.4, Research Plan 
i Questions Methods Data Source
Context
i.
1. What are the historical factors that impacted the development 
of indigenous health policies?
Literature
Chronologies of key events 
¡{Treaties and other legal 
¡documents, legislations, history of j . 
state-indigenous reflections, shifts!,nterv,ews 
!in political ideology) I
Policy
formulation
! 2. What values are apparent in policies?
: 3. Do policies more readily reflect indigenous aspirations, 
i indigenous-state’s historical relationship or other interests?
Policy analysis
Policy
implementation
i 4. What are the apparent compromises made in the process of 
| implementation?
i 5. What factors led to compromises?
Policy analysis over time
I
Practice
j 6. Are indigenous providers able to exercise some control over 
j key areas of decision-making?
] 7, What are the constraints on operations?
I 8. Is the contractual environment an accurate reflection of 
: indigenous health policies or of the state practices in health 
i contracting? Are compromises made to respect indigenous 
\ aspirations?
Decision-space analysis
f; - 
If/:" v.v
Policy documents 
Interviews
Policy documents 
Interviews
Indigenous providers’ minutes of 
board meetings
Review of contracts for a sample of |  
Î one year l
J Review of correspondence, minutes - 
| of meetings, and internal documents J 
! from time of incorporation »
I Interviews Î
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Fiaure3.1. Conceptual Framework
N ational H ealth Indicators
COMPONENTS OBJECTIVES FOCUS OF INQUIRY
Conte:>4
Policy
fo rrnu ld ion
Contrai G overnm ent 
(Regional Government»)
To describe the historical and political 
context of state-indigenous relations, as 
they  relate to question» of access to and 
de livery o f health care services cm Ì >
Government Department responsib le fo r  Indigenous health
Policy ! 
Imp lem en tati oil)
Practice
c >
To analyse indigenous health policies, 
including the values they convey and 
mechanisms and process es they  identify to 
im plem ent the ir stated objectives
[DC
History of relations 
Societal values 
Health Care System
Indigenous Health 
Policy Analysis
IDC
DOC
Govern ment Departm ents responsib le to  i mplement ind igenous h e d th  po lic ies
To track changes and co m p ro m ise  
made in the process of implementing 
indigenous health policies overtime
Com m unity-based Ind igenous PHC O rg a n is io n s
IDO = >
Indigenous Health Policy 
Analysis
Ad m in istr atio n overtime
DOC = >
To docum ent the level of decision-making 
authority being transferred to Indigenous 
PHC services, including opportunities and 
contingenci es
[DC
_ r-^  C ontractual environment
fo r Indigenous PHC 
Services
= >
Health care consumers
METHODS
R eview of literature 
Interviews
D oc ument analysis 
Interviews
D oc um e nt a n a lys is
Interviews
Cæ estudies
Framework adapted 
from  Bssert
Health
Inequalities
3.4.2 Interviews
A total of twenty-seven unstructured interviews were conducted with key 
stakeholders in indigenous health and policy development, including government 
officials, senior administrators, Directors of the Board and historical players. The exact
breakdown is provided in Table 3.5.
. ......... . . n w  nunvn
Table 3.5, Interview conducted I
Category o z NZ
j
#o f
interviews
Reference number in 
text
# of
interviews
Reference number in 
text
NZ07 NZ23 NZ27 
NZ28
j Government officials 4 AU09, AU10, AU18, 
AU26
4
Senior administrators 
and directors of the 
| Board
7 AU02, AU12, AU13, 
AU14, AU20, AU21, 
AU29
6 NZ01.NZ03, NZ06, 
NZ08, NZ11.NZ16,
| Historical players 3 _AU05.AU 15, AU22, 3 NZ24, NZ25, NZ30
The selection process for interviewees was somewhat opportunistic. In most 
cases, interviews were conducted towards the end of the document/contract review 
process. Requests were made in person, and a suitable time was scheduled. In the 
case of senior administrators in particular, time constraints limited the length and scope 
of interviews and interruptions occurred repeatedly. For individual case studies, all 
senior administrative staff was interviewed. In the case of government employees, 
access was limited by a number of factors including political caution, time constraints, 
and a limited opportunity for the interviewer to explain’ the purpose of the research and 
establish a relationship. In some cases, government employees contacted the 
researcher to consent to a meeting, after months of attempts at establishing contact. In 
a few cases, only a casual conversation was agreed to. These are not included in the 
above Table as a formal consent process and interview was not agreed to.
Key themes explored in interviews included:
• Key factors or events that led the government to begin to support community-based 
indigenous PHC initiatives, obstacles and debates;
• Role and vision of person being interviewed;
• Goal of government, vision, scope of responsibilities being transferred, 
opportunities in terms of service delivery and contingencies;
• How is the financing structured, how sustainable is this within the political 
landscape; and •
• Can the services meet the needs of the indigenous population, what are 
opportunities, contingencies, how does this match indigenous aspirations for self- 
determination.
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Interview guides are provided in Appendix III. These were used with flexibility. In some 
cases, the documentation analysed had already provided ample evidence on some 
themes, but other questions had arisen. In other cases, it was clear that the question 
was not appropriate for the person being interviewed, or that they had their own topic 
they planned to discuss. The interviews complement the documentation and analyses. 
They provide context and were sometimes used as a stepping stone for pursuing 
another line of inquiry.
The interviews were conducted to supplement and give context and meaning to 
key issues and fill gaps in the literature. They were analysed using NVIVO. All interview 
transcripts were anonymised. An attribute grid was created reflecting the country where 
the interview was conducted, the ethnicity, role and organisational attachment of the 
interviewee. Transcripts were thematically coded with a total of 343 free codes. Some 
of these were later merged as the concept they reflected dovetailed too much to justify 
separate codes. The majority of free codes were then classified under fourteen broad
categories, including,
• Community and tribal issues; • Indigenous place -  legal issues;
• Participation; • Relational contract;
• Government; Health services;
• Issues of community control; Administrative issues;
• Funding and budget; • Health needs;
• Contract; • Theoretical concepts; and
• History.
NVIVO allows for reports to be generated on specific or clustered codes that can then
be analysed for patterns and prevalence. Coding reports were generated and analysed 
along themes.
3.4.3 Contract analysis
Funding contracts were read and notes were taken on a variety of issues, 
including purpose; type of funding (core, recurrent, project, one of); funding levels and 
terms; payment schedule and process; length of contract and scope; provisions for 
renewal, dispute resolution and amendments; standards and flexibility; reporting 
requirements and accountability framework; intellectual property rights; and any other 
particularities of relevance, such as mentions of a particular policy, obligation, 
legislation, treaty, etc. These specific provisions relate to those defined in the decision- 
space analysis adapted for this study (see Table 2.10). The Information was entered 
into an Excel spreadsheet for comparison of provisions between contracts for a single 
organisation and a comparison of the contractual environment between organisations.
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3.4.4 Minutes and other documents
For each case study, minutes of meetings from the time of incorporation, 
correspondence, internally produced documents and annual reports were reviewed. 
Detailed verbatim notes were taken on selected themes including:
• Relationship with government and funding agencies;
• Impact of health reform;
• Impact of system’s changes;
• Issues related to funding;
• Relationship with union where applicable; and
• Issues related to governance.
A detailed reading of the material was done to identify recurring key themes. This 
information was integrated into the text of the case study reports and a reference 
quoted.
3.4.5 Synthesis: Analysing policy and implementation over time
Key portions of policy documents were analysed for objectives, recurrent 
themes in their justification and anticipated results. In each country, the most recent 
policy documents were secured. Previous policy statements as well as foundation 
documents were identified from recent policies and analyses of these documents, and 
copies were secured.
The retrievability of these documents was excellent. In Australia, a visit to the 
national library provided most relevant documents. The Commonwealth Aged and 
Health Care web site (http://www.health.qov.auA was also helpful, as most policy 
documents are available electronically. Finally, a health policy timeline posted on the 
healthinfonet web site completed the list (http://www.healthinfonet.ecu.edu.auA. In New 
Zealand, the health librarian of the New Zealand Ministry of Health was extremely 
helpful in providing a crash course on New Zealand health policy development, locating 
original copies of all relevant documents and suggesting the name of key historical 
players.
Implementation was tracked through mapping out successive policy 
development, discussions and critiques appearing in the literature (more extensively 
developed in New Zealand) and through interviews with key historical players, current 
government employees and indigenous health providers. Indigenous providers’ 
minutes of Board of directors meeting were very helpful in highlighting emerging 
issues, such as political pressures, in identifying how these were dealt with by
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government and how these decisions impacted policy implementation and the 
indigenous provider.
3.4.6 Synthesis: Evaluating decision-making space
As discussed in chapter 2, the framework adapted from Bossert’s decision- 
space analysis was used to evaluate the level of and constraints on providers’ 
autonomy in meeting the needs of their culturally-defined constituency.
3.4.7 Strengths and limitations of sources of Information
Each source of evidence collected for this study carries strengths and 
limitations. Overall, the case study-specific documentation accessed for this study was 
fairly comprehensive. All sites opened their files for consultation and extensive note 
taking. The investigator was able to freely access files and documents and select items 
for review. Retrievability was lower for one site only, and only with regards to its first 
year of operation. This was not seen as a significant problem. Selectivity bias remains 
a potential issue, because:
• Some pertinent information may not be written; or
• The information filed may not contain the full spectrum of information related to 
specific contracts.
However, any significant factor affecting the organisation or specific contracts is likely 
to be raised in Board meeting minutes or show in contract reporting and 
correspondence between the purchaser and the provider. Likewise, the retrievability of 
policy documents was high. However, the context of policy document production could 
only be partially reconstructed, mainly from the literature. While not crucial to the study, 
context may have helped predict sustainability.
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f Table 3.6, Potential Strengths and Weaknesses of Sources of Evidence (adapted from Yin 
1994)
Strengths Weaknesses I
Case Study
Specific
Documentation
. Stable-was reviewed repeatedly;
. Unobstructive;
. Reliable: created independently from 
the study to communicate information 
to informed participants;
. Exact and extensive: include dates, 
names, details of events;
. Broad coverage: long life span, many 
events,
i Retrievability can be low; i 
. Potential biased selectivity;
. Reporting biases reflect biases of 
author; I 
. Access may be deliberately blocked, j
Policy
documents
. Stable-was reviewed repeatedly;
. Unobstructive;
. Reliable: created independently from 
the study;
. Broad coverage: long life span, many 
events,
. Retrievability can be low; i 
.  Potential biased selectivity; | 
. Reporting biases reflect biases of j 
author; j
. The full context of production is not j 
disclosed;
. Access may be deliberately blocked j
Interviews . Targeted: focuses on case study 
topic;
. Insightful: provides perceived causal 
inferences.
. Biases due to poorly constructed \ 
questions;
. Response bias;
. Inaccuracies due to poor recall;
. Reflexivity: interviewee gives what 
the interviewer wants to hear, or j 
withhold information. j
3.4.8 Triangulation
Triangulation was conducted to ensure reliability. McDonnell et al discuss how 
using different accounts from different participants, and analysing multiple types of 
documents including minutes, policy documents, minutes of meetings, etc., generates 
“a multidimensional picture... created by an amalgam of perspectives" (McDonnell et al 
2000, p. 387). A number of strategies were used for this study. Themes raised in 
correspondence or minutes were explored through interviews. Policy documents were 
explored through interviews, the literature discussing them, a review of the media 
where possible, and through the case studies in term of implementation. Some themes 
raised only in interviews were explored in other interviews. The case study reports, 
which contain some policy analysis as these relate to the experience of the indigenous 
health organisations, were reviewed by senior health administrators and Board 
members, some of whom were historical players involved in policy debates.
3.5 Relevance and Generalisability
This research project focuses on the place occupied by indigenous health 
organisations within the health care system of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. As
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discussed in chapter 2, there remain significant gaps in the literature with regards to 
the link between policy and the performance of complex contractual environments. 
This research helps address some of these gaps. The research however has broader 
relevance, as it explores issues related to the organisation of primary health care 
services for vulnerable populations and contracting with non-government organisations.
Writing for this thesis occurred over a four and one half year period. Although all 
the material presented in this thesis was produced for this thesis, a number of 
publications drawing from this material have been published elsewhere. Lavoie (2003b) 
explores the value and challenges of separate health services through a discussion of 
the health transfer policy (discussed in chapter 2). Two publications explore some of 
the preliminary results of the cross-national analysis of the policy and contractual 
environments discussed in more depth in chapters 4, 5 and 6 (Lavoie 2003a, 2004). 
Kaufert and Lavoie (2003) explore issues related to the development of ethics 
guidelines in Australia and summarise the experience related with negotiating ethical 
approval in three countries.
The author’s current work commitments include acting as the principal 
investigator in the national evaluation of the Canadian Health Transfer Policy, This 
commitment began in July 2003. All research presented in chapter 2 was completed 
before the beginning of this contract. This thesis has informed the national evaluation. 
The reverse is true only to a limited extent as the final report of the national evaluation 
is likely to remain under ministerial embargo until mid 2005.
At a time when indigenous people world-wide are advocating for some measure 
of self-determination (Ewen & The Native American Council of New York City 1994), 
and working towards the creation of an international network on indigenous health 
knowledge and development, international applied comparative analyses are of 
particular relevance. As of December 2004, eight seminars on this material have been 
delivered to policy makers in all three countries, by invitation.
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CHAPTER 4, INDIGENOUS HEALTH POLICIES IN 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
This Chapter provides a cross-national analysis of indigenous health policies, 
as formulated in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It attempts to answer three key 
questions:
1. What are the historical factors that impacted the development of indigenous health 
policies?
2. What values are apparent in policies?
3. Do policies more readily reflect indigenous aspirations, indigenous-state’s historical 
relationship or other interests?
4. What are the apparent compromises made in the process of implementation?
5. What factors led to compromises?
Havemann suggests that international comparative analyses must be appropriately 
contextualised, taking into consideration the interdependence of internationalised 
discourses on indigenous rights, the history of indigenous-state relations and 
contextual specific phenomena (Havemann 1999d). The pursuit is nevertheless 
worthwhile. Havemann (1999d) and Armitage (1995) point out that international 
comparative analyses can be of use to first, provide some perspective on existing 
policies, and second, explore possible alternatives.
This chapter explores the processes of policy formulation and implementation in 
Australia and New Zealand, and contrasts these to Canada. The first two sections look 
at the emergence of Aboriginal Medical Services (hereafter referred to as ACCHS)32 
and of Maori providers respectively, and the policy development that ensued. The third 
section analyses the policies currently in place, paying particular attention to the 
analytical questions outlined above. The final section summarises the findings.
4.1 Austra lia : Background
In Australia, the origin of “by indigenous for indigenous" health policies appears 
to have been grounded in two national historical processes. The first was the election 
of a Labour Government in 1972 and its adoption of a policy of self-determination. This 
led to the Commonwealth Government taking over the responsibility for Aboriginal
32 Aboriginal Medical Services was the expression used at the time. Although still widely 
used, the current terminology is Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services or ACCHS, 
ACCHS is used throughout the text for clarity.
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Affairs, including ATSI health from the states. The visibility of ATSI issues increased 
tremendously as a result.
The second, which coincided with the first, was the emergence of community 
controlled ACCHS in the early seventies. This was the result of ATSI communities’ 
mobilisation to ensure that some level of health services was accessible to an 
impoverished, marginalised and underserved Aboriginal and Torres Strait (hereafter 
ATSI)33 population. The number of ACCHS grew over the next decade and now 
counts over 100. Eventually supported by policy and some core funding, it is clear from 
the onset that ACCHS were seen as complementary to existing state/territorial 
services. Their funding was and remains largely limited to project funding from vertical 
strategies. The ATSI community however uses ACCHS as the mechanism designed to 
make primary health care services accessible to them. Indeed, alternatives are lacking 
in many communities (Deeble et al 1998).
This perspective has now shifted as a result of research linking issues of equity 
and ATSI health care financing (Deeble et al 1998). The Primary Health Care Access 
Program (PHCAP) was endorsed in policy in 2003 (National Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Health Council & Australian Health Ministers' Conference 2003). It is 
now being rolled out. For the first time, Australia is promoting the implementation of a 
national comprehensive process to ensure that all ATSI people, whether urban, rural or 
remote, have equitable access to primary health care. This section will first explore the 
emergence of ACCHS in Australia. This will be contextualised with a discussion of the 
Australian health care system and followed by chronological review of ATSI health 
policy development. ,
4.1.1 ACCHS In the Australian Health Care System
The financing of the Australian health care system is anything but simple, As 
shown in Figure 4.1 (adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 1994), the system involves an interplay between public subsidies and 
market forces (Connelly & Doessel 2000, Donato & Scotton 1998). The 
Commonwealth Government funds the Health Insurance Commission whose role is to: 
a) administer Medicare, the national health insurance system; b) administer the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme; and c) provide grants to non-governmental 
organisations for health related projects. Medicare and the Pharmaceutical Benefit 
Schemes are financed through a combination of federal income tax (63%) and an
33 In Australia, the term Indigenous applies to both the collective “Aboriginal people" and 
Torres Strait Islanders. The abbreviation ATSI has been adopted throughout the text.
earmarked (hypothecated tax) of 1.5% on income (27%) (Commonwealth Department 
of Health and Aged Care 2000). Features of the Australian system include:
• Doctors are generally self-employed, especially in ambulatory care services. 
Hospital physicians may be salaried, although some opt to contract their services 
rather than being employed.
• In theory, Medicare covers 85% of the schedule fee for physicians. Since the 
schedule fees are not compulsory, some doctors may only charge 85% of the 
schedule fee, leaving no out-of-pocket cost for the patient. Alternatively, if 
physicians opt to charge above the schedule fee, patients must cover the difference 
either through direct payment or private insurance.
• Under Medicare, hospital care provided by a public hospital (or a hospital 
administered by a non-profit, non-governmental organisation but funded by the 
government) and pharmaceutical supplies dispensed in hospital are free. Medicare 
refunds care obtained in private hospitals are the rate of 75% of the total cost. •
• The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme subsidises the cost of medications by 
capping the cost to the patient. The cap is a means-adjusted threshold and based 
on family income.
Two systems exist to access Medicare funding: patients may be required to pay 100% 
of the physician fee, and apply for a Medicare refund which is unlikely to cover 100% of 
the initial cost; or alternatively, some physicians have the option of “bulk billing” 
Medicare directly to the Commonwealth government. Under this second option, 
physicians are prohibited from charging over the Medicare refunded fee. Voluntary 
private insurance is available, its utilisation vigorously encouraged, and generally used
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to top up services covered under Medicare, such as access to private hospitals. 
Purchasers of private insurance receive a 30 percent subsidy (Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Aged Care 2000, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 1994).
At the state/territorial level, the Australian Health Care Agreements (hereafter 
HCAs) provide the mechanisms to finance the delivery of hospital services (Galbally 
2000). Public health programming has historically been the realm of states and 
territories, with strategies funded out of the Base Health Care Grants. Each state and 
territory has its own public health legislation, although the Communicable Diseases 
Network Australia New Zealand (CDNANZ) has been coordinating the National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) since 1990. Historically, the states 
and territories have tended to favour vertical strategies for health promotion and 
prevention, rather than providing broader-based funding to NGOs and local 
organisations to develop comprehensive strategies (Galbally 2000).
The private sector has always been a part of the Australian health care system 
and has grown since the implementation of Medicare. Like the UK and New Zealand, 
Australia enthusiastically adopted the ideology of economic rationalism in the late 
1980s. Evidence of this ideological commitment can be seen in the adoption of the 
funder-purchaser-provider split as the principle of health care resource allocation and 
delivery (Somjen 2000).
Given the largely decentralised constitutional model in place in Australia, each 
state and territory have been free to develop their own medical system following local 
ideology. In New South Wales and Queensland, the state governments have 
established a regional health care system with centralised purchasing and providing 
roles. In South Australia and Victoria, a purchaser/provider split model with output- 
based funding has been implemented (Somjen 2000). Access to private hospitals has 
remained an option subsidised under Medicare. The public interest in private hospitals 
has been looked upon as an opportunity by the state governments to harness private 
capital in health care delivery. Private hospital admissions now account for nearly one 
third of all acute admissions (Foley 2000). A number of public hospitals have been 
privatised since 1994.
The Northern Territory health care system has to-date been challenged with a 
scarcity of providers, and seriously underserved populations. Three recent studies by 
Bartlett et al (Bartlett et al 1997, Bartlett & Duncan 2000) and Wakerman et al (1997)
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have shown that the system has been far from seamless.34 The Northern Territory 
also experimented with the purchaser-provider split from 1999 onward (Australia 
Territory Health Services 1999). It now appears that this has been abandoned 
altogether under the leadership of the NT Labour government elected in October 2001.
Theoretically, all Australians can access care through the Medicare financed 
system. Despite documented higher health care needs, Deeble et al (1998) reported a 
much lower Medicare and Pharmaceutical Benefits utilisation rate by ATSI people and 
a higher utilisation of state-funded services. This is shown in Table 4.1. This implies a 
higher secondary and tertiary care utilisation rate over primary health care. The 
reasons for this are numerous. First, general practitioners play a gate-keeping role in 
the Australian health care system. In remote environments, where general 
practitioners are unlikely to be found, access to Medicare is simply nil. Second, 
accessing doctor services may simply not have been prioritised early in the onset of 
illness. Third, Medicare can only be accessed with a unique, personal Medicare 
number. This is secured through a process of enrolment, which was developed largely 
on the assumption that new registrants are immigrants. Many ATSI people however 
have historically relied on services offered to them by the state or territorial 
governments, and have never required registration. Others have faced obstacles 
linked to transience or problems with identification (Young 1997).35 In areas where 
there is no general practitioner, state and territorial governments have opted to set up 
clinics staffed by. nurses, thus financing activities that are generally paid for by the 
Commonwealth government for the general population (Bartlett et al 1997, Bartlett & 
Duncan 2000). The Northern Territory Public Accounts Committee documented the 
situation in 1995, showing that this model of health care financing has been particularly 
inadequate for the Northern Territory (Australia Legislative Assembly of the Northern 
Territory Public Accounts Committee 1996).
The Australian health care system was designed to serve the needs of the 
Australian majority. It was never designed to address the sparsely populated, highly 
marginalised ATSI communities (Deeble, 2001 ).36 It is in this context that the ACCHS 
emerged in the early 1970s, capturing the imagination of many academics,
34 The 2000 study identified 3,690 people living in the top end of the NT, representing 8,6 
percent of the population, as having no access to primary health care delivered by either a 
general practitioner, a nurse or an Aboriginal Health Worker.
35 The requirement for identification is generally served by a birth certificate, This 
document is however not a given for Aboriginal people from more remote communities.
36 This was a public statement was made by Professor Deeble in October 2001, at the 
office of the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Professor Deeble is 
acknowledged as the creator of the Australian Medicare system.
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professionals, and community activists, ATSI and non-ATSI alike. ACCHSs created 
much hope that community-based decision-making was the solution to improving ATSI 
health. Stories of their emergence revolved around themes of resistance against 
adversity, lack of collaboration and governmental funding, success in implementing 
innovative strategies, hard work and dedication (Briscoe 1974, Campbell & Ellis 1995, 
Carter et al 1987, Crawshaw & Thomas 1992, Fagan 1991, Foley 1982, Fulton 1985, 
Saggers & Gray 1991, Waterford 1982). The growth of the sector marked a shift in 
power between state/territorial health departments and the ACCHS (Scrimgeour 1997). 
Passion continues to permeate discussions over their value, yet the area has remained 
remarkably unscrutinised with the notable exception of Nathan (1980) who provides the 
only empirical case study of an ACCHS.
Table 4.1, Gross expenditures per person, ATSI and non-ATSI people, through publicly 
subsidised programs 1995-96, by program (Deeble et al 1998)
Abor. Non-Abor. Ratio Abor/ Other
Delivery $ $
Through state and local government 1,763 806 2.20:1
Through Medicare/PBS 128 535 0.24:1
Through ATSI health organisations & other 
Commonwealth programs 344 213
. !
1.62:1 i
Total 2,235 1,554 1.44:1 i
The first ACCHS was set up in the urban centre of Redfern (a suburb of 
Sydney, NSW) in 1971, Fitzroy (near Melbourne, VIC) followed in 1973, and Perth 
(WA) in 1974. In the NT, the Central Australia Aboriginal Congress was set up in 1973 
and began to offer health services in 1975. These services operated under the 
direction of an ATSI Board of Directors, offered primary health care and functioned with 
volunteer staff (including physicians, nurses and community staff) securing rent and 
other necessities with in-kind donations. Commonwealth funding came later. Their 
goal was to provide accessible and appropriate health services. Some have expanded 
over the years, while others have retained their original clinical care focus. 
Recognising the need for a common voice, ACCHS supported the creation of the 
National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organisation (NAIHO) in the mid 1970s 
(Scrimgeour 1997). Following some factionalism and reported administrative 
difficulties, NAIHO was replaced by the National Aboriginal Community Controlled 
Health Organisation (hereafter NACCHO) in 1992. State and territorial “peak bodies" 
(state and territorial ATSI health organisations) emerged thereafter. The movement 
has grown remarkably since it first emerged in 1971 with ACCHSs in each state and
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territory, operating in both urban and remote environments. New member 
organisations have been added every year.
In effect, the ACCHS movement has provided “patches” in a health care system 
that was far from seamless for ATSI people. Although the number of ACCHS has 
increased over time, counting over 100, there remain areas where these services are 
not offered. Further, ACCHS are able to offer the services for which they can secure 
funding. Although they play an important role, they have historically remained 
peripheral to the overall health care system.
4.1.2 Chronology of ATSI health policy development
The Australian distribution of powers between the state, territorial and 
Commonwealth governments has followed a distinct path to that of Canada creating 
other opportunities and challenges alike. The creation of Australia was really a coming 
together of separate colonies who wished to retain considerable autonomy. ATSI 
affairs thus remained the realm of the states, rather than the Commonwealth. In 
theory, each state had its own approach to ATSI health. In effect however, the 
practices ranged from benign neglect to coercive public health measures (Briscoe 
1996, Harrison 1997, Hetzel 2000, Hunter 1993, Jebb 1984, MacLeod & Denoon 1991, 
Maguire 1991, May 1991, Reid 1990, Reynolds 1982, Ring & Elston 1999, Saggers & 
Gray 1991). By the 1960s, attitudes were shifting at all levels of the Australian society, 
leading to legislative changes to end discriminatory practices. Voluntary voting was 
extended to Aborigines in 1962. Constitutional changes in 1967 gave the 
Commonwealth government the authority to make laws in relation to all ATSI people. 
By the same token, the Commonwealth government was given the authority to 
enumerate Aborigines in the yearly national census, a power that had been 
constitutionally denied since 1901 (Thomson 1984).
ATSI health first became a national priority in 1968 with the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Office of Aboriginal Affairs. From 1968 onward, government's 
responsibility for ATSI health shifted six times before finally landing with the 
Commonwealth Department of Health & Aged Care in 1995 In the Northern Territory, 
the Commonwealth government was theoretically exclusively responsible for Aboriginal 
health from 1911 until 1978. In the states, ATSI health program delivery Initially 
remained a state responsibility with funding from the Commonwealth. At that time, 
ATSI access to health care services was limited by a number of factors. Services were 
available in some mission settlements, but for a majority of Aborigines living in remote 
environments, access to treatment was sporadic and linked to the Royal Flying Doctor 
Service. Elsewhere, economic limitations made access impossible because of a lack
107
of transportation (Kamien 1975). When transportation was available, direct charges for 
hospital and physician care added difficulties. Prior to Medicare, health financing 
schemes had been linked to employment, and therefore disadvantaged the poor and 
the unemployed. Applying for the exemption to secure access to free health care 
apparently proved a complex bureaucratic undertaking (Saggers & Gray 1991).
By 1972, the Labour Party was elected to office and self-determination became 
the official policy. Aboriginal Affairs had been part of the Labour Party election platform 
and following the election, Commonwealth expenditures on Aboriginal Affairs doubled. 
The Office of Aboriginal Affairs was replaced by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
(DAA). DAA continued with the State grants, but also initiated direct grants to the 
emerging ACCHS. Initially, self-determination was portrayed as creating opportunities 
for ATSI communities to decide the pace and direction of their future development. 
Eventually, self-determination crystallised as self-management of governmental 
schemes and projects for Aborigines with possibilities for input in planning, 
development and implementation.
In 1973, the Commonwealth Government offered State Ministers to assume full 
responsibility for ATSI affairs policy and planning. All accepted with the initial 
exception of Queensland. The Department of Aboriginal Affairs was thus finally given 
the central authority over ATSI policy. Self-determination in matters of health care 
came to mean the transfer of funds from the Commonwealth Government to ACCHS. 
This was identified in The Ten Year Plan for Aboriginal Health, which had as an 
objective to “raise the standard of health of the Aboriginals of Australia to the level 
enjoyed by their fellow Australians” (cited in Saggers & Gray 1991). A House of 
Representatives Committee on Aboriginal Affairs (with no ATSI representation) was 
established shortly after, reporting mostly on the status of Aborigines but making no 
comment on the effectiveness or accessibility of health services, It did however 
criticise the states, who since 1972 had received increased funding for ATSI health 
initiatives. According to Saggers & Gray:
While the states asserted their constitutional responsibility for Aboriginal health, they
had not accepted financial responsibility for the provision of Aboriginal health programs
(1991, original emphasis).
Meanwhile the Commonwealth Government was actively pursuing the consolidation of 
its role in ATSI health. By 1984, the responsibility for all Commonwealth ATSI health 
programs, including the Department of Health’s role in the funding of some ACCHS, 
was established within the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. It is in this context that, in 
1987, an attempt was made to develop a national Aboriginal health strategy with the 
formation of the National Aboriginal Health Strategy Working Party, chaired by Naomi
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Myers, of the National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organisation and Director of the 
pioneer Redfern-based ACCHS.37 The National Aboriginal Health Strategy (hereafter 
NAHS) report was released in 1989 making recommendations in three broad areas:
• Improving ATSI services by establishing minimum standards of delivery, promoting 
the transfer of state/territorial services to ATSI control and ensuring adequate 
funding:
• Improving essential services and community infrastructure: and
• Improving education, training and employment opportunities for ATSI people in 
ATSI health.
The strategy also recommended the development of,
• A Council of Aboriginal Health, set up as a standing committee to both the 
Australian Ministers’ Conference and the Australian Aboriginal Affairs Council, 
consisting of community representatives and officials;
• Tripartite Forums in each state and territory with representation from the 
Commonwealth, state/territorial and ATSI community; and
• An Office of Aboriginal Health within the Commonwealth Aboriginal Affairs portfolio.
The purpose of these bodies was to ensure meaningful ATSI participation in policy and 
program development. Anderson (1997b) provides a detailed review of the NAHS 
implementation. In essence, the NAHS’ commitment to what Anderson calls tripartism 
(Commonwealth, state/territory and the ATSI health sector) in ATSI health, with its lack 
of a clear jurisdiction and accountability, was responsible for the initial claim of failure 
(Anderson 1997b, Evaluation Committee 1994). By 1994, the Council of Aboriginal 
Health had yet to truly function. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC),38 established in 1990 to replace the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, and 
tasked with securing matching grants from the State and Territorial Governments, was 
stalling. The 1994 evaluation of the NAHS simply recognised that the strategy was 
never effectively implemented. It again called for improved access to funding for the 
ACCHS sector and increased intersectorial collaboration (Evaluation Committee 1994).
One of the main issues being debated around that time was ATSIC’s ability to 
manage ATSI health. Funded for ATSI health, ATSIC’s funding could but provide 
project-based funding and ACCHS were expected to apply for funding yearly, on a
37 This service was the first Aboriginal controlled health service to open its doors in 1971.
38 ATSIC is a statutory authority of the Commonwealth government, and continued to 
deliver the programs of the former Department of Aboriginal Affairs. The Commission functions 
under the guidance of an Aboriginal elected body who designs policies and direct resource 
allocation. :
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competitive basis. Although the debate took some unfortunate turns,39 one core issue 
was that funding for ACCHS was limited and remained disconnected from Medicare 
and other health care funding allocated to the Commonwealth Department of 
Community Services and Health, and by extension, to state governments. The 
campaign to move funds from ATSIC to the Commonwealth Department of Health was 
orchestrated by the ACCHS sector, which saw this move as the only option available to 
access appropriate health funding through ATSI and other sources, namely the Medical 
Benefits Scheme (MBS). The issue was particularly critical in remote communities, 
because the absence of general practitioners meant that Medicare funding was 
inaccessible (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal 
Corporation 1994c, Interview 0020)
The transfer of responsibility for ATSI health from ATSIC to the Commonwealth 
Health Department was completed in 1995, under the Office for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Health Services (OATSIHS).40 With it came a shift in focus, from 
funding ACCHS for projects, to incorporating ACCHS into the overall Australian health 
care delivery system. ACCHS began to receive some core funding. Recommendations 
made in the 1989 NAHS were revisited. In 1995, each Australian Health Ministers 
negotiated a Framework Agreement state/territorial ACCHS peak bodies, 
State/Territorial ATSIC representatives and the Commonwealth Department of Health. 
The Framework Agreements required the establishment of Health Forums in each 
jurisdiction with representatives from each of the signatory bodies, namely the 
representatives from the Commonwealth Department of Health (OATSIH), the state or 
territorial Department of Health, ATSIC and the state or territorial ACCHS peak body. 
The forums were designed to act as regional joint planning processes tasked with the 
identification of gaps in service provision and defining priorities (Australia National 
Health and Medical Research Council 1996). By the end of the year, Framework 
Agreements had been signed in all with the exception of Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory, who signed in 1998 (HealthlnfoNet 1999).
39 Personal attacks were prevalent. See for example the Koori Mail of March 23,1994 
(1994a).
40 It appears that ATSIC may have retained some responsibilities some responsibilities over 
Aboriginal health. In 2001, ATSIC released an Aboriginal Health Policy, speaking to the need to 
address health inequalities and promoting community controlled health services (Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission 2001). The policy was remarkably silent on a number of key 
developments, including PHCAP (discussed below). The policy appears to have remained 
largely unnoticed, and is not referred to in OATSIH Aboriginal Health Frameworks (Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission 2001, National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Health Council 2001, National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council & Australian 
Health Ministers' Conference 2003). ATSIC was dismantled in 2004.
In 1996, the Commonwealth Minister for Health announced the establishment of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council, a national health advisory 
forum complementing the state/territorial forums. In addition, a national level Joint 
NACCHO/Departmental Working Group was established in 1997 to review current 
arrangements for ATSI access to Commonwealth health program funding. These 
processes had first been proposed in the 1989 National Aboriginal Health Strategy 
(Australia National Aboriginal Health Strategy Working Party 1989).
The Primary Health Care Access Program (PHCAP) was announced in the 
1999-2000 Commonwealth budget. Its origin will be explored in more detail in the 
Katherine West case study in chapter 5. The implementation of PHCAP requires the 
carving of Australia into regions where an ATSI regional health board would be funded 
with pooled Commonwealth and state/territorial primary health care funding to provide 
services following local priorities and in a manner deemed as appropriate by the Board. 
The level of funding provided by the Commonwealth is based on the average 
Australian Medicare expenditure multiplied by two in acknowledgement of higher ATSI 
needs and by another factor of two if remote. As a model, PHCAP is a potentially 
remarkable change and stands to have significant repercussions for ATSI Australia. 
PHCAP has three objectives:
• Increase the availability of appropriate primary health care services where they are 
currently inadequate;
• Reform the local health care system to better meet the needs of ATSI people; and
• Empowering individuals and communities to take greater responsibility for their own 
health (Bartlett et al 1997).
What is innovative is the pooling of funding from state/territorial and federal health 
sources, including Medicare dollars that have historically not been accessible to ATSI 
people, for reasons previously mentioned. The Board may opt to remain a purchaser of 
services, or to carry both the functions of purchaser and provider.
Implementing PHCAP is however a complex process (Interviews AU02, AU05, 
AU10, AU18, AU20, AU26). In the Northern Territory, a total of 21 zones were defined 
based on two studies, one for Central Australia (Bartlett et al 1997) and one for the Top 
End (Bartlett & Duncan 2000).41 The primary health care resources and needs were 
mapped out, and priority zones for PHCAP development were selected. In Central 
Australia, five zones were selected as priorities for PHCAP implementation, based on
41 These two studies are really an environmental scan of (lack of) services availability in the 
NT. They make for remarkable reading, with some communities as late as the mid nineties 
receiving visits from a flying medical officer once or twice a year, and no other forms of health 
care services (Bartlett et al 1997, Bartlett & Duncan 2000).
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highest needs and the scarcity of available services. This task was completed in 1998. 
At the time of writing, the development of zone strategic plans for primary health care 
are in their infancy, and PHCAP fatigue is prevalent.
As shown in Figure 4.2, the structure and process adopted for the 
implementation of PHCAP is remarkably complex, involving three layers in the 
decision-making process. Each layer brings together the. four main stakeholders and 
members of the Health Forum: the Aboriginal Medical Services Alliance of the Northern 
Territory (AMSANT, the territorial ACCHS peak body), the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission (ATSIC), the Territorial Health Services (THS) and the 
Commonwealth Department of Health & Aged Care (DHAC). While each layer may 
very well be essential to the successful implementation of PHCAP, there are some 
sticking features to this structure. First, it is remarkably complex when one considers 
that an organisation like AMSANT is relatively small, and that the total NT ATSI 
population to be served in the 21 zones identified is around 50,000. Thus, the 
multiplicity of roles adds a considerable workload to relatively few staff within this 
organisation.
Second, the program literature on PHCAP speaks to the role of each individual 
partner (THS, OATSIH, AMSANT and ATSIC). Two main issues remain unclear:
• The roles and responsibilities of each layer represented in the structure are not
defined; and •
• The timelines and output expected from each layer are also not defined (Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Health Forum 2001a, 2001b, 2001c).
Third, there are concerns that the discussions to date have been spent in 
meetings dealing with higher issues, and that zone issues, including capacity building, 
have been left to be dealt with later (Interviews AU05, AU20, also raised in many 
informal discussions). According to the PHCAP literature, consultants hired by OATSIH 
were allocated 3 to 6 months to come up with zone plans. What seemed to have 
occupied the planners could perhaps be qualified as consensus building. This of 
course is necessary. But a concern that recurred in interviews was that community 
members who were to be helped by this “community controlled” initiative had not been 
integrated into the process. Another concern is that PHCAP is now absorbing all 
energies. Although it is progressively being rolled out, a full implementation will take 
some time. Fifteen years after it was announced, the Health Transfer Policy, a PHCAP- 
like model, has been successfully rolled out to 67 percent of eligible communities 
(Health Canada 2001). Medium term solutions may be required. Because it is seen as 
the solution, reflections on immediate and intermediate solutions for low priority 
PHCAP zones have not been discussed.
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Australia’s most recent health policy position is the 2003 Aboriginal Health 
Strategic Framework, a product of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Council. 
The document has reasserted the 1989 National Aboriginal Health Strategy’s 
commitment to ATSI community controlled primary health care services, naming the 
new Primary Health Care Access Program and making a commitment to supporting the 
development of ATSI Health Boards. It notably goes beyond primary health care and 
identifies the need for the whole health care system to become more responsive to 
ATSI health. The document was signed by all state and territorial Health Ministers 
(National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council & Australian Health 
Ministers' Conference 2003).
Figure 4.2: Primary Health Care Access Program - NT Implementation Structure
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This was followed on April 1st, 2004, by Parliament announcing the demise of 
ATSIC. As a result, ATSIC’s portfolio, which included all ATSI-specific programs with 
the exception of health, has been distributed across; thirteen Commonwealth 
Government Departments, An Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination will be located
113
within the Department of Multiculturalism and Aboriginal Affairs.42 While the 
mainstreaming of ATSI programs may be construed as a step backward, it also 
removes ATSI services from the realm of projects, and places them within existing 
program frameworks that are usually better funded. The shift from ATSIC-managed 
ATSI health projects to the Commonwealth Department of Health in 1995 has yielded 
positive policy commitments. The engagement of 13 separate Commonwealth 
Departments and their state/territorial counterparts is however likely to create 
coordination and consensus building challenges.
4.1.3 Summary
In summary, Australia has progressively moved from mainly state-delivered 
policies of either benign neglect or control, to the promotion of ACCHS as a 
mechanism to provide more appropriate health services. The process has evolved 
largely in answer to ATSI pressures. ACCHS emerged in the early 1970s. The National 
Aboriginal Health Strategy (NAHS) was adopted In the late 1980s. Since, ACCHS have 
been endorsed and promoted in official policies as a key solution to improve ATSI 
health. The implementation of the NAHS was largely delayed until the Commonwealth 
Department of Health took over the responsibility for ATSI health in 1995.
PHCAP is emerging as the new strategy to improve ATSI health and access to 
health care. It is an ambitious policy shift. If implemented as planned, ATSI controlled 
health services will change from playing a role of patch in the system, to that of being 
an integral part of the system, with stable funding. This policy appears to be supported 
by the Commonwealth, state and territorial Health Ministers, and has been well 
received in the ATSI community. This may reflect nearly thirty years of ATSI advocacy 
and consensus building. While support now exists at the political level, implementing 
PHCAP will require yet more localised consensus building, creating other challenges.
4.2 New Zealand
Like Australia and Canada, New Zealand has opted to promote the 
development of indigenous-led primary health care. In contrast to Australia and 
Canada however, New Zealand has resisted pressures by Maori to set up a separate 
funding avenue for Maori services. Maori providers emerged in the 1990s following the 
implementation of the purchaser-provider split. Thereafter, they began to compete for 
funding alongside other providers. The Ministry of Health reports that the sector grew 
from 23 providers in 1993 to 240 in 1998 (New Zealand Te Puni KOkiri 2000). The rapid
42 This information can be read on the ATSIC website, at 
http://www.atsic.aov.au/ATSIC ATSIS Closure/Default.aso.
114
growth of the Maori health sector has created challenges, many of which can be linked 
to a revolving reform process that has taken New Zealanders through four major health 
care reforms in a period of twelve years.
The most recent reform is shifting the focus of the system from competition to a 
more systematic deployment of primary health care funding, associated with 
régionalisation and the consolidation of primary health care providers under the 
umbrella of Primary Health Organisations (PHOs). Despite a policy that continues to 
support the development of Maori providers, some have expressed some fear that the 
emerging PHOs may in fact challenge their existence (Interviews NZ11, NZ16). This 
section focuses on the emergence of Màori health providers and the development of 
Mâori health policy.
4.2.1 Historical context
The settlement of New Zealand followed a different path from that of Australia 
and Canada. As the last colony to be settled, the colonial government was committed 
to avoid the violence documented in Australia, and the complexities of the reserve 
system established in Canada and the United States. Integration rather than 
marginalisation became the objective. The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840 
between the Crown, the Governor and around 500 Màori Chiefs. The need for a Treaty 
had been discussed by the Crown for a few years prior to signature. Moon contends 
that from the Crown's perspective, the impetus for the Treaty was the need to regulate 
and protect its British citizens living in New Zealand and to exert territorial sovereignty 
(Moon 1999). Discussions leading up to the Treaty made no mention of extending the 
protection of British common law to Màori.
From 1840, the imperial government adopted a policy of "racial amalgamation", 
conferring certain legal and civil rights to Màori while selectively incorporating them into 
European institutions. It appears that the goal was to ensure the achievement of 
colonial ends peacefully and to avoid the costs of military interventions, while 
appeasing philanthropic interests in London. Hospitals were set up using colonial 
funds in Auckland, Wellington, Wanganui and New Plymouth. These were non- 
segregated and accessible to both Màori and Europeans, a phenomenon Nicolson 
believes was unique in the history of British colonial administration (Nicolson 1988). 
The overall goal of the policy of racial amalgamation was to integrate Màori, while 
buying up land and ensuring the peaceful settlement of New Zealand. The education of 
Màori in European ways was prioritised. The anticipated result was that of a 
monocultural European country. Still, the strategy yielded some benefits, including four
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seats reserved for Maori to ensure representation43 in Parliament, some forums for 
Maori participation in health care and better educational attainment. These provisions 
have no real equivalent in Australia or Canada (Dow 1995, 1999, Durie 1998a, 1998b), 
but nevertheless fell short of Maori aspirations for a parallel government. The Treaty of 
Waitangi remained largely ignored for many years.
The seventies proved a time of rapid changes. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
was passed by parliament, thereby removing the implementation of the Treaty from the 
realm of policy and providing a mechanism to resolve disputes. Maori were 
increasingly more vocal about the need to link culture and health. This led to Maori 
conferences, health promotion campaigns and community health initiatives, including 
the 1984 Hui Whakaoranga that recommended increased Maori participation (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health 1984). While Maori argued that health could be described 
as taonga [cultural assets], and therefore protected under article two of the Treaty, this 
interpretation was rejected by the New Zealand government, which argued that its 
responsibility in matters of health care was the same for all citizens. Although the 
debate did not lead to separate services, it has provided a solid base for Maori to argue 
for “a fair share of society’s benefits” (Durie 1998b) including health.
The 1988 policy statement Te Urupare RangapQ (Wetere 1988) made an 
unprecedented and never repeated commitment for the Crown to enter into 
partnerships with iwi, which, under the policy, would be tasked and funded to deliver 
services on the Crown’s behalf. Iwi were to be formalised as legal corporations under 
the short lived Runanga Iwi Act 1990. The Act was a response to increasing demands 
for the recognition of a Maori’s system of governance in New Zealand politics, 
reflecting Maori aspiration for tino rangatiratanga [self-determination). Although the Act 
was repealed the same year it was passed,44 its influence on policy remains.
A Board of Health Standing Committee on Maori Health had been set up in 
1984 to advise on policy. It was replaced by a Ministerial Advisory Committee on Maori 
Health in 1989. Both initiatives were short lived and had limited success, but eventually 
led to the current structure of the Maori Health Directorate located within the Ministry of 
Health, in place since 1993 (Durie 1998b). The commitment to a partnership between 
the Crown and Maori had been diluted considerably. The Crown has now adopted a 
fairly narrow view of the Treaty of Waitangi, with a fluctuating recognition of the iwi as
43 Albeit at a lower level that demographics might allow.
44 By focusing on the iwi, the Runanga Act had failed to provide a mechanism to represent 
the interests of Maori unaffiliated with an iwi, and/or living in urban environments. The tension 
between /w/-based governance structures and the pan-/w/ reality of urban Maori is not new. A 
satisfactory solution remains to be found.
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the centre of Maori participation. The Treaty-based health policy advocated for by 
Maori has yet to emerge.
4.2.2 Background to the Development of Maori Providers
New Zealand's national health care system was first set up in 1938 through the 
Social Security Act, providing free and universal access to general practitioners, 
hospitals, pharmaceutical and maternity services. The health care system hinges on 
the government acting as the single public payer for health services. At the same time, 
the provision of services remained largely in the hands of the private sector, with 261 
private hospitals and medical, pharmacy and laboratory services. While the number of 
private hospital beds would initially diminish following the implementation of the Social 
Security Act45 from 22 percent in 1938 to 15 percent in 1949, it was recognised that 
private hospitals drew less on the public purse. The 1957 Hospitals Act was to support 
higher subsidy to private hospitals, thereby entrenching a dual hospital system (Dow 
1995). From the time the Act was implemented, the New Zealand government 
recognised that cost control would be an issue.
By the early 1980s, state funding was mostly for the young, old and heavy adult 
users. Out of pocket payments and private insurance reimbursement were the main 
source of payment for services for the majority of New Zealanders (Borren & Maynard 
1993). An economic downturn coupled with rising cost led to the introduction of more 
cost cutting measures in the 1980s. From then on, New Zealand embarked on a series 
of reforms, each leading to a shift in the authority responsible for purchasing primary 
health care services, namely the Area Health Boards (1983-1993), the Regional Health 
Authorities (1993-1998), the Health Funding Authority (1998-2000) and the District 
Health Boards (current). This is detailed in Table 4.2.
The decentralisation to 17 Area Health Boards (AHB) was intended to provide 
local co-ordination of public health and hospital care. The idea was first introduced by 
the Labour government following the 1972 election. Implementation was however 
stalled by an overwhelming lack of support from the medical profession, small hospital 
boards, voluntary agencies and the private sector. Implementation was completed in 
1983. Physicians were left to operate on a fee-for-service basis (Gauld 2001). The 
AHBs marked the beginning of community participation in health care planning. The 
Labour Party was re-elected in 1984 and continued with the implementation plan, albeit 
with a closer look at integration. It took another 6 years to bring all hospitals under the
45 One reason for this decline was that public hospitals offered unfair competition.
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umbrella of the AHBs (Clark 1989) and for the government to fully define the 
relationship between the Ministry and the AHBs (New Zealand Ministry of Health 1989).
Figure 4.3: New Zealand Health Care Financing
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By 1983, the Department of Health began to subsidise Maori community health 
centres. These centres were expected to be community-based, community-staffed and 
community-controlled. Implementation required a substantial training component for 
staff (van Meijl 1993). As will be discussed in chapter 5, Te Runanga O Raukawa 
(TROR)’s health services emerged as a result of this initiative. The services provided 
were limited to the hiring of Màori Health Workers to act as liaison in the system 
(Interview NZ16, Te Runanga O Raukawa Inc. 1994). Funding was available on a 
yearly basis and provided limited capacity building and administration. This marked the 
beginning of Maori organisations’ participation in health care delivery (Durie 1987).
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Table 4.2, Health funding bodies through the reforms (Gauld 2001) ...............  i
Era Party in power
Leading
Ideology Authority
Number
nationally Billing l
1972-
1975
Labour
Government
Régionalisation
Rationalisation
Area Health Boards 
under planning
1975-
1983
National
Government
Régionalisation
Rationalisation
Area Health Boards 
under planning j
1983-
1993
Labour
Government
(1984)
Régionalisation
Rationalisation Area Health Boards
17 Regional j authority
1993-
1997
National
Government
(1990)
Privatisation
Competition
Regional Health 
Authorities 4
Regional 
authority j
1997-
1998
New Zealand 
First-National 
Coalition (1996)
Public
Administration 
Status quo
Transitional Health 
Authority 1
National
office
1998-
2000
New Zealand 
First-National 
Coalition (1996)
Public
Administration
Competition
Health Funding 
Authority 1
Regional
authority
2001-
current
Labour Party 
(1999)
Public
Administration
Coordination
District Health 
Boards 21
National
office
4.2.3 The consolidation of Mâori Health Providers
The engagement of self-governing iwi in public policy is relatively recent. 
Historically, New Zealand has preferred to engage Mâori in public policy and public 
health by promoting individual Maori participation in public bodies. For example, the 
passage of the Mâori Council Act in 1900 gave nineteen elected Mâori Councils a 
vehicle for community input into local affairs and public health. The formation of the 
Department of Health in 1901 reaffirmed the role of the Councils in public health (Durie 
2000). These structures were revived in 1945, with Mâori Councils at the village level 
and regional Mâori District Councils, each being given responsibilities in the areas of 
welfare, housing and economic development. The Council’s historical role in promoting 
Mâori development has been important. However, these structures were never 
independent agents of Mâori self-determination (Ward 1999). The focus rather echoed 
the historical decision of promoting integration (Interview NZ23).
Following the refocused attention to the Treaty of Waitangi, the 1988 Royal 
Commission on Social Policy recommended that three Treaty based principles become 
the basis of all social policy dealing with Mâori;
• Partnership: working together with iwi, hapQ, whsnau and Mâori communities to 
develop strategies for Mâori health gain and appropriate health and disability 
services.
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• Participation: Involving Maori at all levels of the sector in planning, development 
and delivery of health and disability services.
• Protection: Ensuring Maori enjoy at least the same level of health as non-Maori and 
safeguarding Maori cultural concepts, values and practices (New Zealand National 
Health Committee on Health and Disability 2002).
What these principles mean in practice has shifted over time (Interviews NZ16, NZ24, 
NZ30).
The return to power of the right-leaning and market oriented National Party in 
1990 led to the demise of the AHBs, despite campaign claims to the contrary (Gauld 
2001). The 1991 Green and White paper called for,
• the introduction of the purchaser-provider split;
• the establishment of four Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) bulk-funded and 
tasked with the purchasing of services from public, private and non-government 
organisations;
• alternative Health Care Plans from which New Zealanders could chose to purchase 
care and to ensure competition with the RHAs;
• 23 for-profit Crown Health Enterprises, mostly hospitals, also competing for health 
dollars and the provision of services;
• an independent Public Health Commission to provide advice, and a Public Health 
Agency to monitor and provide services; and •
• a shift to managing health services via contractual relationships with independent 
providers (Upton 1991).
These changes were proposed in the name of fairness, efficiency, increased personal 
choice and self-reliance. This has become known as the 'big bang' approach to health 
care reform. While Ideologically-driven, the new National Government was also 
motivated to address the financial crisis New Zealand was heading towards, with health 
services accounting for 61 percent of the overall budget. The controversial market- 
oriented RHA system was implemented In 1993.
General Practitioners anticipated the Implementation of competition with some 
concerns and began to organise themselves as Independent Practitioners Associations 
(IPAs), owned and governed by General Practitioners. Malcolm and Mays (1999) 
reported that thirty IPAs were in operation in 1999. Over time, they have gained access 
to development and research funding, and provide a spectrum of services including 
some health promotion and prevention.
Maori also received the announcement of the purchaser-provider split with a 
mixture of apprehension and hope. Maori organisations anticipated that opportunities
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may develop for greater involvement in service delivery. But at the same time, such 
participation would imply a support for the commercial overtone of the reform:
"Tino rangatiratanga and its promise of greater Maori autonomy could be construed as 
offering implicit support for privatization or at least for reduced State provision of 
services" (Durie 1998b).
The RHAs were instructed to follow the recommendations of the joint 
Department of Health and Te Puni Kokiri [Ministry of Màori Development] policy 
document Whaia te ora mo te /'w/,46 promoting the development of by Maori for Mâori 
health services and the adoption of a developmental approach to Màori providers (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health & New Zealand Te Puni Kokiri 1993). As a result, a number 
of Màori organisations signed contracts with the RHAs, resulting in an increased 
number of Màori organisations providing primary health care. Under the RHA model, 
specific Màori policy guidelines were issued yearly (New Zealand Ministry of Health 
1994, 1995a, 1996a). These documents granted considerable latitude to the RHAs as 
to the exact direction of their purchasing strategy (Cunningham & Durie 1999), resulting 
in different approaches:
• The North Regional Health Authority adopted a population-based approach to 
purchasing and promoted the development of Màori Purchasing Organisations 
(MAPOs) (Ashton 1995, Kiro 2001). Three MAPO were set up, linked to a total of 
20 by Màori for Màori providers (1997 figures, New Zealand Transitional Health 
Authority Maori Health Groups 1997).
• The Midland Regional Health Authority set up four regionally-based pan-/'w/' joint- 
ventures, tasked to advise on Màori health service purchasing (Hartley & Mules 
1996, New Zealand Transitional Health Authority Maori Health Groups 1997).
• The Central Regional Health Authority opted to adopt a “community development” 
approach and established direct relationships with the 15 iwi in the region. This 
approach led to consultations as to how Màori themselves preferred to see the 
direction of Maori provider development (New Zealand Transitional Health Authority 
Maori Health Groups 1997).
• The Southern Regional Authority promoted a “community-driven” approach, where 
Màori played an advisory role in the purchase of health and disability services (New 
Zealand Transitional Health Authority Maori Health Groups 1997).
Both the Central and Midland Regional Health Authorities endorsed a more aggressive 
approach to contracting to encourage competition (Howden Chapman & Ashton 1994).
The shift towards privatisation and the purchaser-provider split created 
opportunities and the number of Màori providers expanded quickly. The era was one of 
experimentation with different models.
46 Strive for the Good Health of the People,
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• Co-ordinated care was introduced in 1995 to described the MAPO, population- 
based approaches and initiatives that blended primary and secondary care (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health 1995b).
• Managed care by Mâori was introduced by Te Puni Kokiri at a hui held at the 
Whangarae Marae in December 1994. It involved the establishment of Mâori 
organisations as purchaser and provider of health services for a registered 
population (New Zealand Te Puni Kokiri 1995).
• The Midland Regional Health Authority encouraged the development of Integrated 
Care Organisations as fund holders and tasked to provide a range of services for a 
defined population. Mâori joint-venture Boards were encouraged to develop new 
structures in view of setting up a Mâori Integrated Care Organisation (MICO). The 
1996/97 policy guidelines to RHAs explicitly supported these initiatives (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health 1996b).
According to Durie (1998b), the opportunities opened up by the RHAs however fell 
short of Mâori aspirations, because,
• The burden of administration, stringency and level of details of the contracts led 
some participating Mâori organisations to compromise on Mâori values;
• In the process, tino rangatiratanga was reconstrued by the New Zealand 
government as self-management;
• The off-loading of state obligations on iwi authorities and the resulting contract 
monitoring increased the State’s involvement in iwi administration; and
• In the name of efficiency, iwi were placed in a situation of competition with one 
another as service providers, a situation that created tensions and divisions, 
instead of collaboration.47
He sums up the impact of the reform, stating that, "Privatization masqueraded as tino 
rangatiratanga.b icu ltura lism  was confused with partnership; and devolution merely 
created the illusion of self-determination" (Durie 1998b).
The RHA model of competitive contracting proved expensive and labour 
intensive to maintain. The Transitional Health Authority (THA) was established in 1997 
to replace the Regional Health Authorities. The move was an attempt by the Minister of 
Health to shift the focus from a regionalised and competitive development to the 
implementation of national standards in purpose, contracting and pricing (Gauld 2001). 
In terms of Mâori development, the THA proposed to make strategic investments at two 
levels. First, it opted to create a fund to support Mâori provider development in terms of 
infrastructure and workforce development. As a result, the Mâori Provider Development 
Fund (MPDF) was set in place. Second, it opted to support the MICO model as
47 Under the HFA, the development of Maori providers was strongly encouraged. In practice 
however, observers recall that issues of sustainability were not necessarily considered, resulting 
in a multiplicity of small Maori providers competing for limited opportunities (Inrerviews NZ06, 
NZ10. NZ23, NZ25; Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 2000c).
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developed by the Midland Regional Health Authority (New Zealand Transitional Health 
Authority Maori Health Groups 1997, Interviews NZ24, NZ30). The Health Funding 
Authority (HFA), set up in 1998 in replacement for the THA, issued an internal and brief 
Màori Health Policy to guide its purchasing practices (New Zealand Health Funding 
Authority 1998a). The HFA continued to work towards standardisation in priorities, 
pricing and process. The policy made it explicit that Màori health gains could not be 
achieved solely through the development of Màori health providers. Thus, every 
contract saw the inclusion of a Màori Health Clause, requiring all providers to,
“establish and implement a Maori Health Policy that reflects that fact. In developing this 
policy the provider will take into account the Purchaser's strategic direction for Maori 
health in terms of minimum requirements for Maori health based on the Treaty of 
Waitangi, Crown objectives for Maori health and specific requirements negotiated from 
time to time with the Purchaser* (King 2000).
Following the election of the Labour Party in November 1999, the Ministry of Health 
and the HFA found themselves increasingly at odds. Observers recall the HFA coming 
out in the media with statements contradicting the Labour government (Interviews 
NZ24, NZ30). In particular, the HFA actively promoted the American HMO-inspired 
Integrated Care Organisations (ICO) and Màori Integrated Care Organisations (MICO) 
models that aimed at merging primary and secondary care funding under single 
organisation for a registered population. This model was not supported by the new 
Minister, who was perhaps echoing concerns from general practitioners (Central 
Region Maori/lwi Integrated Care Organisations 1998). Many Màori organisations were 
engaged in developing proposals in 1997 and 1998. By December 1999, all MICO 
development was stopped. Màori organisations were instead instructed to develop 
proposals for the establishment of Màori Development Organisations (MDO) (Te 
Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 2000b, Te Runanga 0  Raukawa Inc. 1999c). 
The focus of this emerging model was to act as coordinating and capacity development 
organisations to support the multiplicity of small Màori providers that had emerged 
under the previous reforms.
The June 2000 New Zealand Health Strategy signified the intent of the 
government to return to decentralisation (King 2000) by announcing the creation of 21 
District Health Boards (DHBs). This strategy, which remains current, promotes the 
formation of Primary Health Organisations (PHOs) to consolidate general practices and 
other primary care providers, including Màori providers and IP As, under a single 
coordinating organisation offering services to a registered population. The PHOs have 
been tasked to develop service plans targeting priority health gains and improving 
access for Màori, Pacific Islanders and economically deprived New Zealanders (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health 2004). Organisational membership into PHOs is optional.
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However, providers and IPA who decide not to join a PHO will be expected to secure 
their primary health care funding via one or perhaps a number of PHOs (New Zealand 
Ministry of Health 2002a, NGO\MOH Health and Disability Forum 2004). As of March 
2004, the Ministry reported that 49 mostly IPA-driven PHOs had been formed 
(NGOWIOH Health and Disability Forum 2004).
The New Zealand Health Strategy and associated literature make an explicit 
commitment to Maori providers and to MDOs (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2001 d). 
He Korowai Oranga, the Maori health strategy, reaffirms the Treaty-based core values 
of partnership, participation and protection. The strategy recognises three key threads: 
rangatiratanga, building on the gains and reducing inequalities. It is notable that the 
strategy speaks of rangatiratanga, but not of tino rangatiratanga. Rangatira is the 
Maori word for chief. The suffix tanga refers to attributes or qualities of chieftainship. In 
acknowledging rangatiratanga,48 the strategy speaks to Maori’s right to exercise 
leadership in health. The word tino in the context of tino rangatiratanga refers to 
'absolute/unqualified chieftainship'. The commitment to rangatiratanga may be best 
explained by the strategy emphasising Maori participation within existing structures and 
processes, rather than the development of parallel Maori-specific structures and 
processes. The strategy reiterates the commitment to Maori provider development, 
Maori Development Organisations (MDO) and Maori Purchasing Organisations 
(MAPO). It repeats the thirteen priority health gains identified in the New Zealand 
Health Strategy (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2002c). The document 
WhakatStaka,49 Maori Health Action Plan 2002-2005 provides a blue print to the 
District Health Boards for implementation (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2002c). It 
highlights the role of the DHB, iwi and Maori communities in the regional planning 
process. With regard to Maori provider development, the action plan situates the 
process as a partnership between the Ministry of Health, existing Maori providers, 
Maori communities and DHBs. Wth regards to the emerging PHOs, the action plan 
speaks to Maori provider participation in PHOs but does not take a position on 
governance.
The DHBs have been tasked with the development of PHOs. How this 
development will impact existing Maori providers remains unclear. As in the past, 
regional differences are anticipated. In Auckland, the development of a consortium of 
previously independent Maori providers has led to the formation of two Maori-driven 
PHOs. In other regions, Maori providers anticipate having to affiliate themselves with
48 Williams translates the word as “evidence of breeding and greatness* (Williams 2002).
49 The weaving of strands.
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PHOs that are managed by consortiums of Maori and non-Maori specific organisations, 
or driven by IPAs.
4.2.4 Summary
Since 1988, health policies have reiterated the principles of partnership, 
participation and protection. What these principles have meant shifted over time 
depending on the focus of the reform. During the Area Health Board era (1983-1993), 
some Maori providers were able to secure contracts to employ Maori Health Workers 
as liaisons in the system. The implementation of the RHAs (1993-1997) and its focus 
on privatisation created opportunities for Maori providers to multiply and experiment 
with different models of service delivery. Competition was finally abandoned under the 
HFA (1997-2000). It was during the era that a policy was adopted requiring all 
providers to demonstrate how their services helped meet the Government Maori health 
gain priorities, thus ensuring that all services would become responsive to Maori 
needs. The recent DHB-PHO development requires Maori to link with IPAs and 
consolidate primary health care interventions.
Although a commitment to Maori providers exists in writing since 1993, what 
that commitment has meant has shifted over time. Maori advocacy for tino 
rangatiratanga, or parallel services governed by Maori, has been met with opportunities 
to participate in existing structures. All policy documentation nevertheless cites the 
Treaty of Waitangi and requires a Treaty-based partnership with iwi. It is obvious that a 
consensus on what this Treaty actually means in terms of Maori’s place within New 
Zealand has yet to emerge.
4.3 Indigenous health policies in Canada. Australia and New Zealand
The last two sections reviewed the emergence of indigenous health care 
policies in Australia and New Zealand. This section provides a cross-national analysis 
guided by the questions developed in chapter 2, namely,
1. What are the historical factors that impacted the development of indigenous health 
policies?
2. What values are apparent in policies?
3. Do policies more readily reflect indigenous aspirations, indigenous-state’s historical 
relationship or other interests?
4. What are the apparent compromises made in the process of implementation?
5. What factors led to compromises?
The literature suggests that the relationship between policy formulation and 
implementation is impacted by five factors:
• A consensus on objectives based on a clear theory of cause and effect;
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• The amount of change required for full implementation;
• The availability of resources;
• External pressures and continued commitment; and
• Policy makers’ control over the implementation process (Van Meter & Van Horn 
1975, Walt 1988).
Australian and New Zealand policies will now be revisited in light of these criteria and 
Canadian experience. Findings are summarised in Table 4.3.
Australia The implementation of the 1989 National Aboriginal Health Strategy 
(NAHS) followed rather than preceded the ACCHS movement. The NAHS shows 
evidence of ATSI and of the ACCHS movement’s advocacy. While there may have 
been broad consensus within the ATSI community over the objectives of the NAHS, 
there were significant delays in implementing the strategy. These delays were related 
to,
• The moving of ATSI health funding from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) to the Commonwealth Department of Health, achieved in 
1995; and
• The consensus building required for the formation of ATSI Health Forums in each 
state and territory, with representatives from the Commonwealth Department of 
Health (OATSIH), the state or territorial health department, NACCHO and ATSIC. 
The forums are tasked with states/territories setting ATSI health priorities and 
defining strategies.
Until the adoption of PHCAP, the amount of change required was important, but 
gradual.
The values reflected in the 2003 Aboriginal Health Strategy reiterate those first 
included in the 1989 National Aboriginal Health Strategy, namely,
• Health equity;
• Participation by ATSI people in national and state/territorial priority setting;
• Community control of primary health care services as a preferred method of service 
delivery with a focus on localised decision-making; and •
• Improved responsiveness of the whole system.
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; Table 4 .3, Health Policy Frameworks in Australia and N ew  Zealand (see Appendix II for more details).
§. Australia Mew Zealand
- F^ndation**^ "^ hfi 1989 National Aboriginal Health Strategy and 2003 Aboriginal Health Strategy
[The 2000 New Zealand Health Strategy acknowledges that il
(the Crown is a Treaty partner with Maori; '!§
the Treaty guarantees cultural protection for Maori, meaning that that Maori will have an important role in |  
implementing health strategies for Maori. ;|
1; * people win be part of local primary health care services that improve their health, keep them well, are
|  Policy objectives ensure that Abonginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples enjoy a long and healthy life enriched by a ieasy to get to and coordinate their ongoing care.
i  strong Irving culture, drgnrty and justice. Primary health care services will focus on better health for a population, and actively work to reduce
i  ^  ___ ¡health inequalities between different groups.
Cultural secunty;
|; Addressing inequalities;
i t ; , ,  'ATSI participation in planning forums and at the national level;
y Values apparent
|  in policy Community controlled health services;
Responsiveness of the whole system;
Commitment to PHCAP (since 2000) reflecting an interest in providing Aboriginal health Boards with 
substantial funding to provide comprehensive pnmary health care services.
Integrative rather than parallel systems;
Building on the gains, highlights improvements in Mâori and w h a n a u  o ra  outcomes, service uptake and 
Maori participation throughout the health and disability sector.
¡Reducing inequalities in health care.
Central government ¡Central government
Pre-PHCAP: central government
fclHB and PHOs
v level of 
I  consensus
% Authority for ¿policy aformulation
ir Authonty for 
i- policy
; implementation ^ ost PHCAP: centra! and statertemtonal governments
'■ Although slow in emerging, them appears to be broad consensus surrounding the objectives of the 2003 F or ,he Past «  years- heaf  rare reforms have.succeeded each other too quickly to have time to build
Aboriomal Heafth Strateav consensus and ensure political sustainability. There is no broad-based consensus for the current PHO
I ___ _ (development process.
I  Amount of Until recently, moderate and gradual. ¡Considerable:
?-change required m^Piemerrtin9 PHCAP and ensunng the responsiveness of the overall system wifi require a considerable fThe current focus on PHO requires IPA and independent providers such as Mâori providers to merge,
|  amount Of change. __ thus shifting power relations and potentially impacting Mâori governance of Maori organisations.
 ^Availability of 
[resources
External 
' pressures and 
 ^continued 
* commitment
Until PHCAP, implementing the NAHS did not require a substantial investment of ATSJ-speafic 
resources. PHCAP wifi however require an unprecedented investment.
international and national focus on health inequalities.
As a result of integration, the implementation erf Maori health policies does not require the ring fencing of 
significant resources to be allocated to Maori organisations.
~,§
The sustainability of the current reform and of its associated institutions may be challenged by a change 
In government.
Policymakers’ >
•1 control over the The Commonwealth Depart of Health has little control over the overall implementation process, since this 
i -implementation engages state and temtonal government and ATSl forums, and the ACCHS sector.
'^ process
The policy writers (Ministry of Health and Maori Health Directorate) have indirect control over 
imptementaiion. The DHBs and PHOs will platy a large role. Past experience shows that organisations 
have in the past benefited in a great deal of latitude in interpretation.
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Implementing PHCAP will require a considerable investment in terms of time 
and resources by the Commonwealth and state/territorial government. Although the 
2003 Strategy was signed by all state and territorial Health Ministers, suggesting a high 
level consensus, it is at the implementation level that compromises may be required. 
PHCAP will necessitate the engagement of a number of players not directly under the 
control of the Commonwealth government, namely state and territorial government for 
financial contributions and ATSI peak bodies and communities. The substantial 
financial investment in ATSI-specific organisations will increase the visibility of ATSI 
health services to the Australian public. PHCAP may also impact existing providers in 
less isolated regions. Current debates over the deployment of PHCAP have focused on 
whether ATSI people have the capacity to shoulder the level of responsibility required 
of them. There is already some evidence that implementing PHCAP will be 
contentious, and may, as in Canada, lead to compromises in implementation. This will 
be explored in more details in Chapters 5 and 6.
New Zealand Since 1988, New Zealand social policies have spoken of the 
principles of partnership, participation and protection. The way in which these principles 
have been reflected in the health sector has shifted depending on ideology. The 
process of reform has led to the multiplication of small providers. Reforms succeeded 
each other too quickly for consensus building, full implementation or evaluation.
Historically, guidelines citing Treaty obligations were released by the 
purchasing body of the day to ensure responsiveness to Màori, This approach now 
appears to be waning. The recent reform saw the release of a broader-based policy 
requiring the engagement of Maori providers, Mâori communities, the DHBs and the 
Ministry of Health in regional planning. The DHBs and emerging PHOs are also 
required to ensure Maori involvement in program planning and on the Board. The 
Boards have been tasked with developing a Treaty partnership with all /w/ located 
within their boundaries. The partnership requires the engagement of the local iwi on the 
Health Board and decision-making committee. The partnership is however not a one- 
to-one, DHB-/VW relationship. Although iwi designates may speak to the interests of 
their iwi, they hold a single vote and can be overruled by the Board or Committee.
The tread that runs through the past fifteen years is that Mâori providers have 
emerged, and gained credibility. They are now mentioned in policy, albeit in somewhat 
ambiguous ways, While there is a commitment to Mâori providers and MDOs, there is a 
higher commitment to consolidating small primary health care providers and IPAs into 
PHOs. The ambiguity of the current policy documents speaks to the need to balance 
the coordination of primary health care resources and Mâori aspirations for tino 
rangatiratanga. This ambiguity will however need to be settled in implementation. Here,
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pressures from stakeholders are likely to play an important role and may lead to 
different solutions. In the Auckland area, larger Maori providers have joined with IPAs 
to develop two Maori controlled PHOs. In other areas, Maori anticipate that PHOs may 
be dominated by IPAs and/or non-Maori, and that the principles of partnership, 
participation and protection may be interpreted in a variety of ways. Preliminary reports 
suggest that these assumptions are correct (NGCAMOH. Health and Disability Forum
2004).
The current policy is consistent with a past commitment towards integrated 
rather than parallel systems. The Maori Health Strategy emphasises the role of Maori 
providers in addressing health inequalities, and requires DHBs to establish a Treaty- 
based relationship with iwi located in their respective boundaries. It also focuses on 
improving the responsiveness of the overall health care system. Although addressing 
health inequalities is prioritised, the focus here is on addressing health gain priorities 
identified nationally rather than on local priority setting.
The situation documented in Australia and New Zealand contrasts with that of 
Canada. Of all three countries, Health Transfer Policy is by far the most narrowly 
focused. It vows to work towards improving health outcomes in First Nation 
communities. The mechanism chosen is that of community-based primary health 
organisations integrated with First Nation governance structures. The federal 
government department tasked with policy formulation, FNIHB, is also the funder- 
purchaser. The federal government has never attempted to extend its influence to 
ensure that provincial services are responsive to First Nations. The responsiveness of 
secondary and tertiary care remains unaddressed. ; '
Consensus building does play an important role in the Canadian context, in that 
transfer uptake by First Nation is voluntary. Local buy-in is therefore crucial to the 
success of the policy. At the national level, the Assembly of First Nations has 
established a relationship with Health Canada, and sits on planning meetings advising 
on the development of initiatives. Their contribution is important and influential, but also 
limited to the political sphere. For the past 20 years or so, the Canadian approach has 
been to promote the transfer of responsibility for community-based services to First 
Nation authorities. Thus, the focus has been largely one of local engagement.
In many ways, the distinctions that exist between the Canadian, Australian and 
New Zealand approaches to indigenous health policy reflect the debates shaping 
indigenous health policies explored in Chapter 2. While all three countries recognise 
indigenous identity as collective identity and accommodate for participation in services 
delivery, the policies that emerged reflect a different understanding or willingness to 
accommodate the concept of self-determination. For example, Canadian policies
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clearly favour a localised concept that relies on tribe-specific governments delivering 
government-designed programs with varying levels of specificity. In New Zealand, 
DHBs are expected to develop /vw-specific, Treaty-based partnerships that ensure local 
iwi a voice in decision-making. Although Maori expect this approach to also extend to 
service delivery, the Ministry of Health has resisted the development of parallel 
services for Maori. In Australia, ATSI provider development has been left largely to 
community-based mobilisations. Australia's former practices of ATSI displacement and 
relocation have largely destroyed traditional governance practices. Most communities 
are blends of many ATSI language groups. The ATSI community has focused its 
energies on securing better access to services delivered by ATSI communities 
themselves, and on participating in decision-making on ATSI issues at all levels. It is 
noteworthy that both New Zealand and Australia speak to the need to improve the 
responsiveness of the overall system, whereas Canada focuses on local service 
delivery alone. It thus appears that a localised concept of self-determination leads to a 
much narrower approach to the pursuit of health gains. The choice of approach is not 
evidence-based, but is rather rooted in history and in political debates as they evolved 
over time.
4.4 Conclusions
Although by indigenous for indigenous policies emerged from different 
processes and in different contexts, the policies also bear the marks of international 
debates on indigenous rights. The text of the policies would suggest that policy 
statements take positions that are likely broadly supported to ensure political 
sustainability. The policies reflect commitments made in the distant past, for example, 
integration in New Zealand. They also reflect the value of equity in health, and implicitly 
embody debates over indigenous rights.
CHAPTER 5, INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES
This chapter introduces the case studies conducted in indigenous-controlled 
health services. It is divided into two broad sections. The first section introduces the 
four organisations studied, focusing on the circumstances that led to their emergence, 
and the policy or model of contracting that defines the services they provide. The intent 
of the section is to provide context for further discussions. As a result, it remains largely 
descriptive. Section two explores organisations’ commonalties and differences and 
provides the context for the discussion provided in chapter 6.
5.1 The Selected Case Studies
As noted in the chapter 3, the case study sites were not selected based on 
representativity. The selection process was constrained by a number of factors 
including time, financial resources and acceptability of the project to providers. The 
four case study sites are diverse. This diversity is nevertheless useful in exploring the 
strengths and weaknesses of different contracting models.
5.1.1 Danila Dilba
Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutnum 
Health Service Aboriginal Corporation 
(hereafter Danila Dilba)50 is an Aboriginal 
controlled health organisation based in 
Darwin, Northern Territory. The 
corporation’s name was given by the 
Larrakia people, the traditional landowners.
In Larrakia language, " d a n i la  d i lb a ”  means 
the dilly bag used to collect bush medicines.
‘‘B i lu r u  b u t j i  b in n i lu t n u m "  means “blackfella" 
getting better (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji 
Corporation 2002). The corporation was 
provides services to Aboriginal people living in Darwin and Palmerston and in the
Binnilutlum Health Service Aboriginal 
established in 1991. The organisation
50 The organisation’s logo was designed by Walter Fejo, a member of the Larrakia nation.
The Danila Dilba website provides the following explanation:
T h e  fis h  b e in g  in  a  s c h o o l a re  e x c ite d  w h e n  ju m p in g  a ro u n d  a n d  c o n v e y  to  u s  o u r  e x c it in g ,  
h e a lth y  life . A  fu l l  l ife  th a t  ta k e s  in  p la y , la u g h in g  a n d  e n jo y in g , a  p a r t  o f  y o u r  w e ll b e in g  o f  
tu c k e r  [fo o d ]. T h e  tu r t le  re p re s e n ts  th e  p e o p le  g o in g  b a c k  to  la y  h e r  e g g s . T h e  s t ic k  
re p re s e n ts  a  h u n t in g  to o l o n  h o w  to  f in d  h e r  e g g s  (D a n ila  D ilb a  B ilu ru  B u t j i  B in n ilu t lu m  
H e a lth  S e rv ic e  A b o r ig in a l C o rp o ra t io n  2 0 0 2 ).
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Aboriginal town camps of Kulaluk, Minmarama Park, One Mile Dam, Knuckey’s Lagoon 
and Fifteen Mile. It also serves the homeless Aboriginal population living in temporary 
camps around Darwin (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Health Service Aboriginal 
Corporation 2002).
Darwin is the capital of the Northern Territory and is located in the Top End. 
The Aboriginal Traditional Owners of Darwin are the Larrakia people, also known as 
the “saltwater people." Unlike other parts of the Territory, the Larrakia people came 
into contact with Europeans early on, as a result of the 1869 NT Survey Expedition. By 
1874, settlers were asking Aboriginal people to move out of the area because of the 
noisiness of corroborees. The emerging settlement was destroyed by a cyclone in 
1897, but re-emerged to become a small government settlement by 1911. It was 
partially destroyed by a cyclone in 1937, by Japanese bombers in 1942 and nearly 
levelled by cyclone Tracy in 1974. Today, Darwin is the home of 68,802 people, one 
third of the overall Northern Territory population, and is remarkably cosmopolitan. The 
1996 census showed a total of 5,723 Aboriginal people in Darwin (8.5 percent) 
distributed throughout the suburbs of the town with some concentration in Karama, 
Malak, Tiwi, Millner and Anula. Palmerston is located 25 km south east of Darwin and 
has a total population of 13,121 people of which 1,645 are of Aboriginal descent (12.5 
percent) (McLennan 1996). According to the Larrakia Nation Aboriginal Corporation, 
there are currently 1500 Larrakia people living in the Darwin area (Larrakia Nation 
Aboriginal Corporation 2001).
Before Danila Dilba, health services in Darwin were delivered by the outpatient 
service of the Darwin Hospital and the use of private physicians. The Northern 
Territory Department of Health and Community Services also operated a clinic in the 
Bagot community (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal 
Corporation 1993a).51 Cyclone Tracy devastated the city of Darwin on December 25th 
1974. Large segments of the community were simply levelled. The wide scale 
evacuation of survivors that followed led some Aboriginal people to come into contact 
with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services (ACCHS) in Alice Springs 
(Central Australian Aboriginal Congress, established in 1973) and Redfern (Aboriginal 
Medical Services, established in 1971) and created an interest in opening a similar 
facility in Darwin (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal 
Corporation 1996c).
51 This is an Aboriginal community located within the boundaries of Darwin.
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Initial calls for the establishment of an Aboriginal controlled health service were 
met with resistance.
T o w a rd s  th e  e n d  o f  th e  1 9 7 0 s , th e re  w e re  
d e m o n s tra t io n s  a n d  a s it- in  a t th e  D e p a r tm e n t o f  
A b o r ig in a l A f fa irs  (D A A ) a re a  o ff ic e  a b o u t  
A b o r ig in a l h e a lth  c o n d it io n s  a n d  th e re  w e re  c a lls  
fo r  a n  A b o r ig in a l c o m m u n ity  c o n tro lle d  h e a lth  
s e rv ic e  in  D a rw in . T h is  le d  to  d is c u s s io n s  a n d  
n e g o tia t io n  w ith  th e  H e a lth  D e p a r tm e n t. H o w e v e r,  
w e  w e re  to ld  o f  c o n s id e ra b le  o b s tru c t io n  b y  th e  N T  
h e a lth  b u re a u c ra ts  o f  th e  d a y  (C ra w s h a w  &
T h o m a s  1 992 ).
This resulted in the establishment of the Aboriginal 
and Islander Medical Service (AIMS), an organisation 
funded by the Northern Territory government whose mandate and funding was limited 
to medical transportation (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service 
Aboriginal Corporation 1996b). This “solution” fell short of aspirations and the 
Department was met with vocal dissatisfaction. The Bagot clinic continued to operate 
but remained out of reach for most of the Darwin-based Aboriginal population. In
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addition, the facility at Bagot caused concerns. It was deemed too old to serve its 
original purpose A proposal was submitted to the Northern Territory government to 
include a new clinic as part of the proposed Bagot Council office complex. This 
proposal was however removed from the capital works list for 1990-91 without 
explanation provoking angry responses from workers and the Aboriginal community 
(Interview AU20). A meeting with the NT Minister of Health was held in June 1990, 
where the Minister promised that a Health Centre would be reinstated on the capital 
works program. Apparently this never happened, but it may have acted as a catalyst. 
Concerned Aboriginal residents met at Bagot and a working party was formed, 
including Aboriginal community organisation representatives, health centre staff and 
Aboriginal employees of NT Health Department. The working party’s mandate was to 
see the establishment of an Aboriginal controlled health service in Darwin, separate 
from the Bagot clinic. Its role was to write the proposals, to lobby and network. In 
February 1991, the interim committee of the Darwin Aboriginal and Islander Medical 
Service submitted an expression of interest to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) for National Aboriginal Health Strategy Funding for the 
establishment of a medical service. The submission was accepted, the organisation 
was incorporated in June 1991,52 and the first patient was seen in October 1991. The 
original clinic was set up in facilities leased from the Northern Territory government. 
This site was later handed over by the Minister of Health as a lease in perpetuity 
(Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 1991, 
Interview AU20, fieldnotes, Dunham 1994a, see also 1994b, Chandler 2005and , 
1994c). •
The first five years of Danila Dilba’s life were a constant struggle for funding 
(Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 1993a, 
1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996a).53 The original submission to ATSIC for seed 
money to employ a person to coordinate the initial setting up of the organisation was 
apparently accepted as the basis for on-going funding. This caused problems 
thereafter, as the organisation remained underfunded for core funding and forced to 
rely on a spectrum of smaller funding opportunities to remain afloat.
Danila Dilba has lurched from one financial crisis to another over this last year. The
Service took these difficulties to whoever would listen and this included the large public
52 Under the Aboriginal Council and Association Act, 1976.
53 Annual Report s do not provide financial statements for the organisation. The 1990-91 
and 1991-92 Audited Financial Statements show a total income of less than $300,000AU for all 
expenditures. By 1994, Danila Dilba recorded 6,700 active files (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji 
Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 1994b).
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ra l ly  h e ld  e a r l ie r  th is  y e a r. T h e  S e rv ic e  c a m e  u n d e r  c o n s id e ra b le  p o l it ic a l p re s s u re  a s  
w e  s tru g g le d  to  m a in ta in  a m e d ic a l s e rv ic e  fo r  th e  A b o r ig in a l a n d  T o rre s  S tra it  p e o p le s  
o f  D a rw in .
V is ito rs  d u r in g  th e  y e a r  in c lu d e d  th e  fo rm e r  M in is te r  fo r  H e a lth , G ra h a m  R ic h a rd s o n , D r  
B re n d a n  N e ls o n , F e d e ra l P re s id e n t o f  th e  A u s tra l ia n  M e d ic a l A s s o c ia t io n , S e n a to r  
S te p h e n  L o o s e le y  a n d  th e  H u m a n  R ig h ts  P a r l ia m e n ta ry  S u b -C o m m itte e , th e  W o rld  
C o u n c il o f  C h u rc h e s , S e n a to r  C h r is to b e l C h a m a re tte  o f  th e  G re e n s  a n d  D r  C a rm e n  
L a w re n c e , th e  c u r re n t F e d e ra l M in is te r  o f  H e a lth .
W e  s p o k e  to  th e m  a ll a n d  e x p la in e d  o u r  S e rv ic e  a n d  o u r  d if f ic u lt ie s  (D a n ila  D ilb a  B ilu ru  
B u t j i  B in n ilu t lu m  M e d ic a l S e rv ic e  A b o r ig in a l C o rp o ra t io n  1994a ).
The issue was picked up in the media. The NT Times of April 5th, 1994 shows
the headline, H e a lth  p ro te s t c a ll (1994b). Although Danila Dilba was fighting to secure
its own stable funding, the issue was tied with health funding being managed by
ATSIC.
[T h e ]  d e b a te  o n  a  n a t io n a l le v e l a b o u t th e  
fu n d in g  o f  A b o r ig in a l h e a lth  h a s  b e e n  h a rd  b u t  
th e  fa c ts  a re :
T h e  N a t io n a l A b o r ig in a l H e a lth  S tra te g y  c a m e  
d o w n  in  1 9 8 9  a n d  w a s  s tro n g ly  s u p p o r te d  b y  th e  
fe d e ra l a n d  s ta te / te r r ito ry  g o v e rn m e n ts . W h a t 
d id  n o t  h a p p e n  (o r  m a y b e  th e  M in is te r  was n o t  
a d v is e d  c o r re c t ly  o r  s u c c e s s fu l in ) was a C a b in e t  
d e c is io n  to  in c re a s e  th e  a m o u n t o f  fu n d s  fo r  th e  
im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  s tra te g y . I t  w o u ld  h a v e  c o s t  s e v e ra l b i l l io n s  o f  d o lla rs  b u t  in  m y  
v ie w  it was th e  re s p o n s ib il ity  o f  th e  fe d e ra l M in is te r  fo r  A b o r ig in a l a n d  T o rre s  S tra it  
Is la n d e r  A f fa irs  a n d /o r  th e  M in is te r  o f  H e a lth  to  a p p ro a c h  C a b in e t fo r  th e  fu n d s .
W h a t d id  h a p p e n  w a s  th a t  A T S IC  s e t  a s id e  -$ 5 0 m il lio n  in  th e ir  b u d g e t fo r  'to p -u p ' 
fu n d in g  b u t a c tu a lly  fu l ly  fu n d e d  s o m e  o f  th e  9 6  A b o r ig in a l H e a lth  S e rv ic e s  a c ro s s  th e  
c o u n try . T h e y  c a m e  u n d e r  a t ta c k  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  f ru s tra t io n s  th a t  s e rv ic e s  l ik e  o u rs  
h a v e  in  t r y in g  to  g e t  th e  fu n d s  th a t th e y  d o  n o t h a v e .. .
T h e  fe d e ra l h e a lth  b u d g e t is  a lre a d y  m o re  th a n  $ 3 3 b ill io n  d o lla rs  a n d  ra t io n a lis a t io n  w ill 
o c c u r  w ith in  h is  o v e ra l l  b u d g e t to  e i th e r  s e t  u p  a  D iv is io n  o f  A b o r ig in a l H e a lth  o r  m a k e  
fu n d s  m o re  a c c e s s ib le  to  c o m m u n ity  o rg a n is a t io n s  o n  a  t r ie n n a l b a s e d  fu n d in g  le v e l.
I th in k  th a t i t  is  g o o d  th a t  th is  d e b a te  is  h a p p e n in g  a n d  w h e n  th e  s m o k e  c le a rs , 
h o p e fu lly , re s o u rc e s  w il l  b e  m a d e  a v a ila b le  to  o rg a n is a t io n s  s u c h  a s  o u rs  to  g e t  o n  w ith  
th e  w o rk  (D a n ila  D ilb a  B ilu ru  B u t j i  B in n ilu t lu m  M e d ic a l S e rv ic e  A b o r ig in a l C o rp o ra t io n  
1 9 9 4 b ).
ATSIC’s underfunding meant that funding to ACCHS was allocated yearly 
through a submission-driven process. The need to compete for funding created 
tensions with other ATSI health organisations (Crough & Cronin 1996) and instability.
T h e  p a s t  y e a r  h a s  b e e n  a n o th e r  e x tre m e ly  h a rd  y e a r  a s  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  c o n t in u e d  to  
b a tt le  fo r  i ts  v e ry  s u rv iv a l. T h is  h a s  p u t  t re m e n d o u s  s tra in  o n  a l l  th e  s ta f f  w h ic h  n e e d s  
to  b e  a c k n o w le d g e d .. .
D ire c t  fu n d in g , a s  y o u  w il l  re c a ll, is  a R e c o m m e n d a t io n  o f  th e  R o y a l C o m m is s io n  in to  
A b o r ig in a l D e a th s  in  C u s to d y .54 M o s t o f  m y  t im e  s in c e  I to o k  u p  th e  jo b  a s  D ire c to r  a n d
54 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody described the ATSIC funding 
cycle as follows:
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the time of all previous Directors, has been spent chasing funds in order for our Service 
to exist and to survive. Hopefully, now this cycle is drawing to a close and myself and 
future Directors will be free to devote our time, experience and expertise to our 
community and to have an even better health service catering to the needs of our 
community now and as these needs change...
Direct funding will allow us to maintain our self respect (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji 
Binnilutlum Medical Sen/ice Aboriginal Corporation 1995).
Funding under ATSIC was neither formulae-based nor based on needs. For 
example, the minutes of a Management Committee meeting in January of 1994 reports 
the following:
Data reflecting staffing levels and funding from other major Aboriginal Health 
Organisations within the NT indicate that we are grossly underfunded in Darwin ie.
Congress Alice Springs. 3000 active files, 100 employees;
Auluainva Tennant Creek, 928 active files, 69 employees;
Wurli Wurliniana Katherine. 1500-2000 active files, 24 employees;
Danila Dilba. 6700 active files, 22 employees (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum 
Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 1994b).
Once funding was transferred from ATSIC to the Commonwealth Department of 
Health in 1995, Danila Dilba’s attention shifted to another debate, that of securing an 
effective voice in Aboriginal health' policy and planning in the Northern Territory 
(Interview AU20). This meant the creation of the Aboriginal Medical Services Alliance 
of the Northern Territory (AMSANT), which was formed in October 1994. Although an 
independent organisation, AMSANT was initially set up under the Danila Dilba umbrella 
until it acquired its own funding and structure. It now counts 13 members. One of the 
core issues for AMSANT and Danila Dilba was the signature of the Framework 
Agreement.
...As you are aware, the NT is the only State [sic] which has not signed a Framework 
Agreement. It is unlikely that the NT government will. This meeting was called by [the 
Secretary, Territory Health Services] to discuss if we could have an arrangement and 
still work collaboratively together. There was no agenda except this loose discussion.
We talked about the content of the Framework Agreement which is very open and 
loose. It really is a "gentleman's agreement" and could only work if all parties agreed to 
actively participate. The main stakeholders to the Agreement are NT government, 
ATSIC, Commonwealth government and AMSANT. We expressed disappointment that 
even at this bare minimum level the NT was not prepared to cooperate. AMSANT said 
that it was difficult for us to have a collaborative arrangement with the Department when 
[it was] making public statements denigrating AMSANT...
At the moment, Abonginal communities are invited to 'bid' for funds for their general needs 
or else to apply for grants under particular programs. In either case the Aboriginal request 
is considered in the context of existing programs, and if the 'bid' or request fits within the 
funding category and if funds are available and, further, if the community Is deemed eligible 
on a ‘needs' basis then funding is approved, usually for a year (Australian Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation 1998).
Recommendations 190 and 191 emphasised the need for Aboriginal organisations to be funded 
with a system of block funding from a single source on a triennal basis,
The discussion went backwards and forwards and culminated with [ THS] putting on the 
table the possibility of them funding AMSANT Secretariat. He suggested a figure of 
$100,000.00. We said this wasn't enough, we had a prepared submission into 
OA TSIHS for $195,000.00. [OA TSIH] countered by saying perhaps the Commonwealth 
could pick up the shortfall as a one off. We were not happy with this proposal (Danila 
Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 1997).
The Framework Agreement was finally signed in 1998, leading to the formation of the
Northern Territory Health Forum, where ATSIC, THS, OATSIH and AMSANT meet as
equal partners (although with unequal access to resources).55
The 1995 transfer of Aboriginal health funds to the Commonwealth Department
of Health provided an opportunity for improved access to funding, but did not entirely
resolve the issue (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal
Corporation 1996b). The core funding provided was administrative and not linked to
primary health care programming which needed to be secured through proposal writing
(Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 1996a), an
issue acknowledged in the media as problematic by the Federal Health Minister in
1994 (Cridland 1994). The Commonwealth Department of Health extended approval
for Aboriginal controlled health services to bulk-bill Medicare in July 1996. By 1998,
Aboriginal controlled health services were also allowed to bill for longer consultation
periods. Danila Dilba began to use Medicare monies somewhat reluctantly on May
31st, 1999. The reluctance was grounded in the General Practitioner-focused
Medicare, which means that consultations managed by Aboriginal Health Workers
were not billable to Medicare, this despite being a more efficient use of resources
(Thomas et al 1998). -
Securing access to Medicare funding has been a major gain. Nevertheless, a
review of the organisation’s contractual environment shows that the funding on which
the organisation depends remains fragmented. A substantial portion comes from time-
limited and proposal-driven projects. This case study shows to what extend current and
past debates in Aboriginal health have impacted Danila Dilba’s ability to provide health
services to its constituency. The sector developed from the bottom up and has had to
gradually negotiate its place as a service delivery organisation. The 1989 National
Aboriginal Health Strategy’s commitment to support ACCHS to alleviate inequalities
resulted in ACCHS being able to access some core funding in 1995. However, access
to funding remained fragmented. The environment over which Danila Dilba has control
is largely defined at national and territorial levels, and can only be challenged through
lobbying.
55 Although the issue lies outside the scope of this particular research, state and territorial 
peak organisations are called to play a very important role under the Framework Agreements, 
and one wonders the extent to which resources match expectations.
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N o th in g  h a s  b e e n  g iv e n , a  lo t  o f  p a s s iv e  v e rb s  i f  y o u  l is te n  to  p e o p le  w h e n  th e y  s p e a k  
a b o u t A b o r ig in a l p e o p le , a  lo t  o f  p a s s iv e  v e rb s  l ik e  th e  lo s t  la n g u a g e , lik e  s o m e o n e  ju s t  
d ro p p e d  a t is s u e  s o m e w h e re  a n d  ju s t  w a lk e d  a w a y .. .  N o t a s in g le  th in g  h a s  b e e n  
g iv e n , i t  is  th ro u g h  a lo t  o f  h a rd  w o rk  a n d  lo b b y in g , a  lo t o f  s a c r if ic e , a  lo t  o f  la te  
c o m m u n ity  m e e tin g s . It  h a s  b e e n  lik e  th a t  e v e r  s in c e  n o n -A b o r ig in a l p e o p le  h a v e  b e e n  
h e re . So, w e  g e t i r r i ta te d  b y  a ll  th e s e  p a s s iv e  v e rb s  s u r ro u n d in g  A b o r ig in a l p e o p le  
b e c a u s e  it  is  ju s t  n o t tru e , n o th in g  h a s  b e e n  g iv e n . I m e a n , a c c e s s in g  b e t te r  p r im a ry  
h e a lth  c a re  a n d  f in d in g  a  s o u n d  a n d  q u a lif ie d  p la c e , th a t  h a s  c o m e  fro m  us, n o t  fro m  th e  
s ta te  g o v e rn m e n t s y s te m  (D a n ila  D ilb a  s ta ff, 2 0 0 2 ).
5.1.2 Katherine West Health Board fKWHBI
■ -
Based on the 
information reviewed, it 
appears that the story of the 
Katherine West Health Board 
Aboriginal Corporation
(hereafter KWHB) 
should be told from at 
least three different 
perspectives. There 
is the story of
Aboriginal people in
the region who 
suffered for one
hundred years at the 
hands of government 
policies and the
pastoral industry, 
opting for passive 
resistance in order to 
avoid more
massacres (Interview 
AU14)56 and the
possibility of
extermination, until 
the Daguragu strike
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56 The extent and details of this story has been document by Bird Rose (Rose 1991) and 
remained unchecked until the second world war, after which employment in the cattle industry 
guaranted access to grossly insufficient rations and wages (Berndt & Berndt 1987, Katherine 
West Health Board 2003).
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of 1966. This story has been told by Creswell (2001) and is central to the creation and 
success of KWHB:
Just like Daguragu strike and things like that, they had a bit of power too and someone 
been helping them to get to that state. And now, this Katherine West been putting 
something in our heart to make our own strike to build that up (Jack Little, KWHB Board 
Member and former chairperson, cited in Creswell 2001).
The origin of KWHB is also rooted in the ACCHS movement explored in chapter 4 and
through the Danila Dilba case study, with in its continued lobbying for better access to
primary health care and stable funding. The third perspective relates to the opportunity
that was taken by a group of people, including the District Medical Officer for the Top
End and the District Medical Officer for the Katherine region, to submit a proposal to
undertake two Aboriginal Coordinated Care Trials (CCT) involving the pooling of
financial resources from the Commonwealth and THS (interviews AU02 and AU10).57
The KWHB region is a heterogeneous collection of culturally and linguistically
diverse people, albeit with strong historical and cultural ties. It is an administrative
creation that emerged for the purpose of the Coordinated Care Trial with the Board of
Directors having input into the inclusion of communities and outstations (the region was
created as a result of the Bartlett study, Bartlett & Duncan 2000). The town of
Katherine is not part of the service delivery area, although the Board's offices are
located in town. The region is 162,000 square km in size with an estimated population
of 2800, of which 84 percent is of Aboriginal ancestry (Katherine West Coordinated
Care Trial Local Evaluation Team 2000).
The region includes the town of Daguragu, which was born as a result of protest
by Gurindji people over the poor living and working conditions on cattle stations. On
August 22, 1966, Gurindji leader Vincent Lingiari headed a walk off of workers and set
up camp at Wattie Creek, a place called Daguragu. This camp became the strikers'
headquarters where sympathisers and strikers could organise in the struggle for better
wages, conditions and land rights. The strike had a ripple effect among Aboriginal
people working in the cattle industry in the Victoria River district and Daguragu became
the home of workers laid off during the wet season. In 1972, workers of Moolooloo,
Pigeon Hole and Mt Sanford also “walked off’ and moved in Daguragu. Their example
was followed by workers from Humbert River. In 1975, the strikers were able to secure
title to 2,500 square km from the nearby Wave Hill station. This (and became
Aboriginal land in 1981. Kalkarinji. formerly known as Wave Hill, was shaped by the
57 A more detailed description and evaluation of the process can be obtained from the 
Menzies School of Health Research's evaluation reports (d’Abbs 1998a, 1998b, d’Abbs et al 
1998,2002, Katherine West Coordinated Care Trial Local Evaluation Team 1998a, 1998b, 
1999a, 1999b, 2000, Katherine West Health Board Aboriginal Corporation 2001).
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events outlined above. After the walk off, Government officials and the Wave Hill 
station government regarded the Wave Hill community as a legitimate community, 
whereas Daguragu was regarded at an illegitimate community, a striker’s camp. 
Whereas police, welfare entitlement, health and postal services were delivered to 
Wave Hill, Daguragu received nothing (fieldnotes from visit to Daguragu and 
Kalkarindgi). The 1981 Gurindji land claim included Kalkarinji (d'Abbs et al 1998, 
Katherine West Coordinated Care Trial Local Evaluation Team 2000).
Aboriginal people in more southern stations supported the land right strike, but 
were unwilling to join the camp at Daguragu. Going to Daguragu would have meant 
leaving their own country and facing the possibility of never being allowed to return. 
Instead, they organised their own strike in 1972 to press for land. In November 1973, 
an agreement in principle was signed securing the transfer of 240 square km to be 
used as a cattle station, including the derelict Gordon Creek station, now renamed 
Yarralin. This was not a first choice for location, and the size of the land allocation was 
deemed insufficient, but t h e ___________________ _______________
Chairperson of the KWHB Board
and remains a Board Member today. Now in his mid-eighties, he had a long 
involvement in health and was the head of the Katherine Institute for Health, an 
organisation created in the early 1980s to deliver the Health Worker Training Program
conditions were nevertheless 
accepted as a gesture of goodwill. 
Additional land was secured in 1984 
(d'Abbs et al 1998, Katherine West 
Health Board 2003). These events 
remain highly significant. The 
Daguragu land claim was the first 
successful land recovery process in 
the history of Australia and is a 
source of great pride. A picture of 
the hand-over ceremony hangs in 
the local pub and new comers are 
told the story of the strike without 
prompting (fieldnotes from visit to 
Daguragu and Kalkarindgi). The 
event has been made the theme of 
popular Australian songs.
Jack Little was the first
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(Fleming & Devanesen 1985). Jack Little was involved from the beginning. It was he 
who drew a poster to represent the vision of the Board, explained as follows:
Why I did that [poster] because, what brought that really, we want better health. I think 
Europeans and Aboriginal people should work together. That's why there’s two roads, 
the narrow road for European people and that broad, wide road that’s for Aboriginal 
people. But there’re all in it for health.
When I thought about it, why every European people always have to be in charge, why 
can’t Europeans come to the Aboriginal road? Both get an idea from each, whlteman 
get ideas from blackfella, and blackfella get ideas from whiteman, so they can work 
together.
And not only that too, our dreamtime and things like that, that’s very important, our 
culture and our dreamtime, that's our health. We lose that, we sick, not physical, 
spiritual, sick inside cause we lost everything. You know what I mean? And that’s 
really why we had to put that up.
It wasn't easy, trying to run this Katherine West trial, we had hard trouble to get there. 
We had to be present, to come to every meeting, we had to commit ourselves and show 
that we can do it, we are capable of doing it! (Jack Little, KWHB Board Member and first 
Chairperson, 2002; Katherine West Health Board 2003)
KWHB was initially set up in 1998 to implement the Katherine West Co­
ordinated Care Trial. It was one of four Aboriginal Coordinated Care Trials to be 
conducted across Australia. This was part of a larger national process motivated by a 
changing demographic profile and the need to explore strategies for cost containment. 
In February 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG, head of each 
State/Territory and Prime Minister) appointed a national Task Force who recommended 
the restructuring of the health care system into three streams corresponding to three 
categories of individual needs:
• The general care stream, corresponding to people's needs for occasional and
uncomplicated care; .
• The acute care stream, corresponding to people’s need for acute and specialised 
care; and
• The coordinated care stream, corresponding to people's need for a mix of services 
for a long period of time (Council of Australian Government's Task Force on Health 
and Community Services 1995a).
Neither the 1995 Task Force report, nor the update issued in December of the same 
year made any reference to Aboriginal needs (Council of Australian Government's Task 
Force on Health and Community Services 1995a, 1995b). In September 1995, the 
Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health called for expressions of 
interest from the public and private health sectors. Nine “mainstream”58 and four 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders CCTs were undertaken. All mainstream CCTs
58 The idea that indigenous life occurs at the margin of a “mainstream" is prevalent in 
Australia. The terminology is maintained because it is local and historical, but may be 
uncomfortable to certain readers.
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were located in areas where services were readily accessible (Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Aged Care & University of Adelaide (GISCA) 1999). The 
Aboriginal CCTs were located in remote or very remote environments. Mainstream 
and Aboriginal trials were evaluated both locally and nationally.
Mainstream CCTs focused on the coordination of care plans for clients with 
multiple and complex needs. The trial required the establishment of a coordination 
process to avoid duplication, and to ensure an effective, high quality intervention 
(Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Community Services 1995, 2001). 
In contrast, the Aboriginal CCTs involved setting up a capitation model involving the 
pooling of financial resources previously allocated for Aboriginal health, but 
administered separately, and the transfer of that pool to an Aboriginal authority 
thereafter charged with the task of purchasing services for a population located in a 
designated geographical area (Interviews AU02, AU10, AU18, AU26).
Aboriginal health had not been identified as a fertile ground for coordinated care 
trials. The 1995 call for a proposal by the Commonwealth Department of Health and 
Community Services did not specifically target Aboriginal health services. In the 
Northern Territory, the Territorial Government initiated the proposal that led to the 
Katherine West and Tiwi trials.59 Key players at the Territorial Health Services 
(hereafter THS) saw this as an opportunity to access Medicare and pharmaceutical 
benefit dollars not available to the Northern Territory because of its thinly distributed 
population and its lack of general practitioners (Interviews AU02, AU10, AU18, AU26). 
This situation had been discussed extensively in the Aboriginal health sector for many 
years. The Aboriginal CCT proposal submitted by THS to the Commonwealth 
Government proposed the establishment of two regional Aboriginal Health Boards to 
act as fundholders,60 with funding pooled from THS and the Commonwealth 
government, including Medicare. It was seen as the solution to bring Medicare funding 
into the Northern Territory. Although there were probably as many perspectives as 
protagonists on what the CCT would look like once implemented, some THS 
employees saw the Aboriginal Health Boards as a mechanism that would allow THS to 
continue to offer services directly to the communities, while having access to Medicare 
through the fund-holders (Interviews AU02, AU10, AU15, AU29).
59 One in Tiwi and one in Katherine West. It is unclear whether the same occurred for the 
two other Aboriginal trials, Perth (WA) and Wilcannia (NSW).
60 According to both authors of the proposal, the role of the Aboriginal Health Board as a 
provider was not defined in the proposal. But the proposal did not exclude this possibility,
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The planning of the CCT required a complex process of consensus building at 
three levels. First, within the KWHB region, community members and leaders had long 
been used to whitefella promises.
When the government people come they promise on thing. When they go home, 
something that’s very important that the community people been ask for, well nothing 
happen (Jack Little, KWHB Board Member and former first chairperson, cited in 
Creswell 2001).
The ACCHS sector initially opposed the CCT, because of concerns over the idea that 
KWHB’s role might be limited to that of a fund-holder and merely a mechanism for THS 
to secure access to Commonwealth funding (Interviews AU02, AU15, fieldnotes on 
KWHB). A contributing factor may have been that there were limited Aboriginal 
community and authority involvement in the initial proposal. Time constraints appear to 
have been a major factor: the initial response to the call for a proposal was drafted in 
48 hours to meet a deadline (Interview AU10), Discussions with the ACCHS sector 
began after that and support was eventually gained.
The most time-consuming and complex process involved OATSIH, THS and 
KWHB’s negotiations for appropriate resourcing, process and fund pooling (See 
minutes of the following meetings for discussion: Katherine West Health Board et al
1999, 2001c, 2001a, Katherine West Coordinated Care Trial Local Evaluation Team
2000, d'Abbs et al 2002, see also 2001b for a detailed discussion). As shown in Table 
5.1, the planning phase lasted one and a half years. The CCT Live Phase began on 
July 1st 1998, meaning that KWHB became a fund-holding body mandated to purchase 
health services on behalf of the CCT population located in the KWHB region. At that 
time, KWHB continued to purchase services from THS for the clinics located at 
Kalkarindji, Daguragu, Yarralin and Pigeon Hole. There was however some discomfort 
with that arrangement:
How is community control going about though, because the clinics belong to Territory 
Health, how is the community going to have control of co-ordinated care? (Helen Morris, 
Board Member, Daguragu, cited in Katherine Wes/ Health Board Aboriginal Corporation 
1998).
Table 5 1, The Development of KWHB (d'Abbs et a\ 2002) u __ ,■ ■ 1
Coordinated Care Trial Phase Planning __ | \  January 1997 to June 30th, 1998  ^ |
Coordinated Care Trial Live Phase_ _  [  July 1s1, 1998 to March 31 *', 2000 |
I  Transition Year _ . _ _ _ _ _ _  j _  'April 1st 2000 to December 31**, 2001 I
I  Primary Health Care Access Program i January 1sl, 2002 1
KWHB took over the clinics at Daguragu/Kalkarindji, Yarralin and Pigeon Hole on 
November 1st, 1999. This was followed by the clinic at Lajamanu in September 2000, 
and the clinics at Timber Creek, Bulla and Mialuni in June 2001 (Katherine West Health
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Board et al 1998a, 1998b). KWHB signed a three- year contract on December 19th, 
2001, funded under the Primary Health Care Access Program (PHCAP). This is the 
first organisation in Australia to be funded under the new.
Under the KWHB-PHCAP model, access to Medicare shifted from a demand- 
driven process to a capitation model, facilitating the adoption of a primary health care 
model of service delivery. This is something the ACCHS movement lobbied for many 
years (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 
1998, This was evident in Danila Dilba's board minutes, 2000a, 2000b). It is therefore 
not surprising that KWHB is now considered a remarkable success story that is having 
repercussions for all ATSI people. This is THE example provided every time PHCAP is 
mentioned. Much of the enthusiasm expressed towards KWHB comes from the fact 
that this is a tremendous improvement over the former level of service delivery.
KWHB now operate eight community clinics, and oversee 72 staff. Its 
governance model is that of a regional organisation, with the benefits and challenges 
that it poses. While it is governed by an Aboriginal Board, the space the Board 
exercises control over is carefully defined by legislation, finances, performance 
indicators, geography, recruitment and retention, and a spectrum of other factors as 
well. The organisation nevertheless greatly benefits and draws considerable flexibility 
from having access to predictable, substantial and comprehensive funding.
5.1.3 The iw i-based Te Runanqa O Raukawa
Te Runanga O Raukawa Inc.
(hereafter TROR) is an /W/'-based 
organisation, located in Otaki, with ‘T e  ‘R lU U lt lC fC l O  T ( l l l l f ( ( lZ V C l ‘In c .
. . _  , . , .. re Rau Hou O Raukawa. He iti na Motai Tanjcau Rau
offices in Levin, Palmerston North and 
Feilding. It was incorporated in February of 1988.
The organisation delivers services in the areas of health, social services, education, 
employment readiness and justice. Although its mission is primarily to serve the 
development needs of Ngati Raukawa and affiliated h a p u /iw i [sub-tribe/tribe], services 
are delivered to those who seek them, including the larger Maori population living in the 
area as well as all other cultural groups (discussions, Otaki fieldnotes). According to 
the 2001 Census, Ngati Raukawa (Horowhenua/Manawatu) counts 11,088 members, 
totalling 2.4 percent of the overall Maori population of New Zealand (Statistics New 
Zealand 2001). A third of Ngati Raukawa members live in the Manawatu-Wanganui 
region.
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Figure 5.3, Te Runanga O Raukawa
Ngati Raukawa’s involvement in service delivery is linked to the history of Maori 
Councils. The Raukawa District Maori Council was founded in the early eighties to 
administer a government economic development loan scheme (MANA Enterprise). 
Involvement in health care followed in 1982 with the successful establishment of a 
health promotion initiative with the Palmerston North Hospital Board. The goal of the 
service was to raise health awareness. Five Maori Health Workers were hired in the 
early eighties (Interviews NZ08, NZ16, Minutes of meeting from April 23, 1986).
In 1984, the fourth Labour government embarked on a reform of Maori affairs 
that culminated with the document Te U ru p a re  R a n a p u /P a rtn e rs h ip  R e s p o n s e  (Wetere 
1988), promoting the development of iw i as an operational base for Maori 
development. This position echoed Maori demands for greater participation and 
autonomy in Maori affairs. The Runanga Iw i Act adopted in 1990, enabled iw i to
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register as the authorised voice of that iwi, and to be recognised as such by the Crown 
and all public authorities (Bennion & Melvin 2002). This was the first attempt in New 
Zealand to recognise and integrate traditional Maori tribal and governance structures in 
public policy and service delivery. Although the Act was repealed in 1991 following the 
election of the National Party, it has left an important imprint on Maori development and 
shaped the development of TROR.
Te Runanga 0  Raukawa was formed in 1989, in response to the devolution policies of 
the Labour Government, which in 1986, in a move to promote Maori development, 
established the MANA LOANS and MAORI ACCESS schemes and authorised Te 
Komiti Whakatinana O Raukawa, a joint committee of the Raukawa District Maori 
Council and the Raukawa Trustees to manage these schemes. Prior to "devolution" 
these programmes would have been administered by the Department of Maori Affairs 
and Department of Labour respectively.
The Komiti Whakatinana [Governance Committee] 0  Raukawa, a non incorporated 
body, had limited powers and a body with wider powers was needed to give full effect to 
Government policy. In 1989, the Department of Maori Affairs was dis-established and 
the Iwi Transition Agency (ITA) was set up to manage the transition of MANA, 
MACCESS and other programmes to iwi control. Following the approval of its 
Constitution, Te Runanga O Raukawa Inc. replaced the Komiti Whakatinana 0  
Raukawa as an Interim Iwi Authority and took over the management of the programmes 
and associated funds and iwi development generally.
The Runanga/lwi Act 1990, gave statutory recognition to Runanga/lwi and opened the 
way for all iwi to express their rangatiratanga [sovereignty]. This encouraged the break 
up of previously stable multi iwi groupings as individual iwi moved to express their own 
identities. Te Runanga 0  Raukawa was not immune and as iwi indicated their desire for 
autonomy, so too did the hapu of Ngati Raukawa.
In September 1990, a number of hapu voiced a desire for amendments to the 
Constitution which would give Ngati Raukawa hapu a greater say in their affairs. Three 
subsequent hui held in June and July 1991 gave overwhelming support for this view. 
Amendments have shifted the decision making powers to the hapu of Ngati Raukawa 
but do not exclude the participation of all iwi who were included in the original 
Constitution (Te Runanga O Raukawa Inc. 1991b).
The overall goal of the organisation was to integrate all services defined by 
public policy under a single organisation and single contract, and deliver kaupapa 
Maori services [services founded on principles reflecting Maori culture] to whanau 
[family] and hapu [clan]:
Our vision was that health would be part of the broader field of Maori development. So 
that the health programmes would be linked into our employment programmes and to 
our education programmes and to our justice programme. We had this idea that.,, 
social policy might be under one umbrella and... every hapu would develop in a holistic 
way. Now we tried that and but because in about 1991 or '92 we had a number of 
contracts with the different sectors, we called all the sectors together. Health, justice, 
social welfare, education and their subdivisions like probation services and early 
childhood and said to them you know it’s great we've got a contract with each of you, 
[but] we would like to work together so that we don't have to repeat for every sector 
what we think is common to you all. So we called this meeting. We had two meetings 
actually, and to our surprise of course because we were naive, it was the first time that 
most of these different sectors had actually met each other although they all operated in 
the same region. And after the second meeting it was pretty evident that any notion 
that they might work together to produce a single contract that would enable us to 
pursue this holistic vision was probably before its time. So that’s where opportunism I
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think took over... This is how the contracts are being shaped, that's what we’ll do. But 
there is still that notion that... really the runanga’s mission is not about health or about 
education, it’s about development at another level. And we would like it to be able to 
reflect all those things in some combination that we don’t yet have (Interview NZ16).
TROR has lived through four (4) major health care reforms since it first became
active as a health service provider in 1992, from the Area Health Boards (1983-1993)
to the Regional Health Authorities (1993-1998), the Health Funding Authority (1998-
2000) and the District Health Boards (current). As shown in Figure 5.4, TROR has
thrived through the reforms, continuously expanding its access to funding.61 But the
reforms have brought many challenges to the organisation.62 For example, the
transition from the Manawatu/Whanganui Area Health Board (1983-1993) to the
MidCentral Regional Health Authority (1993-1998) created some disruption. As noted
by Ran Jacobs, CEO at the time, in his report to the W haiti,
F i g u r e  5 . 4 ,  A c c e s s  to H e a l t h  C o n t r a c t s  t h r o u g h
t h e  R e f o  rm s
AHB RHA HFA DHB
The new health system is confusing. New structures and new terminology make it 
difficult for the general public to fully understand it. The Runanga Health Committee has 
spent a lot of time adapting to the changes and renewing contracts with the new 
organisation.
Changes in the Health system took effect on 1 July 1993. The Manawatu/Wanganui 
Area Health Board was replaced by the Mid Crown Health Enterprise. The 1992-93 
contract to provide a community health programme that the Runanga had with the 
MWAHB was transferred to the Mid CHE on 1 July. The contract will continue (in 
quarterly segments) until the Central Regional Health Authority (Central RHA), the 
funding agency for all health providers, becomes fully operational, at which point we 
hope to contract with the Central RHA to deliver the Whanau Ora Health Plan.
61 Based on audited financial statements from annual reports.
62 Challenges are repeatedly expressed in minutes of meetings and reports, related to how 
TROR relates to new structures, and with continuity of programs and funding (Te Runanga O 
Raukawa Inc. 1993, 1998a, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b, 2002).
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It is probably that the Whanau Ora Health Plan or a modified version of it, will be in 
place by the commencement of the new year (Te Runanga 0  Raukawa 1993).
The Whanau Ora [family health & wellbeing] programme had already been in the
planning since October 1992. Discussions with the Manawatu/Whanganui Area Health
Board had to be halted to accommodate the reform. Funding for the programme was
finally secured in September 1994 with a much reduced budget (Te Runanga O
Raukawa 1994).
The transition from the MidCentral Regional Health Authority (1993-1998) to the 
Health Funding Authority (1998-2000) led to a roll-over of contracts without an 
opportunity to review volume in light of needs (Te Runanga O Raukawa Inc. 1997). The 
transition to the HFA gave TROR the opportunity to explore the possibility of a different 
model of development. Nationally, the Regional Health Authorities had led to an 
interesting development for Maori health providers. Each of the four authorities had 
developed a different model to engage local Maori, whether as iwi or pan-iwi 
organisations. In the north of the country, Maori Purchasing Organisations (MAPO) had 
emerged to act as advisers in health funding allocation and to support independent 
Maori providers. The Midland Regional Health Authority opted for joint ventures 
governed by RHA and Maori iwi representatives. In contrast, the MidCentral Regional 
Health Authority had largely maintained the practice of purchasing services from small 
/'w/'-based providers (Cunningham & Durie 1999).
The HFA supported the development of Maori Integrated Care Organisation 
(MICO) proposals. The model was seen by TROR as an opportunity to move forward to 
implement its vision. The development of a MICO proposal was first brought up at the' 
Whaiti meeting of March 31, 1998 [Board meeting] (Te Runanga 0  Raukawa lhc. 
1998b). By the mid November 1998 Whaiti meeting, funding had been secured and a 
consultant hired to develop a proposal. The HFA abandoned the MICO model in June 
1999, at the request of the Health Minister (Te Runanga 0  Raukawa Inc. 1999b, 
1999c). As expressed in the Health Strategic Planning Committee's Report at the 1999 
Annual General Meeting,
By June 1999, and contrary to local information, the HFA had reversed its policies on 
MICO and all MICO development was terminated. Although there was no financial loss 
to the runanga (the HFA eventually agreed to meet all expenses) a great deal with time 
had been spent and the outcome was disappointing. Reasons for the change in HFA 
policy are not clear but it appears to be linked to the Authority's intention to establish... 
partnerships with iwi (Health Strategic Planning Committee 1999).
The most recent reform, the transition from the Health Funding Authority to
District Health Boards, was anticipated with some discomfort.
It has been widely reported in the media that the new Government intended to 
dismantle the Health Funding Authority - HFA and return to [District] Health Boards.
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Consequently, Iwi Maori Health Providers have expressed major concern about the 
effect that this will have on Iwi Maori around the motu [island], Ngati Raukawa has been 
quoted, particularly as a "preferred provider’^ 3 of health services as likely to be 
disadvantaged by the proposed changes. Meetings have been held at Parliament with 
the Associate Ministers of Health and Employment and correspondence has been sent 
directly to the Minister of Health about those concerns (Te Runanga O Raukawa Inc. 
2000b).
Hopes that iwi-based health providers may be funded directly by Central Government, 
rather than the District Health Board, did not materialise either (Te Runanga O 
Raukawa Inc. 1999a). At this time, most of TROR’s funding comes from the MidCentral 
District Health Board.63 4
This reform is still in the process of being implemented. More specifically, the 
implementation of the Primary Health Care Strategy (New Zealand Ministry of Health 
2001 d) requires the DHBs to promote the development of Primary Health 
Organisations (PHO), which will be funded on a per capita basis and tasked to provide 
(or purchase and provide) primary health care services to an enrolled population. 
TROR, through its participation in the pan-/w/ consortium Manawhenua Hauora, has 
produced a position paper to guide the MidCentral District Health Board with minimum 
specifications to be required of a pilot PHO (Durie 2002). This is an attempt to ensure 
that Maori needs will be considered and provided for. Depending on the direction taken 
in the development of the PHO in the region, TROR may see its funding coming from 
yet another authority, this time a PHO of which it may or may not be a stakeholder. It is 
yet unclear whether the organisation will continue to exist as an independent provider 
(Interviews NZ08, NZ16).
In summary, the contractual environment that emerged as a result of a New 
Zealand's shift towards competition in the early 1990s has created opportunities for 
Maori participation in service delivery. TROR has thrived on these opportunities. The 
initial vision of the organisation was to funnel all primary health care funding through a 
single contact facilitating the breakdown on jurisdictional barriers and western 
categorisation in service delivery. This has been reshaped by the contractual 
environment (Interviews NZ08, NZ16, also evident in minutes of meetings and
63 This means that the organisation can hope to have its contracts renewed without having 
to submit a proposal or compete through a standard tendering process. It is unclear whether the 
Preferred Provider status is linked to an official policy of the funder, or whether this is simply a 
practice established by the HFA. It is further unclear whether this practice will have currency 
under the present reform. The Preferred Provider status prized by Te Runanga O Raukawa is 
not mentioned in contracts. No contract contains an explicit provision for contract renewal. This 
means that theoretically and legally, good performance does not guarantee renewal. As the 
system stands, the funder holds no obligation to the provider once the contract has ended.
64 The Runanga O Raukawa service “map" overlaps neatly with that of the MidCentral 
Health Board. This is a fortunate coincidence.
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discussions). The organisation is now delivering services defined narrowly by highly 
defined health contracts. It is not that the vision has been abandoned, but rather that 
the requirements of continued service provision and the limitations of a health care 
system continuously involved in reforms have limited TROR’s opportunity to pursue its 
vision.
The Crown has repeated its commitment to partnership, participation and 
protection (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2001a). How are these values to be 
reflected in practice may well remain a matter of debate. Contracts continue to be 
designed as patches to the current health system delivery. The organisation remains 
vulnerable to shifts in political ideology and health care reforms. How this relates to a 
“Treaty partnership” is unclear.
A  TE R00PU HUIHUINGA 
V À  HAUORA INC.
5.1.4 Te Roopu Huihuinqa Hauora Inc
Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora 
Incorporated (hereafter TRHHI) is a 
Màori organisation based in 
Whataku, near Hastings. It coordinates contracts and health provider services in the 
Hawke’s Bay region. The organisation was incorporated in May 1997.
In its role as a Maori Development Organisation, TRHHI provides support 
services to nine independent Maori health provider member organisations. TRHHI’s 
philosophy statement reflects the current Crown interpretation of the T ir it i O  W a ita n g i 
[Treaty of Waitangi] framework, which includes participation, partnership and protection 
(Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 2003).
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Ngati Kahungunu is the largest and fastest growing iw i in the country, with 51,552 
members claiming w h a k a p a p a  [genealogy, lineage] back to the tribe (New Zealand 
Transitional Health Authority Maori Health Groups 1997). The organisation covers a 
wide region reflecting the Ngati Kahungunu ro h e  [area, tribal boundaries]. It crosses 
administrative and district health board boundaries, compounding governance and 
administrative complexity (Interviews NZ11, NZ27).
TRHHI was incorporated under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 in May 
1997. It was a coming together of sixteen Mâori providers existing in the region and 
wishing to create an umbrella organisation to advance their interest with the funding 
authority of the day. Interim trustees selected from member Maori providers were 
appointed in February 1999 and a proposal was submitted (March) to the Health 
Funding Authority (Interviews NZ06, Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 1999b).
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The development of the Maori Development Organisation is linked to changes 
brought by health reforms. As shown in Table 5.2, TRHHI’s beginnings overlapped with 
a succession of health care reforms. This has meant a shift in government priorities,
funding authorities and funding officers.
Table 5.2, Timelines
May 1997
June 1997
June 1998
TRHHI is incorporated
Reform 1: Regional Health Authorities replaced by the Transitional Health 
Authority
Reform 2: Transitional Health Authority replaced by the Health Funding 
Authority
March 1999
October 1999
TRHHI submits a MICO proposal to the Health Funding Authority
TRHHI is informed that its MICO proposal was rejected
November 1999
December 2000
TRHHI is informed that it will be funded as an MDO _____
Reform 3: The Health Funding Authority is replaced by the District Health 
Boards
TRHHI’s initial plan was to secure funding as a Mâori Integrated Health 
Organisation (MICO) (New Zealand Transitional Health Authority Maori Health Groups 
1997, Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 1999a, 2000b). The opportunity was 
however short-lived. As was the case for TROR, the Board was advised that its MICO 
proposal would not be funded. Instead, the organisation was offered funding under the 
new Mâori Development Organisation model (MDO).
Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Inc structure has not been exempt from change as you will 
all be aware, having its beginnings as a Mâori Integrated Care Organisation in May 
1997 and emerging as a Maori Development Organisation in December 1999.
Even the original intent has changed from the provision of high quality, accessible 
comprehensive health services to Maori by Maori to one that reflects the type of work 
that the organisation is now engaged in, being the purchase and provision of an 
integrated continuum of services through a kaupapa Maori approach to health to people 
residing within the region; and to promote tino rangatiratanga me te hauora of the 
individual, whanau, hapu and iwi (Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 2000a).
Initially, MDOs were expected to be funded on a capitation basis65 for a
registered population. This has however not occurred. The main reason can be linked
to a decision-maker within the HFA.
I refused to have any contracts written for Maori that were capitated... I hired a 
statistician demographer who had done all the funding formula for the Treasury and she 
explained to me that there was no way, there was absolutely no way unless we had an 
excessively funded capitation contract that this was going to be any good to Maori 
organisations. So we kept them all on what we call a nominal population basis which
65 The basis for capitation was never defined. While it is clear that funding for secondary 
care would not be included, it is not clear at all whether the planned capitation formulae was 
expected to include all primary health care funding or only a portion of it (health promotion and 
prevention for example).
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related to their tribal populations and tribal districts. And this provided them with quite 
some flexibility really in the application of the funding (Interview NZ30).
The MDO model reflected a new governmental commitment to fund
developmental organisations to assist existing Maori providers. This was a significant
scaling down from the MICO model. If funded on a capitation basis, MDOs may have
been able to develop services in all or at least many priority areas (New Zealand
Health Funding Authority 2000, Interview NZ06). Since this was never implemented,
the focus of the MDO contract eventually shifted to provider support and coordination
(New Zealand Ministry of Health 2001c).
The health funding authority decided to move down something called a Maori 
Development Organisation, basically as a mechanism for building capacity amongst 
providers. That's really what it was on about. The second thing it was on about was to 
somehow deal with the proliferation of small providers that were starting to crop up in 
the Maori field and it made sense that if they could devolve some of that responsibility 
for looking after those small providers... So the Maori, the managed care type stuff went 
out the window and in the window came the idea of a capacity building organisation and 
also an organisation that relieved some of the monitoring and control problems that a 
proliferation of small providers actually introduced (Interview NZ06).
Funding to address Maori health priorities was to be secured through separate
contracts, thus perpetuating rather than addressing the fragmentation experienced by
TROR. The MDO model’s focus was two prong:
• To support existing providers in their development, by focusing on Maori provider 
and service development; providing a professional and efficient infrastructure within 
which that expansion could occur; creating an administrative umbrella with more 
service and bargaining strength; and addressing Maori workforce development 
issues (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2001c). And, •
• To promote policy-defined Maori Health Gain Priority Areas. The UFA initially 
defined 8 such priorities. This has now been extended to 13 (see Table 5.3) (New 
Zealand Health Funding Authority 2000).
I  Table 5.3, Service Priority Area for the MDO (New Zealand Health Funding Authority 2000) 
New NZHS Population Health Objectives
¡ Former HFA Maori 
j Health Gain Priority 
I Areas
Immunisation
Smoking
Diabet e s ___
Oral healthy 
Mental health
| Injury prevention
Ensure access to appropriate child health care services including all
child and family health care immunisation_____
Reduce smoking
Reduce thejncidence and impact of diabetes 
Improve oral health
Improve the health of people with severe mental illness
Reduce violence in interpersonal relationships, families, schools and 
communities
|| Hearing 
I  Asthma
Minimise harm caused by alcohol and illicit and other drug use to both 
individuals and the community _____ ______
Reduce the rate of suicide and suicide attempts
Reduce obesity
Increase the level of physical activity
Reduce the incidence and impact of cancer^
Reduce the incidence and impact of cardiovascular disease
Improve nutrition
What is clear is that the MDO model, as described in the MDO contract, 
reflected tendencies in stream-lining the health care system (Interviews NZ06, NZ24). 
The MDOs were to focus on national priorities, in effect providing additional services 
and support to MSori in areas where health inequalities were most apparent. This was 
a departure from earlier approaches focusing on integrated care, capitated funding, 
and promoting Maori provider participation in all aspects of Maori health services 
delivery. The approach to priority setting had shifted from local to national.
The end of the HFA was announced in December 1998 and with it, came the 
end of centralised purchasing. This was replaced by a regional and population-based 
approach to primary, secondary and tertiary care planning and delivery. The 
implementation of this strategy led to the formation of twenty-one district health boards 
(King 2000). Unlike TROR, whose boundaries fits into the territory of a single health 
board, Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora’s boundaries straddle three. This situation 
multiplies the number of players to establish relationships with, and administrative 
complexities. For reasons yet unclear, TRHHI has been made to carry the full 
responsibility of the success of these relationships (evident in Interview NZ27).
The Primary Health Care strategy has specifically mentioned the role of MDOs 
in the overall system, placing them on equal footing with Primary Health Organisations
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(New Zealand Ministry of Health 2001 d). This suggests that existing MDOs may find 
themselves a preferred mechanism for PHO development. This may well be happening 
in other regions, but it was not apparent in the Hawke’s Bay region. The Hawke’s Bay 
District Health Board has stated that it will support the development of a Maori PHO, 
leaving to Maori organisations and IPAs the responsibility to sort out ownership and 
governance issues. Discussions are on-going (Interviews NZ06, NZ11, NZ27).
In summary, TRHHI has been caught in the process of health care reforms. It 
was a shift in policy that led TRHHI to shift its vision and mandate, from that of an 
Integrated Maori Health Organisation to that of a Maori Development Organisation. 
With the recent reform, TRHHI has seen its iwi rohe and territory fragmented into three 
District Health Boards, creating a myriad of administrative difficulties. Despite the policy 
commitment made to MDO, the future of this particular MDO is unclear.
5.2 Commonalties and differences
The organisations discussed above emerged out of different processes. Table
5.4 summarises commonalties and differences. Danila Dilba is the only largely urban 
organisation. In contrast, KWHB, TROR and TRHHI have central offices located in 
small towns and serve populations located in a number of small rural or remote 
communities. Both KWHB and TRHHI are single care providers in their areas, whereas 
Danila Dilba and TROR provide complementary services. KWHB offers comprehensive 
primary health care services to a fixed population. In contrast, Danila Dilba serves a 
variable and highly mobile population. Access to care is to some extent demand-driven, 
and to some extent population-based, depending on program specifications and 
funding.
TROR provides contract-defined services to a variety of narrowly defined 
populations identified in nationally priority areas as having higher needs. These 
population pockets may or may not be Maori. There is no consistency on the 
population to be served from one community to the next, or from one contract to the 
next. The population served by TRHHI’s providers is more consistent with its 
commitment to Ngati Kahungunu. The communities served by these providers are for 
the most part isolated and providers are the only organisation providing services in the 
community.
155
j Table 5.4, Case studies’ commonalties and differences ................................. I
i
Danila Dilba 
<DD)
Katherine West 
(KWHB) TROR (RH)
Te Roopu |  
Huihuinga |  
Hauora (TRHHI) |
Began operation 1991 1998 1988 1997 |
j Location
| .
!
Darwin, population 
68,802
SW of Katherine 
NT,
Population 2,800
Levin, with offices 
in Otaki,
Palmerston North 
and Feildings
Otaki based, total |  
catchment I  
population |  
(Manawatu- j 
Wanganui) 1 
142,827 Ij _
| Category ACCHS PHCAP
Mâori organisation 
that also provides 
health services
MDO 1
. . .  ;i
|
| Characteristics Urban
Katherine based 
office serving 
remote and rural 
communities
Levin-based office 
serving small 
offices in rural 
communities
Otaki-based office |j 
serving small 1 
offices in rural |  
communities <|
1 Focus Health and some education Health
Cross-sectorial 
(health, social 
services, 
education, 
economic 
development, etc.)
Health and 
provider | 
development
|| Population 
|  served
ATSI estimated 
7,000
14 separate 
language families 
2,350
11,008 members 
in the area
32,601 Maori in J 
catchment area. 1 
Organisation |  
services over |  
11,000 clients. 1
|  Services 
j Alternative
Comprehensive 
primary health 
care, with some 
prevention/ 
promotion 
activities 
constrained by 
access to 
proposal-driven 
funding
Comprehensive 
primary health 
care. Proposal- 
driven funding 
supplementary.
Services depend 
on funding 
- secured yearly, 
mostly health 
prevention and 
promotion
Services depend 1 
on funding f 
secured yearly, | 
mostly provider f  
support and health |  
prevention and if 
promotion |
1 access to PHC 
1 services
Yes, if sought and 
responsive. 
Access fee 
required
Single care 
provider in 
communities
Yes, if sought and 
responsive. 
Access fee 
required
Member J 
organisations are 1 
single care 1 
provider in f  
communities §
j Emerged out of
Community 
mobilisation, 
protest and 
resistance
Proposal that led 
to broad based 
mobilisation and 
policy shift
Competitive 
access to funding
- 1 
Proposal-driven | 
and shift in policy I
Both KWHB and TRHHI are funded on the basis of a model created as a result 
of policy. In contrast, Danila Dilba and TROR collect funding contracts for an eclectic 
variety of health services. The difference is grounded in history: both Danila Dilba and 
TROR emerged out of indigenous processes that connected service delivery with 
indigenous political aspirations. Although both KWHB and TRHHI could claim the 
same, their emergence coincided and was largely shaped by the introduction of a
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government-driven model of service delivery, the CCT-PHCAP and the MDO. Their 
access to resources was less gradual and the services they provide are defined by the 
model of financing they participate in, rather than a collection of contracts gleaned over 
time. There existence is also linked to indigenous aspiration linking service delivery to 
self-determination. This is reflected in the contractual environment they have access to: 
in both case, organisations that emerged through the adopted of a government-drive 
process benefit from a larger proportion of their funding coming from a relational 
contract than their community-driven counterpart.
5.3 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to provide an overview of the four case 
studies. This chapter provides the backdrop for chapter 6. The Australian case studies 
reflect the policy development process outlined in chapter 4.
A detailed analysis of the evolution of providers in fact provides insights into 
policy implementation, its impact on the ground, and on the distance between policy 
and implementation. This is indeed a postulate of this thesis and will be explored in 
more details in chapter 7.
CHAPTER 6, DECISION-SPACE ANALYSIS ACROSS 
CONTRACTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
This chapter explores the models of financing that emerged to support the 
development of indigenous health providers in Australia and New Zealand. It presents 
the results of four in-depth case studies conducted in indigenous-controlled health 
services. As described in chapter 3, each case study is meant to explore how 
indigenous health policy shaped the indigenous-controlled health sector. Specifically, 
this chapter will explore the following questions:
1. Are indigenous providers able to exercise some control over key areas of decision­
making?
2. What are the constraints on operations?
3. Is the contractual environment an accurate reflection of indigenous health policies 
or of the state practices in health contracting? Are compromises made to respect 
indigenous aspirations?
This chapter is divided into three broad sections. The first section explores all four 
organisations' experiences using the framework adapted from Bossert. Section two 
revisits Bossert and offers a critical analysis of contractual environments, in light of the 
international literature. Section three explores the lessons emerging from the analysis 
presented in this chapter, and discusses the usefulness of the adopted framework as a 
methodological tool for exploring contractual environments.
6.1 Decision-space analysis
As discussed in chapter 4, the emergence of Maori and ATSI providers has 
been legitimised in policy. A theme that recurs in policies is that local priority setting 
and responsiveness are key to improving health inequalities. As discussed in the 
literature review, the framework adapted from Bossert (1998) provides a useful 
framework to explore the level of decision-making available to indigenous health 
organisations in three key areas:
• finance,
• governance and service organisations, and
• accountability.
These areas will be explored in detail in turn. A final section will summarise findings.
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6.1.1 Finance
As seen in Table 6.1, all organisations receive their funding from a spectrum of 
contracts. Danila Dilba’s budget draws from 18 contracts with eight government 
sources.66 Core funding, nearly half of Danila Dilba’s current funding, is the most 
stable source. Recurrent funding strategies, nearly thirty percent of the total, are also 
fairly stable, but are linked to specific medium term vertical strategies tied to 
performance indicators. Danila Dilba currently accesses less than two percent of its 
funding from a strategy that requires Danila Dilba to contribute either in kind or 
financially from its budget. Generally, the last two categories (nearly twenty percent of 
funding) are accessed on a competitive basis. These are funds from vertical strategies 
that are usually short lived.
Only the core funding component offers the organisation some flexibility in 
allocation (Interviews AU12 and AU13). This includes funds from Medicare. All other 
sources of funding are “siloed”, in that contractual obligations curtail the movements of 
fund from one project to another and within the project’s budget, from capital to salaries 
to operation. Funding comes with pre-drafted contracts, performance indicators and 
limited budgets. The Commonwealth Health and Aged Care (including OATSIH) 
actually requires the organisation to set up separate bank accounts for each new 
project (Interview AU13).67 *
66 This review is based on an analysis of the contracts listed in Appendix 5. A nineteenth 
contract remains under negotiation and may be added if an agreement is achieved. The 
organisation administered 19 contracts in 1997-98, 22 in 1998-99, and 17 in 1999-00, 27 in 
2000-01. The same detailed analysis was not pursued for previous years.
67 Funding authorities appear not be satisfied with audited financial statements and
accounting conventions.
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iTable 6.1: Percentageallocation of funding per category for all case studies, sample year 2001-0268
i ...................................
f; . '• ■ ■ _ • Danila Dilba KWHB TRO R TR H H I §
¡Annual budget in GBP, 2001/02 j £1,814,531 £3,255,517 £510,717 £188 ,888  i
I: .
: Category Definition )1 . • . ' - • r
# o f
contracts
l  ■
| %of budget
i
# o f
contracts %of budget
# o f
contracts %of budget
| # of 
i contracts %of budget f
if
|Core Recurrent operational funding that is not 1 tied to specific programs j 2 | 48.5% 169.
67.7%
.
0 0%
\
j 1 29.9% 5
i Strategies Recurrent 
: Funded 100%* 70
Relatively stable funding sources tied to ] 
specific initiatives ; 5 j 29.9%
{
} 2.0%
4 7.8% 11 79.6% I 8 44.7% f
I  ■
s Strategies Recurrent, 
I  Requiring Employer 
Financial Contribution|;
¡Relatively stable funding source tied to i 
¡specific initiatives and requiring a i 
sizeable organisation contribution (partial i 
¡funding) j
1 0
■
0%
■
0 0% 0
¡1
0%
»Multiyear projects 
One of
Funding for multiyear innovative project ‘ 4 i 11.4% 3 20.3% 2 9.6% 2 12.9%
•Single year or shorter term project ; 6 | 8.3% 3 4.2% 2 10.8% I 2 12.5% 1
1 18 I 100.0% 11 100.0% ........ 15 .....j 100.0% ! 8 100.0%
58 This information was derived from a review of the organisation's funding contracts for one year. The percentage distribution of funding between 
categories is provided as a rough indicator, to be used in comparisons with other funding models.
6S During the transitional phase, core funding was divided under 6 contracts. These were combined under one master contract in December 2001.
70 May be annually or multi-year.
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To have a harmonious working relationship, you have to break down those silos and 
kind of get this whole holistic-type of health going. We keep on saying that you can’t 
just do the body part stuff and in not having that you try to break down those silos and 
try to point out that you can’t run nutrition unless you have a good babies health 
program. You can’t run it, you know, how it all flows in together, you can't have a 
happy, healthy family unless you have emotional, social well being issues addressed...
[W]e try to say to staff, we’re all part of one big team, all going together. However, that 
is not the case because as an organisation we’re split up into 4 units which is basically 
education and training, clinical services, emotion and social well being, the special 
projects and admin. So, there’s those 4 big areas. However, even with those 4 big 
areas you then break it down because this is when you get those silos. So, as a 
manager of a team, you encourage this team bonding, there's team building, there's 
team effort. As an administrator of the programs you then have to pull everyone back 
and put them back in their silo so that you can do the financial reporting of them, and 
so, you have to say, look you're part of this, for instance, you're part of this emotional 
and social well-being team, which is fine, but then you have got to say, but however, I 
need you to isolate your expenditure on that program so it accurately reflects exactly 
what you're doing. So, part of this, we are obliged to fill this silo idea back in and it's 
very difficult, because in some aspects, we want people to put themselves in isolation, 
others of course, we don't (Interview AU13).
It is apparent from discussions with indigenous administrative staff that 
submission-driven funding demands a significant time investment and the expertise of 
more technically proficient staff or consultants (Interviews AU12, NZ03, NZ08, NZ11).71 
Their implementation requires more administrative energy in terms of pursuing the 
initiative, securing the funding, providing the service and documenting the required 
performance indicators. Typically this type of funding is accessible only for short-term 
projects (months to 3 year), and is a drain on administrative energies: this is apparent 
in all organisations. Danila Dilba still submits proposals to access this funding, mainly 
because once the organisation has made representations to the community or 
government agencies that an important health problem requires attention, it finds itself 
obligated to develop a program to deal with it when funding becomes available. 
Because of the competitive nature of these strategies, the actual funding approved may 
represent only a fraction of what was requested (this is especially true for multi-year 
and one off projects). In such cases, Danila Dilba may feel morally or politically 
obligated to provide the services, despite administrative concerns.
Danila Dilba is expected to house new initiatives and provide services while 
maintaining standards expected of all health care delivery facilities, this despite the fact 
that few sources of funding provide for capital expenditures.72 Some submission-driven
71 This concern was raised in all organisations, except KWHB.
72 The original facility currently occupied by Danila Dilba was the property of the NT 
government, and was provided to Danila Dilba through an extended lease at no cost. Other 
capital costs have been shouldered by Danila Dilba through a variety of sources including 
donations and fund raising (fieldwork notes).
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capital funding is available from THS and the Commonwealth on a competitive basis, 
but it is only disbursed in association with acceptable project-based services, if at all 
(Interviews AU09, AU13, fieldnotes from the THS visit).
KWHB’s budget draws from 11 contracts with the Commonwealth and Northern 
Territorial offices of OATSIH. One contract is a tripartite agreement that also includes 
the Northern Territory Department of Health. As shown in Table 6.1, core funding, over 
two thirds of KWHB’s current funding, comes from a single contract and is both stable 
and flexible. The pooling of funding does not prevent KWHB from applying for 
additional funding from other sources (33.3 per cent, Interview AU02). Recurrent 
funding strategies, nearly eight percent of the total, are also fairly stable, but are linked 
to specific medium term strategies tied to medium term national priorities (mental 
health services, for example). Generally, the last two categories (nearly twenty five 
percent of funding) are accessed on a competitive basis, rather than on needs. These 
are funds from vertical strategies that are usually short lived (a few months to three 
years). Unlike other providers in this study, KWHB does not depend on project funding 
for its own survival as an organisation, or to maintain the provision of comprehensive 
health care services. Instead, this funding provides KWHB an opportunity to 
experiment in service delivery and health promotion with the goal of adjusting its 
service delivery if experiments prove effective (Interview AU02, field notes). This is the 
most appropriate use of vertical strategies.73
The pooling of funding has replaced the previously fragmented flow of health 
funding to communities (Interview AU02, AU10, AU18, AU29). This is best shown in 
Figure 6.1.74 Prior to the Coordinated Care Trial, funding trickled from multiple pots of 
funding from the Commonwealth and Territorial Government. Under this model, 
community clinics remained funded and managed by THS. Although opportunities 
existed for communities to access additional health funding from other strategies, such 
as nutrition or sexual health, communities themselves may have lacked the capacity 
and human resources to do that. Thus, the multiplicity of funding sources shown on 
the left may have been mostly theoretical.
73 See contract listing in Appendix 5.
74 These diagrams were produced by THS as part of the initial community consultations for 
the Coordinated Care Trial. They are here reproduced with KWHB's permission.
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KWHB is currently receiving $1,700/per capita (tnree times the average 
Australian utilisation rate) and can bill Medicare for additional activity without penalty. 
The targeted Medicare pooling of $2,000/per capita (four times the average Australian 
utilisation rate) will be reached in the near future, at which time KWHB will be given the 
choice between two options:
• To either receive the full Medicare amount of $2,000/per capita and end any HIC 
billing. Under this option, services received by KWHB residents outside of the 
region would be billed back to KWHB by HIC; or •
• To receive $1,800/per capita and to continue to bill the Health Insurance 
Commission (HIC) for Medicare activities. Under this option, services received by 
KWHB residents outside of the region would not be billed back to KWHB. This 
scenario is the preferred one at this time.
The current pool does not provide for capital development and facility maintenance. 
Under PHCAP, health clinics remain the property and responsibility of THS, thus 
minimising KWHB’s financial risk.
The current agreement also provides for KWHB to be refunded for any savings 
THS may experience as a result of a drop in KWHB population hospitalisation rate 
(KWHB fieldnotes, d'Abbs et al 2002). This is a meaningful provision. A THS report 
dated May 2001 suggests that indeed the hospitalisation rate for KWHB dropped 
slightly between 1996 and 2000 (Foley 2001). What the exact payment will look like 
remains to be negotiated with THS. This is an example of an economic incentive to 
promote a more efficient use of health resources and the move from a medical to a 
primary health care model.
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For KWHB, negotiations have been lengthy and complex, involving both the 
territorial and Commonwealth governments, with each side monitoring the other to 
ensure that cost-shifting was not occurring. The tension existing between the two 
governments has helped KWHB’s access to information. This was evident in the 
minutes of most Monitoring Group Meetings (21 sets reviewed).
TROR was administrating 15 contracts in the 2001-02 year. The Maori Provider 
Development Scheme is the only contract funded by the Ministry of Health. All other 
contracts are funded by the MidCentral District Health Board. The organisation has 
delivered a majority of these contracts for the past five or six years, which makes up 
nearly 80 percent of its health funding. As previously mentioned, access to funding has 
not only been stable, but has also constantly grown.
As an organisation, TROR assumes a substantial amount of financial risks. 
First, the organisation receives no core funding. The two one-off contracts are for 
service development. A first is from the Maori Provider Development Scheme.75 The 
second is for the development of a primary health care service. All other contracts are 
for service delivery only.
Second, although increased contracts usually mean capital funding 
requirements to provide for office and clinic space, funding for capital expenditure has 
not historically been and is still not provided by the Ministry or its funding bodies 
(Interview NZ08). An exception to this rule is the primary health care development 
contract that includes provisions for capital expenditure for renovation, but conversely 
provides limited opportunity for service development, Given the historical practice of 
renewing contracts on a yearly basis (see Table 6.2), TROR has had to shoulder all 
risks associated with capital expansion with limited express guarantee of continued 
funding.
Finally, the administrative costs associated with the contractual environment are 
substantial. For example, each contract is negotiated separately and contains contract- 
specific delivery objectives. All are volume-based with specified minimum levels of 
services. Contracts secured in the early 1990s were generally paid quarterly. In 
contrast, each contract now specifies provisions for monthly billing on a cost recovery 
basis. It is under the Health Funding Authority that a monthly cost-recovery payment 
mentality was entrenched in the non-profit sector.76 New service contracts generally
75 Provider support is accessible through the Maori Provider Development Scheme, a fund 
initiated in 1997 (New Zealand Ministry of Health 1997), that provides some short term 
proposal-driven development funding.
76 The rationale for the shift is unclear, and is not Maori-specific.
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provide for an upfront payment termed an establishment fee that allows the 
organisation to accommodate up front expenditures. The first payment reflects 15 
percent of the total yearly budget.
¡Table 6.2, TROR’s Contract Renewal through the Reforms
IRHA
;HFA
;DHB
Era Date of Meeting
issue
AHB OI-Jul-92 •
•
01 -Jut-93
12-Apr-94
OI-Jul-94
06-Sep-94
01-Oct-94
t . .
11-Oct-94
01 -Jul-95
01 -Jul-96
01-JUI-97
14- JUI-9S
15- Jun-99 
13-Jul-99 
01-Jul-OO 
18-Sep-OO 
12-Jun-01
MSori Health Workers contract signed for 12 months.
Maori Health Workers contract transferred from the Manawatu/Wanganui Area Health 1 
Board to the Central Regional Health Authority. The contract is renewed for 3 months at a 1 
time, until the RHA structure develops. I
Discussion on the Whanau Ora contract that began with the Manawatu/Wanganui Area 1 
Health Board continues with the Central Regional Health Authority. |
Maori Health Workers contract signed, with an ending date of June 30,1994
Maori Health Workers extended for a year. 
Whanau Ora contract still being negotiated.
16-Sep-Q2
The Health Committee notes that there is no funding available to accommodate for capital 
expenditure needs associated with increased staffing for health service delivery.
Whanau Ora contract signed, with end date of June 30 1995.
Note that contracts do not allow for more than a 5% margin for contingency (including 
capital expenditures).
Whanau Ora and Maori Health Workers contracts rolled over for 12 months.
Mental Health contract signed. Timeline not minuted.
Contracts rolled over to August 31,1996, because of delays in the renewal process. They | 
are eventually renewed for 12 months.
Contract for disability support services signed.
Note that the Health Committee will be endeavouring to increase contractual outputs (fee 
for services funding formula) to accommodate for Increased service utilisation.
Whakapiki Hauora topped with a 10% increase in funding. Note that this increase is 
unlikely to make any meaningful impression in meeting the needs of hapu/iwi members.
Other contracts renewed for one year.
Mental Health contract downgraded by the HFA, who no longer sees the needs for a 
qualified mental health nurse in this service. TROR is not prepared to simply lay off the 
employee, and continues to employ her in service delivery, leading to allegations of non- 
compliance with the contract by the HFA.
All contracts rolled over for 12 months with the exception of Mental Health. Delays In 
renewing the Mental Health contract are related to issues of non-compliance below.
TROR requests that contracts be renewed for 2 years.
All contracts renewed for 3 years, i.e. until June 30,2002,
New Mobile Nursing contract signed for 2 years.
Letter sent to the HFA to request meeting to discuss price increase.
Auaki Kore (smoking) contract signed for three years.
All contracts are renewed for 12 months.
It is noteworthy that the New Zealand Treasury Guidelines for contracting with 
non-government organisations acknowledges the high cost of short term, multiple
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contracts and multiple invoicing, and recommends longer term contracts for recurrent 
services (New Zealand Treasury 2001, p. 26-27). In contrast to these guidelines, 
TROR must send 14 invoices monthly to recover the cost of providing health services. 
The invoices are sent to a Dunedin's office of the Ministry of Health, the Health 
Payments, Agreements and Compliance office (Health PAC, formerly the Shared 
Support Service Group). Reports, when due, are also sent along. There, it is assumed 
that invoices are matched against contract requirements. Once reconciled, payment is 
issued. Reports are not verified for completeness or accuracy by Health PAC, but are 
rather forwarded to the relevant Health Board for that purpose. Should a report fail to 
meet the required standard, the Health Board notifies Health PAC and payment may be 
suspended until the situation is rectified. The lag time is generally a minimum of three 
months. The centralisation of payment under a single authority was established to 
minimise opportunities for financial mismanagement (fieldnotes, visit to the MidCentral 
District Health Board, Interviews NZ07, NZ27). From the outside, the system 
nevertheless appears cumbersome, inefficient, and unlikely to ensure a level of 
accountability commensurate with the costs it carries for both the funder and the 
provider.
TROR administrators report having been able to renegotiate minimum volumes 
of services on which their contract payments are based at the time of renewal, to 
accommodate for new circumstances and increased costs (Interviews NZ01, NZ03, 
NZ08). The level of negotiation cannot be compared to that of KWHB. Senior staff 
report limited influence in creating a. contractual environment that better reflects the 
organisation's vision (Interviews NZ03, NZ16). The stated objectives of the Crown to 
favour Maori provider development and to promote Maori models of health (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health 2002b) are poorly reflected in the contractual environment 
currently in place, especially when compared to other models reviewed.
TRHHI receives some core funding through its Maori Development 
Organisation (MDO) contract. It also receives some funding from the Maori Provider 
Development Scheme. These contracts were originally signed with the Ministry of 
Health. At this time, only the Maori Provider Development Scheme contract remains 
with the Ministry of Health. This provides infrastructure and capacity development 
funding, accessed through a proposal-driven process (Interview NZ11).
TRHHI had originally envisioned to be funded on a capitation basis. It would 
then sub-contract services to its independent Maori member-providers. Five years after 
it first began to receive funding, the organisation has remained simply a channel for a
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few pre-determined contracts with narrowly defined targets and activities (Interviews 
NZ06, NZ11).
The MDO contract is the only secure funding for TRHHI at this time, and 
represents less than thirty percent of its total funding. All other funding is from the 
Hawke’s Bay District Health Board and is passed on to member-providers for service 
delivery. Figure 6.2 below shows that TRHHI’s member-providers were previously 
funded by the same organisation, the Health Funding Authority. Since the reform, one 
member receives its funding from the MidCentral District Health Board, one from the 
Wairarapa District Health Board’s and all others from the Hawke’s Bay District Health 
Board. This has complicated TRHHI’s communications considerably (Interview NZ11).
Figure 6.2, Reform's 
Impact on TRHHI 
Governance ami 
Contracts
HFA, Dec. 1999 to 
Dec. 2000
DHBs, since Dec. 
2000
DISTRICT HEALTH 
BOARDS
TREATY PARTNERS HIPS 
MDO
PROVIDERS
In summary, all organisations discussed above derive nearly 100 percent of 
their funding from government via a number of contracts. Although all experience a 
fragmented contractual environment, this fragmentation does not impact organisations 
in the same way. The impact of this fragmentation is most felt by TRHHI and TROR, 
and, albeit of somewhat of a lesser extent by Danila Dilba. In contrast, KWHB 
administers more contracts than TROR or TRHHI. It however benefits from one large, 
stable and flexible contract and therefore does not depend on collecting a variety of
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small contracts for sustainability or to provide the services its constituency requires. 
KWHB is the only organisation whose budget (main contract) is linked to needs and 
population. It Is also the only organisation that has been able to negotiate its 
contractual terms.
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contract
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. . . . .  . .
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....... 2....... ......
Quarterly
¡Project
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1
.-  ...
Performance (payment
number varies, min 1 ).............
Bi-annual
¡Project 1 Quarterly 4
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S  i Recurrent 100% 1 Bi-annual_________________ 2
! Performance (payment
'Recurrent 100%
j ....... i  ¡number varies, min 1)
2
¡Recurrent 100% 1 «Other 1
Recurrent 100% 1 Quarterly 4
¡Recurrent partial L _ 1 Unknown___ .____________ j.
j " Ï8 ....._ ...55
Core 1 Quarterly ________________ r—  4
¡Multiyear 2 Monthly 24
¡Multiyear ■ 1 Bi-annual ........... .. 2
Multiyear 1 Quarterly 4
S. Project 1 ______ Quarterly ___ ^ 4  _ ..
x  Project ____ ■ 1______ _ Single ......._ 1  _
>  ¡Recurrent 1 0 0 % ______ 2 ........ Quarterly ____________ L........... 8
¡Recurrent 100% i Unknown___ ___________ „ .J . . ,
Recurrent partial ' i Single r ■ . i
i -..... : ............" .... 11 49
¡Multiyear 7 Monthly 84
O f f  ¡Project _ _ ___ __ 1 Bi-annual 2
i  S. Project ................... . 1 Monthly ___________ ____ 12
! 9 98
êt&IH&eMWtHiriatim:
3
2
~2~~.
8
.Monthly 
¡Bi-annual_ 
: Monthly _  
Monthly
J £2,485 I
36 
.4  . 
24 
12 
76
Average 
payment per
transaction77
£32,991
£66,439
£5,211
Each contractual environment includes administrative costs for the funder and
the provider. Table 6.3 highlights the number of transactions associated exclusively 
with the payment of contracts. In Australia, the better resourced KWHB is able to 
secure more funding per transaction. In fact, KWHB is able to secure 67.7 percent of its 
funding in four (4) transactions. In contrast, Danila Dilba relies on a number of relatively 
small contracts and larger number of transactions for relatively small payments, largely 
for historical reasons. TRHHI and TROR, the least resourced organisations, shoulder 7
77 Calculated by dividing the annual funding received by the number of transactions.
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the highest number of transactions. This reflects the contractual environment that 
emerged as a result of purchaser-provider split, and that appears to have survived 
since, despite Treasury Board guidelines (New Zealand Treasury 2001).
6.1.2 Governance and service organisation
All organisations studied tie service delivery to their constituency, to the ideal of 
self-determination (Interviews AU15, AU20, NZ08, NZ11, NZ16). The goal is to improve 
the health of a population to which the organisation is attached politically and to 
respond to needs with culturally appropriate services. Their ability to do so is 
constrained by contractual obligations and access to funding. In the context of the 
KWHB, aspirations are not explicitly tied to national and international indigenous 
political discourses, but to ATSI people in the Katherine West region having the 
opportunity to exercise control in a key area of their lives (Interviews AU02, AU14, 
AU29,). The focus is more regional than national. This is here a slight but important 
nuance.
As shown in Table 6.4, providers are funded for a variety of services. Of all 
organisations, KWHB is the only organisation able to sustain its operations and offer 
comprehensive health care services on its core funding alone. As mentioned above, 
the funding it accesses from vertical strategies is used to explore the effectiveness of 
different strategies (Interview AU02). As a result, KWHB is able to ensure that its 
services continue to improve and adapt to local needs (evident in conversations with 
staff, also Interviews AU02, AU15). In contrast, Danila Dilba, TROR and TRHHI 
depend heavily on project-based funding for sustainability. All organisations 
nevertheless appear able to weave disparate contractual obligations into coherent 
service delivery plan, albeit to a varying degree. This is explored in the following 
discussion.
Danila Dilba is incorporated under the Aboriginal Councils and Associations 
Act 1976 (ACA Act hereafter), a Commonwealth Act administered by the Office of the 
Registrar of Associations and Councils. The ACA Act is the only legislation that allows 
ATSI organisations to limit membership to ATSI people and their spouse, and has been 
preferred by ATSI organisations for that reason. The Board of Danila Dilba has been 
clear that, although it delivers services to non-ATSI spouses, its membership should be 
limited to ATSI people. The ACA Act thus is at odds with the Board’s wishes. Other 
incorporation options exist for organisations, including organising as a public company 
or as an association under NT legislation. These options however do not limit
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membership to ATSI ancestry. Thus, no other incorporation mechanism exists that 
would better meet the Board’s wishes.
Table 6.4, Services for which organisations are funded for (based on contract review)
DD KWHB TROR TRHHI
Organisational
administrative
funding
Core
Facility-based 
Primary Health 
Care
Core (incl admin 
funding)
Core (incl admin 
funding)
Recurrent
Mobile Primary 
Health Care
Core (incl admin 
funding)
Core (incl admin 
funding)
Recurrent Recurrent
Traditional
healing Recurrent
Chronic disease 
control and 
prevention
Multi-year project Multi-year project Recurrent
Asthma Recurrent
Sexual health Multi-year project Short term project
Eye health Short term project
Renal health Short term project
Nutrition Multi-year project Multi-year project
Tobacco Multi-year project
Addiction 
(Alcohol & 
Drugs)
Multi-year project Recurrent
Mental Health Multi-year project Multi-year project
Training for staff Recurrent Recurrent
Training (open to 
non-staff) Recurrent
Youth
engagement Short term project
Capital Short term project Short term project
Organisational
Development
Funding
Short term project
Other
Capital project to 
help another 
ACCHS
Management 
contract to help 
another ATSI 
region
170
The Clinic provides medical services free of charge. A men’s clinic operates on 
Tuesdays and a women’s clinic on Tuesdays and Thursdays.78 A mobile clinic 
operates on a daily basis, providing home care. The organisation reported over 11,000 
client contacts in 1999-2000, with peak utilisation rates from March until June. The 
clinic also offers specialist services, such as audiology, ENT (ear, nose and throat), 
paediatry, diabetes and asthma.
At the onset, the organisation adopted a policy of Aboriginal Health Workers 
First.79 This means that,
Patients usually see an AHW first, thereby ensuring Aboriginal control and familiarity'on 
the ground’. It also means that as the organisation grows so too does its 
empowerment for AHWs in terms of career profile and structure. As political agents of 
change (by the very nature of having a political role in Aboriginal health), AHWs have 
had to and continue to fight for conditions and rights taken for granted in other 
professions (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 
1994a).
This makes clinical activities AHW-focused as opposed to general practitioners focused 
as in territorial services. In a 1996 study of consultations at Danila Dilba, Thomas et al 
(1998) reported 42.6 percent of consultations managed by AHWs alone, 53.5 percent 
managed by both an AHW and a General Practitioner, and 3.9 percent managed by a 
General Practitioner alone (from a sample of 583 consultations).
The Education and Training Centre is a Registered Training Organisation under 
the Northern Territory Employment and Training Authority Act 2001 and provides 
training for Aboriginal Health Workers, an essential component to ensure that Danila 
Dilba has access to a trained workforce. It began to offer the National Aboriginal 
Health Worker and Torres Strait Islander Health Worker Competency Standards in 
1999-2000. The Centre offers First Aid, Vaccinations, Workplace Assessor Training, 
Training Small Groups and the Well Women’s Check course. The Centre also runs 
community and school-based health education campaigns and an illicit drug use 
project. The Emotional and Social Wellbeing Centre provides one to one and family
78 It is customary for many Aboriginal people to separate genders, especially In matters 
related to Intimate information or ceremonies. This extends to health matters. Thus the staff of 
the men’s clinic is male, whereas the staff of the women’s clinic is female. At the time of 
fieldwork, the oganisation could afford to maintain separate clinics only three days a week. A 
preferred alternative would be to hold women and men’s clinic in separate facilities altogether, 
The establishment of a men’s clinic has been caught in limbo for some time, as funding for 
capital expenditure and services has yet to be secured. This is a very significant problem. The 
lack of a facility means that Danila Dilba shoulders the risk of community criticism and of 
underserving its constituency. Should it find itself able to fundraise to provide the facility, 
insecure funding means shouldering substantial financial risks.
79 Danila Dilba does not employ nurses.
counselling services. It also houses a spectrum of support groups (Danila Dilba Biluru 
Butji Binnilutlum Health Service Aboriginal Corporation 2001).
Danila Dilba’s policy is to deliver health services free of charge to whoever 
comes through the door. This has however led to some difficulties. The minutes of a 
Committee Meeting dated December 1999 show that Territorial Health Services were 
promoting Danila Dilba’s services to ATSI and non-ATSI people unable to pay.80 
Serving a non-ATSI population causes some difficulties as most of Danila Dilba’s 
funding is ATSI-specific. The organisation was able to argue the case with Territorial 
clinics and stop the practice (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service 
Aboriginal Corporation 1999). It however remains committed to serve anyone requiring 
care. Refusing access could also lead to a complaint to the Anti Discrimination 
Commissioner and negative publicity.
Danila Dilba employs 69 people, of which 45 are on a full time basis, for a total 
of 51 full time equivalent. Of these, over 70 percent are of ATSI ancestry. The 
organisation has grown considerably since its first year of operation, from a staff of 27 
in 1992-93 (Danila Dilba Biluru Butji Binnilutlum Medical Service Aboriginal Corporation 
1993a) to 69 in 2002. This represents 45 full time positions, for a total of 51 full time 
equivalent positions. The size of the staff is defined by the level of funding secured 
each year. A review of the organisation’s Service Activity Reporting81 for the past 
three years shows that the number of full-time equivalent has remained mostly stable, 
from 53.2 in 1998-99 to 50.5 in 1999-00 and 51 in 2000-01.
Like Danila Dilba, KWHB became incorporated under the Commonwealth 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 on February 3, 1998 (Katherine West 
Coordinated Care Trial Local Evaluation Team 2000). The choice of incorporating 
under this act limits Board members to people of ATSI ancestry and their spouses. 
While 84 percent of the region population is ATSI, the remaining 16 percent are 
generally associated with the cattle industry that was historically responsible for the 
massacres and dispossession of ATSI people in the region (Bird Rose 1991). The 
cattlemen interests have historically been well represented by the Country Liberal Party 
that was in power in the Northern Territory for the past 25 years. It was defeated by 
the Labour Party in October 2001. Some have expressed discomfort with their lack of
80 This can be interpreted as a humanitarian gesture, since the Territorial clinics charge a 
consultation fee. It could also be interpreted as cream-skimming of easier cases and the 
referral of more demanding cases elsewhere.
81 The Service Activity Reporting is a mandatory yearly reporting attached to funding from 
the Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health.
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formal representation. The Board has responded by setting up a Sub-Committee of the 
Executive to represent members of the pastoral industry. It appears that this solution 
has not entirely satisfied their aspirations for representation (AU02, AU15, AU21). 
There is however significant support for the mobile clinic service established by KWHB 
to serve the cattle stations (d'Abbs et al 2002).
KWHB is governed by a volunteer Board of Directors elected for a term of two 
years (the election is not staggered, therefore all terms end on the same year). It 
includes members from each of the KWHB communities.
Lajamanu and outstations: 3 members; Kalkaringi/Daguragu: 3 members;
Yarralin and outstations: 3 members; Yingawunarri outstation: 1 member;
Pigeon Hole: 1 member; Timber Creek; 3 member; and
Bulla: 2 members; Mialuni: 1 member.
Doojun: 1 member;
The Board is distinct yet integrated with other ATSI governance structures, 
namely the traditional owners, the Northern Land Council and the Central Land 
Council. KWHB has made a point of seeking permission from the traditional owners to 
ensure that they approve of KWHB’s presence on their land and of the intended 
activities. This is a departure from former government practices.
The Board has made it very clear that they see their collective role as that of 
supporting community-based decision-making. There have been discussions of setting 
up Health Committees at the community level (Katherine West Remote Health Board 
Aboriginal Corporation 1999). These would provide a local voice to support Health 
Board members in their role and advise in the development of local health and 
community development strategies (Interview AU21). By the end of the transition 
phase, the Health Committee in Kalkarindgi/Daguragu was In place (d'Abbs et al 2002). 
The precise carving out of the roles and responsibilities of the Health Committees, and 
how these will relate to the Board, is still in the drafting stage.
Both the Board and staff carry a great deal of pride about their success in 
having the Board be more than a figurehead, rubberstamping a staff-driven decision­
making process. It was a strategic decision of the previous and current CEO to design 
policies that carefully limited their own authority especially with regards to the financial 
management of the organisation, in order to ensure that the decision-making authority 
remained with the Board. The Independent Evaluation of the Live Phase of the CCT 
concluded,
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The establishm ent o f KW HB as a fund-ho ld ing body has indeed led  to A borig ina l 
control, both as an objective rea lity  (eg in the take-over o f c lin ic m anagem ent) and  as 
defined by the subjective experiences o f Board m em bers and s ta ff involved. We also 
believe that three factors have p layed  a particu larly significant part in ach ieving this 
outcom e:
The continuing emphasis, which has las ted  throughout the Live Phase, on tra in ing and  
educating Board m em bers in m atters to do with the Trial, especia lly financia l 
m anagem ent;
The d iligence o f Health B oard  s ta ff in not attem pting to usurp the B oard ’s decis ion­
m aking powers, as so often happens in organisations ostensib ly under A borig ina l 
contro l; and
The continuing high leve l o f invo lvem ent d isplayed by Board members, and re flected  in 
the high leve l o f attendances at Board m eetings (Katherine West C oord inated Care 
Trial Loca l Evaluation Team 2000).
One of the key features of the Board’s development has been the use of
Panagaea Inc.’s Money Story, a software accounting package that provides a pictorial
representation of financial statements (see Figure 6.3). With appropriate support, this
allows Board members with limited English literacy and numeracy to understand and
exercise control over the organisation’s budget.82
Early in the live phase of the
trial, the Board’s mandate shifted from
that of a fund holder and purchaser of
services to that of a community
controlled health services provider.
The shift from purchaser to
community controlled health
organisation manifested itself in:
• The take over of four health 
centres previously managed by 
THS at Kalkarindji, Daguragu,
Yarralin and Pigeon Hole;
• The hiring of three general 
practitioners to work in the 
Lajamanu, Kalkarindji/Daguragu 
and Timber Creek regions;
• The establishment of mobile
82 I attended the Annual General Meeting of the Board in November 2001, where the 
Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson reviewed of the yearly financial statement using large 
Money Story posters. I have attended many Board meetings over the years, in the Arctic and 
the Subarctic, where most Board members have virtually no involvement in the financial 
management of the organisation. The level of interaction generated at the KWHB meeting was 
refreshing.
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clinics to serve cattle stations; and
• An investment in local human resources that resulted in a shift in service utilisation 
from secondary and tertiary to primary health care (Foley 2001, Katherine West 
Health Board Aboriginal Corporation 2001).
Staffing in 2000/01 included 40 staff, of which 57.5 percent were of ATSI 
ancestry. Clinical staff included 4 doctors, 10 nursing positions and 9 Aboriginal Health 
Workers recruited locally. This is an expansion of services from pre-trial time. But 
perhaps more important in the context of this study, the flexibility of the pool has 
allowed KWHB to make strategic staffing decisions to better meet community needs. 
The Health Centres now operate under the direction of a community member with 
training as an AHW. This is a recent change. It Is noteworthy that at the beginning of 
the CCT, several Aboriginal Health Worker positions (in managed THS clinics) were 
unfilled. Throughout the trial, KWHB encouraged a number of senior AHWs to return to 
work. Although the final evaluation report noted a high attrition rate especially in 
Lajamanu, this appears to have stabilised. Administrative Officers were added to the 
clinic contingent early in the trial to deal with answering the phone, handling the mail, 
filing pathology reports, etc. A nurse previously handled these tasks. The 
Administrative Officer is now the first point of contact for patients.
TROR became incorporated as a Non-Profit Society under the Societies Act 
1908, in February of 1988. The governance structure represents the 23 hapu in the 
region. The overall organisation is governed by Te Runanga Whaiti, composed of the 
Tumuaki (chairperson] of the Runanga and one person elected by each hapu. 
Members may hold office for a maximum of three years. The organisation’s bylaws 
provide for a kaumatua [elder], whether kuia [woman] or koroua [man], to be present at 
each meeting to provide guidance (Te Runanga O Raukawa Inc. 1991a). The Runanga 
Whaiti meets monthly. The day-to-day operations of the organisation are overseen by 
the Chief Executive Officer. The Health Programme is under the direction of the Health 
Manager. The overall health workforce has 23 employees, of which 21 are Maori. The 
Health Reference Committee provides support to the CEO and Health Manager in 
health related matters, networks with other organisations and makes recommendations 
to the Whaiti on strategic decisions related to health. The Health Reference Committee 
meets monthly.
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Table 6.5, TROR contractual profile and service coverage..........
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Most contracts require the delivery of services to a narrowly defined and not 
necessarily Maori population.83 This is documented in Table 6.5. In a way, this leaves
the organisation in a bind, since it is funded for a particular set of activities, but remains 
accountable to all of Ngati Raukawa.
And so our contracts are very fragmented. That one in particular, contraception, 
because its Horowhenua and Otaki only. And I bend the rules because our contracts
83 The standards for contracts were lifted from pre-existing program standards for out­
patient hospital services. The HFA adopted these standards for Maori providers because it was 
flet that creating Maori-specific standards would be politically contentious. The same standarss 
remain today (Interviews NZ06, N230).
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also talk about within the rohe of Ngati Raukawa ki te Tonga and for me, so the contract 
delivery states Horowhenua Otaki, but for me the tribal boundary is beyond that.
And so I go as appropriate. Yeah our health education promotion, we still do that even 
though it's not specifically something we have to do (Interview NZ03).
The funders at first had a much more generic approach to health, now the contracts are 
much, much more specific which is a mixed blessing. On the one hand you know what 
your outputs are going to be. On the other hand it sort of creates a silo effect so that 
you've got contracts working in parallel with each other, sometimes slightly competitive 
with each other and its producing -  well the good thing it’s producing is a strong health 
workforce. The problem with it is it’s a bit of a fragmented workforce as well and not 
only fragmented between sectors but fragmented within the sector, within health. So 
although we’ve got a health team, what is missing I think is an overall health contract to 
deliver a range of services. One contract which might have a much more holistic 
approach. So we’ve bought into a system of fragmented delivery (Interview NZ16).
The organisation is exploring alternatives in contracting to facilitate the development of
a more integrated approach to health and other services.
TRHHI serves primarily Ngati Kahungunu Maori. Unlike TROR, TRHHI is not a
service arm of the Ngati Kahungunu iwi. TRHHI maintains positive on-going
discussions with the political organisation, but its governance has always been and
remains independent from tribal governance (Interview NZ11, Te Roopu Huihuinga
Hauora Incorporated 2002c). As a result of the recent reform, the DHBs have been
instructed to develop Treaty-based partnerships with iwi and Maori communities (Ngati
Kahungunu Iwi Inc. 2003). This requirement, while understandable, has added
complexity to the MDO-iwi relationship, as was shown in Figure 6.2. The Hawke's Bay
District Health Board has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ngati
Kahungunu iwi, thus creating a Treaty-based partnership with the tribal administration.
This is a potential improvement in ensuring that Ngati Kahungunu interests are
represented in regional planning. TRHHI sees the role of the Ngati Kahungunu as
being two fold:
One is to be very knowledgeable about the need of the community that they’re 
responsible for and the second one is that they are very clearly a strong monitor of 
whether or not what is agreed to from a strategic point of view, is in fact implemented 
(Interview NZ11).
The document Maori Health Plan for Hawke’s Bay, Healing our Spirits 2003- 
2005 (Ngati Kahungunu Iwi Inc. 2003), reflects Ngati Kahungunu priorities for Maori 
health development in the Hawke’s Bay region. Ngati Kahungunu has requested 
access to $467,000 to set up its infrastructure and deliver on the Treaty partnership. As 
such, its role would be to analyse information using the DHB health databases, monitor 
the performance of Maori and for Maori service delivery, and provide support to the 
DHB in developing effective Maori health strategies. It has been careful not to define 
itself as a service provider.
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Both Ngati Kahungunu and TRHHI's visions of the Treaty partnership show 
congruence (Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 2001c, 2002a). However, the 
Treaty-based relationship with Ngati Kahungunu and Ngati Kahungunu arm’s length 
relationship with TRHHI appears to have created some confusion at the Hawke’s Bay 
District Health Board (apparent in Interview NZ27). This confusion currently threatens 
TRHHI’s access to funding and limits its future developments. The Wairarapa District 
Health Board has set up a Maori Health Committee consisting of Ngati Rangitane and 
Ngati Kahungunu. It has also signed individual Treaty-based Memoranda of 
Understanding with each Tribe. TRHHI has a positive relationship with that Board. The 
MidCentral District Health Board has signed a Treaty-based Memorandum of 
Understanding with an pan-/W/' organisation, Manawhenua Hauora, representing the 
four iwi located in the region. TRHHI has representation in this organisation. The 
relationship between Manawhenua Hauora and the MidCentral District Health Board is 
positive. However, the relationship between the MDO and the MidCentral District 
Health Board, its main funding body, is somewhat tense.
TRHHI’s governing body is composed of representatives from its membership 
and external members nominated by its member organisations. TRHHI’s Constitution 
defines the criteria for members as being a provider of Maori health services within the 
region (meaning the geographical area from Mahia in the north to Wairarapa in the 
south) holding a service contract with a Government owned funding agency for a 
period of not less than 12 months (Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 2001a). 
All member-providers are Ngati Kahungunu.
At the time of incorporation, the Board of Directors was formed exclusively by' 
member-provider representatives. The organisation had 16 members, of which three 
were large and well-established providers. In many ways, the needs of the three large 
providers differed considerably from that of smaller providers. It was at the request of 
smaller providers that the organisation restructured its governance to allow for the 
nomination of three non-provider Board members. This was meant to create a more 
level playing field among member-providers and reaffirm the need for impartiality in 
contract allocation. This change led to the departure of the three large providers from 
the membership (fieldnotes, staff discussions). Table 6.6 shows the existing 
membership at the time of fieldwork. It is noteworthy that the policy climate of the time 
supported the idea of large Maori providers taking over smaller ones (New Zealand 
Transitional Health Authority Maori Health Groups 1997). This was a departure from 
the former MidCentral Regional Health Authority, which promoted a community 
development approach.
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Table 6.6, Te Roopu Huihuinga Existing Membership (Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated 
2001b)
Name Location In operation since
Number of clients
Kahungunu Health 
Services “Choices” Hastings 1995
4500 registered clients, of 
which a majority is Mâori.
Mangaroa Marae 
Health Hastings 1997
533 registered clients, 522 are 
Mâori.
Nga Kaitiaki 0  
Waikaremoana Tuai 1996
469 registered clients, 362 are 
Mâori.
Ngati Pahauwera 
Hauora Raupunga 1996
460 registered clients, 396 are 
Mâori.
Tamaki Health Dannevirke 1994 850 clients of which 800 are Mâori
TamateaYouth
Consultants Waipukurau
1994 289 clients, of which 269 are Mâori,
Te Whanau Awhina 0  
Waimarama Waimarama
1997 440 registered clients, of which 410 are Mâori.
Whaiora Whanui Trust Masterton 1997 3,410 registered clients, of which the majority is Mâori.
Hine Kotau Ariki Napier 1989, funded in 1991
600 Mâori clients with 800 
consultation annually. j
TRHHI has developed an assignation policy that allows for the transfer of all 
DHB provider contracts to TRHHI. Once assigned, TRHHI would assume the 
responsibility for negotiating, signing and administrating these contracts, while 
subcontracting service delivery directly to its member-providers. This had been 
encouraged for a number of anticipated benefits, including, a) improving the 
consistency of quality across the membership; b) increasing the MDO flexibility to place 
resources where they will provide the best return; and c) encouraging and supporting 
better planning and service delivery (Fleming 2002). In effect, providers delegate the 
responsibility for their negotiations and communications with the District Health Board 
to TRHHI.
179
: Table 6.7, TRHHI Membership and Contract Assignation as of January 2003 
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It is noteworthy that some members have opted to retain their direct linkages 
with the funder. According to a draft audit report of TRHHI commissioned by the 
Hawke’s Bay District Health Board, larger providers appear to both want TRHHI’s 
administrative and clinical support, while also wanting to retain their autonomy and 
resenting the financial contribution made to TRHHI (Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora 
Incorporated 2002b, Thompson & Fakahau 2003). This is reflected in Table 6.7.
The reality of the system as it stands is that TRHHI’s role is limited to that of 
Maori provider support and vulnerable to shift in DHB policy and priority in funding 
allocation (including deficit management). While this is an essential role, and one that 
was never fulfilled by government funders, the opportunity for TRHHI to capitalise on 
Maori culture and provider experiences to develop more responsive kaupapa Maori 
contracts with its providers is very limited. At this time, TRHHI can at best reallocate 
the limited contractual terms it secures.
The MDO is currently revising its Constitution to allow for a broadening of its 
mandate. Assuming that the proposed revisions are accepted by the Board, the MDO 
will be in a position of extending its membership and services to Maori organisations 
providing services in other areas. This is a step towards inter-sectorial innovations, 
which to some extent is being prompted by the current climate in the health sector.
One of the reasons why I’m insisting...that we diversify [is] because if we rely on the 
health service with the shortage of money, there’s very little chance of it actually being 
subsidised to the extent that it can grow in the way ail believe it should grow because 
there’s no more money. I mean the government have made it very, very clear that. . .the 
Maori people have got to come up the, the wellness scale in some way or other. That's 
all very well but that automatically means some form of repriorisation if you’re going to 
succeed because there isn’t the money there to do it (Interview NZ06)
As of April 2003, the organisation’s membership has been increased to twelve
providers (Notes, Constitution meeting, Te Roopu Huihuinga Hauora Incorporated
2Q02d).
In summary, Danila Dilba’s vision and obligation to its constituency is aligned 
with the services it offers. It serves primarily ATSI people. It is however not able to 
serve the primary health care needs of all ATSI people requiring its services in the 
Darwin region. The services it offers are constrained by contractual limitations and 
funding. In contrast, KWHB is mandated and funded to provide the full complement of 
primary health care services to its constituency. TROR and TRHHI offer the services 
they can secure funds for. As shown in Table 6.5, TROR is particularly disadvantaged 
with a patchwork of contracts with narrowly defined populations. TRHHI's contract 
more closely reflects its commitment to Ngati Kahungunu Maori, but is limited by an 
amazingly complex administrative structure, spanning three District Health Boards.
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Although both TROR and TRHHI report being able to adapt programs to meet their 
constituency’s needs, their situations cannot be compared to KWHB or to lesser extent 
Danila Dilba in terms of flexibility.
Nevertheless, all organisations engage their community in decision-making to 
ensure responsiveness, either through their Board (all of them), local Health 
Committees (KWHB), consultations (TRHHI or TROR) or other means. Danila Dilba’s 
commitment to its policy of Aboriginal Health Workers first has diminished its 
dependency on general practitioners and creates a cost-effective and cultural 
appropriate alternative. KWHB’s commitment to local engagement and hiring, coupled 
with significant increases in service delivery, has led to a modest decrease in 
secondary and tertiary care utilisation. Innovations are less evident for TROR and 
TRHHI, partly because the contracts they sign are highly prescriptive and fragmented. 
There is less room for innovation and evidence of improved outcomes will be more 
difficult to track. While all organisations are obligated to balance responsiveness with 
contractual obligations, TROR and TRHHI have significantly less room to do so.
6.1.3 Accountability
Table 6.8 summarises at the reporting burden for each organisation. It appears 
that the reporting burden is least for the best resourced organisation, KWHB. The 
reporting burden is remarkably high in New Zealand.
¡Table 6.8, Number of report for the 2001-02 sample year, as prescribed in contracts \
|Dani!a Dilba
I K WH B_ _ _ _ __„
TROR
 ^ Sample year budget 
I £1,814,531
Number of reports
Average funding per 
report
£3,255,517
£510,717
£188,888
46 £39,446
25 £130,221
30 £17,024
36 £5,247
Danila Dilba’s current reporting framework is fragmented and defined by the 
funding agencies whose programs are accessed every year. Core funding reporting 
requirements are mostly limited to participation in annual national Service Activity 
Reporting (SAR) and the submission of financial statements (Danila Dilba SAR file). All 
other funding sources have stringent performance indicators and reporting 
requirements. OATSIH requires the organisation to participate in the SAR, plus 
includes specific program performance indicators in each contract. Only one contract 
from the Northern Territory government harmonised reporting with OATSIH to ease
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administrative burden. Commonwealth health funding strategies that are not OATSIId- 
based have their own reporting requirements.
Funding from the Northern Territory Education, Training Authority is tied to 
retaining Quality Endorsed Training Organisation (QETO) status and in the submission 
of performance indicators on training and completion meeting Territorial requirements. 
Funding for multiyear projects is tied to the submission of bi-yearly progress reports 
addressing performance indicators. -
All contracts reviewed provided provisions for termination in the case of non­
performance by the organisation. Contracts from the Commonwealth Health and Aged 
Care, including OATSIH, make a provision for dispute resolution with the help of a 
mediator that can be called by either party. However, contracts do not provide for a 
readjustment of funding or performance indicators if circumstances change. This is a 
problem especially for multiyear project funding, which is designed to foster the 
development of innovative approaches to service delivery (Interviews AU12 and AU13). 
Innovation necessarily means that unanticipated opportunities and strategies may 
emerge as more productive than what was originally anticipated as the project 
develops. The contract framework cannot, at this point, accommodate a readjustment.
The reporting requirements under KWHB’s new tripartite agreement are 
extensive, covering 64 distinct indicators. KWHB submitted its first report in March 
2002. In a letter dated March 21, 2002, the CEO made the following remarks:
"Whilst this has been an exceptionally tedious process, it has been worthwhile for a 
number of reasons.
In the first instance, it has enabled us to look more closely at the information we gather 
and its relevance to the Katherine West Health Board, Currently we gather information 
for three reporting formats (SAR, Sch 5 and Monthly clinic reports). Where we can we 
will adapt and modify information requirements so the process can be streamlined, In 
the main this will mean changing the monthly clinic reports which are a legacy from THS 
days and which have not been modified since the handover to community control.
The reporting process also revealed the inadequacies of training on [a new health 
information system] it has been charged with providing and the alarming under reporting 
in some clinics. This problem has now been resolved and the KWHB... provide all 
training. Improved training we believe will rectify the under reporting problem.
One final issue which became apparent during the compiling of this report was the 
shortcomings of many of the questions and the difficulty of obtaining information to fit 
questions that were vague, incomplete, proscriptive or unobtainable due to legislation 
changes (Whelan 2002).
Each other contract includes specific reporting requirements, namely,
• Quarterly activity reporting,
• Bi-annual narrative report, addressing eligibility criteria for the program, and
• Annual financial reports.
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The Monitoring Group emerged to meet the needs of the CCT and remained 
when the KWHB moved into the current arrangements, at the request of the Board. It 
brings together representatives from the Commonwealth Department of Health & 
Ageing, Northern Territory Community and Health Services and KWHB. Its purpose for 
the CCT was to work as a forum for communication and coordination. A review of the 
Monitoring Group minutes since its inception in 1997 shows that this mechanism has 
played a vital role in the success of the CCT, since it brought together the key 
stakeholders to problem solve. They also show a dynamic where one government can 
put pressure on the other in order to bring about a resolution on contentious issues 
(Monitoring Group, 2001). This is best reflected in the dispute resolution clause 
provided for in the PHCAP contract. It can be invoked by any of the three parties, 
requires the involvement of a mediator agreeable to all three parties and whose 
decision is final and binding on all parties. The clause has been tested twice and has 
proven cost-effective in settling disputes.
TROR’s contracts target a different population, including at times, all poor 
women in the area, or mainly Maori residents in the rohe, or Maori and Pacific 
Islanders in a given community, etc. (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2001b), The 
quarterly reports are limited to outputs. As the system currently stands, it is difficult to 
see how the multiplicity of reports on outputs (activity reports, number of workshop 
held, number of clients seen) can contribute useful information on health outcomes 
(changes in health status as a result of activities and improved health). Indeed, the high 
level of fragmentation in the contractual environment makes it difficult to establish 
whether this provider’s, or any other provider, interventions produce better outcomes. 
Conversely, the funder cannot have Its funding strategy evaluated in light of its 
obligation to produce better outcomes.
In the case of TRHHI, the MDO contract reporting requirements include,
• The yearly production of a business plan;
• A three year strategic plan; and
• An annual report covering the organisational structure and governance, outputs 
and performance against strategic and business plan targets and milestones; a list 
of MDO stakeholders; policies and procedures; a report on Maori Health Gain 
service provision; a comprehensive disease prevention and health promotion 
analysis report; a report on quality plan activities, including 
practitioner/provider/consumer satisfaction summary; and report on MDO issues 
and areas for improvement.
The organisation is also expected to report quarterly on,
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• MDO Health Services -  being the key MDO establishment and Operational 
activities, including human resources and organisational system development;
• MDO Stakeholder relationships; and
• Service & Client Co-ordination improving managed access, utilisation, choice and 
service.
This reporting is for the MDO contract only. Any other service contracts have their own 
reporting requirements above and beyond those mentioned. The level of reporting 
required here is daunting and it is unclear what purpose it actually serves.
Contracts originally written under the HFA required the MDO to provide invoices 
and reports within 20 days of the end of the month. TRHHI, by virtue of its mandate, 
must first secure reports from its contract holders and consolidate them to abide by its 
contractual reporting requirements. It is interesting that the current contracts make no 
allowances for a more appropriate time frame for this coordination. Hence, TRHHI has 
allotted 10 days to its members for submitting reports and allotted itself 10 days for 
consolidation and report submission. This may be somewhat unrealistic and may 
explain why mentions of late reports recur in correspondence with the funder (reporting 
file review).
All New Zealand (whether for TROR and TRHHI) contracts make a provision for 
audit requirements giving the funder the authority to appoint an auditor of its choice. 
The provision does not require that this choice be by mutual agreement. The current 
process focuses on governance, policy and procedures, administration, quality 
assurance and consumer satisfaction. TRHHI has just undergone an audit, 
commissioned by the Hawke’s Bay District Health Board. It duplicates the reporting 
process outlined above. It is not clear whether the auditors actually accessed TRHHI’s 
reports prior to the audit, since these were not mentioned in the audit (Thompson & 
Fakahau 2003).
All contracts contain standard provisions of accountability in the areas of:
• Financial management,
• Quality assurance in service delivery, and
• Required outputs.
The contract gives the funder the authority to monitor the provider and to suspend 
funding if accountability standards are not met. A dispute resolution clause is present in 
all contracts, with the exception of the Maori Provider Development Scheme contract. 
However, the clause is weak as the process can only be activated by mutual consent. 
Thus a provider cannot activate the process without the consent of the funder. Of
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course, litigation is an alternative, but given the disparity in funding, this option is not as 
readily available to small providers as it is to the District Health Board.
To summarise, of all organisations, only KWHB’s core contract has an effective 
dispute resolution mechanism. This anomaly may be attributed to the fact that this is a 
tripartite contract signed with both the territorial and Commonwealth government. Both 
levels of government have shown a keen interest in ensuring that their counterpart is 
contributing adequate funding to avoid cost-shifting. Although other organisations have 
dispute resolution mechanisms in their contracts, these provisions have not been 
tested.
At this point, each contract has contract-specific reporting requirements that 
focus on outputs rather than outcomes. Collectively, they are onerous and of little use 
to the organisation or the funder in assessing the effectiveness of programs.
6.1.4 Synthesis
Table 6.9 summarises the findings discussed above. Boundaries around 
provider’s decision-making result from a number of factors, including limited stable 
funding, prescriptive programs and outputs associated with specified populations. Less 
visible constraints are associated with the administrative costs of managing a 
fragmented contractual environment with extensive reporting and large number of 
transactions.
For example, although all organisations derive their funding from government 
contracts, the percentage of that funding that is earmarked for specific programs or 
expenditures varies considerably. KWHB’s funding is the most flexible with 32.3 
percent of its funding earmarked, followed by Danila Dilba at 51.6 percent, TRHHI at
70.1 percent, and finally TROR at 100 percent. Although all experienced a contractual 
environment that is fragmented, the impact of this fragmentation can be amortised by 
having some flexibility over a higher percentage of expenditures. In general, core or 
relational contracts tend to be longer-term contracts, and block funded. With the 
exception of the KWHB core funding contract, block funded contracts did not correlate 
the funding provided with some assessment of needs or expected expenditures, When 
proposal-driven, the allocation generally amounted to a percentage of what had been 
requested. Volume-based contracts (TROR or TRHHI) specified a minimum level of 
service to be provided for payment. They favoured individual intervention over 
population-based approaches. TROR reported being able to negotiate the volume of 
service required at the time of contract renewal. Of ail organisations, KHWB is the only 
one that was able to engage both the territorial and Commonwealth governments in .
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meaningful negotiations at the time of signing its first tripartite agreement and also at 
the time of its renewal.
In terms of access rules, both KWHB and Danila Dilba are funded to serve the 
health care needs of the ATSI population in their area. KWHB’s funding is calculated 
based on the population it is mandated to provide primary health care services to. The 
situation is different for Danila Dilba, who's mandate is to offer primary health care 
services to the Darwin and Palmerston-based ATSI community, but is constrained by 
the level of funding it can secure. Its approach is therefore a blend of providing services 
on demand, with some outreach, population-based strategies (illicit drug use or 
nutrition programs, for example). By virtue of serving communities that are somewhat 
isolated and mainly Maori, the service contracts TRHHI signs on behalf of its member- 
providers are closely aligned with its mandate to serve the needs of its Ngati 
Kahungunu. TROR, for reasons that remain unclear but that may be largely historical, 
is asked to serve the needs of a variety of populations, narrowly defined in contracts in 
terms of ethnicity, socio-economic status, gender and geographical location,
Both KWHB and Danila Dilba have a great deal of flexibility in designing their 
programs. Core funding is entirely flexible. Targeted funding is generally accessed 
through proposal writing, thus the organisation can define its own approach to 
addressing the health issue being targeted. TROR and TRHHI face a different 
situation. The contracts they sign are highly specific, describing with precision the 
activities to be undertaken. The only exception is the MDO contract.
The fragmentation of the contractual environment impacts mostly on reporting 
requirements. Here, Danila Dilba, TROR and TRHHI face a considerable burden as 
reporting requirements are contract-specific. KWHB is also burdened with contract- 
specific reporting requirements. The reporting under the large PHCAP contract is 
however streamlined. KWHB administrative staff can absorb the burden associated 
with the other contracts. TROR and TRHHI, which are in comparison relatively small 
organisations, are more impacted by the administrative burden they shoulder. Of all 
organisations, only KWHB benefits from an effective dispute resolution mechanism, 
which was specifically designed for the tripartite contract. In contrast, TROR and 
TRHHI depend on a provision that requires the DHB to agree that there is a dispute. 
The case arose during fieldwork where TRHHI and the MidCentral Health Board found 
themselves at odds over an issue related to funding. TRHHI made representations to 
have this item identified for resolution under the dispute resolution provision. At a 
meeting held between TRHHI and the DHB, which was attended by the researcher, the
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MidCentral Health Board however disagreed that there was a dispute, ruled that the 
matter had been settled and left TRHHI with no recourse.
Table 6.9 synthesises the information provided in the case studies following the 
framework adapted from Bossert. The information as presented gives some 
indications as to the level of decision-making available to each provider. The following 
section will re-evaluate this information in light of the range of choice criteria developed 
in chapter 2.
6.2 Decision-space analysis applied to contractual environments
This chapter began with three questions. This section focuses on the first two:
1. Are indigenous providers able to exercise some control over key areas of decision­
making?
2. What are the constraints on operations?
The answer to these questions depends largely on the contractual environment in 
place. The above analysis shows that contractual environments are complex and 
operate in manners somewhat similar and somewhat different from what is discussed 
in the contracting in health literature. To date, the literature on contracting has focused 
on the characteristics of single contracts. The framework adapted from Bossert has 
been used in this chapter to map out the characteristics of four contractual 
environments. When reviewed against the range of choice criteria adapted from 
Bossert, the case studies sum up to the analysis presented in Table 6,10, Here, the 
four contractual environments explored in this chapter'and the contractual environment 
experienced by First Nations have been ranked based on their range of choice. Based 
on this analysis, it appears that contractual environments that hinge on a multiplicity of 
classic contracts offer the least opportunities for choices. This is the case for TROR 
and TRHHI. This limits opportunities for significant innovations. The presence of a 
relational contract increases flexibility and opportunities for innovations. The 
administrative burden is also greatly reduced. In the case studies reviewed, 
administrative burden was inversely proportional to the proportion of the organisation's 
budget that is derived from the relational contract. In both Australia and New Zealand, it 
appears that administrative costs are highest for the least resourced organisation. This 
is reflected in the number of transactions for payment and in reporting requirements.
Table 6.9, Case Study Summary |
Function Indicator Danila Dilba KWHB TROR j TRHHI I
Finance j
Sources of 
Revenue
Intergovernmental transfers as % 
of total local health spending Nearly 100 percent Nearly 100 percent
Nearly 100 percent for health 
services Nearly 100 percent j
| Allocation of 
j expenditures
Intergovernmental transfers as % 
of local spending that is explicitly 
earmarked by higher authorities
51.6 percent 32.3 percent 100 percent
. ■ j
70.1 percent |
| Contracts Number, type and level of fragmentation
18, mostly classic, moderate to 
high fragmentation
11, one main relational 
contract 9, classic, high fragmentation 8, high fragmentation
j Length of 
| contracts Short versus long term
Yearly except for multi-year 
projects (N=4)
Core funding is 2.5 years, 
other depends
Yearly, some renewed more or 
less automatically, some time 
limited vertical strategies
Yearly, some renewed more or j 
less automatically, some time 
limited vertical strategies
I Payment 
j structure
Block, volume, fee for services or 
partial funding
Core funding and vertical 
strategies are block payments 
Quarterly payments up front
Core funding is a mix of block 
payment and fee-for-service. 
Others are block payments 
Quarterly payments up front
Mainly cost and volume 
contracts
Monthly payments on a cost 
recovery basis
Core funding is block funded. 
Service funding is through cost 
and volume contracts | 
Monthly payments on a cost j 
recovery basis
■ Fair
! negotiations
Disclosure on alt parties of 
financial basis for funding. Equal 
access to information.
No negotiations
Extensive negotiations 
throughout the study phase, 
more limited thereafter
Some negotiations on 
deliverables No negotiations j
i Governance and Service Organisation
i Access Rules 
, and Targeting
•... 1 ■/
Defining priority populations ATSI. largely demand-driven ATSI, defined by geography
Largely TROR, although 
includes other Maori, Pacific 
Islanders and some 
underserved populations, 
defined by contract
Largely TRHHI, although i 
includes other Maori and j 
Pacific Islanders j
i Required 
: Programmes
Specificity of norms for local 
programmes
Flexibility for core funding 
Remaining contracts are 
proposal-driven
Flexibility for core funding 
Remaining contracts are 
proposal-driven
Limited flexibility in program 
design
Limited flexibility in program !
design j
¡Accountability
' Reporting Reporting required Reporting defined in each contract, onerous
Reporting consolidated for the 
PHCAP model
Reporting defined in each 
contract, onerous
Reporting defined in each 
contract, onerous j
■ Measures of 
; reciprocal 
; accountability
Provision for dispute resolution Dispute resolution clause in 72% of contracts
Main contract has effective 
clause
Dispute resolution clause in 
45% of other contracts
Dispute resolution clause in all 
contracts, both parties must 
agree that a dispute exists
Dispute resolution dause in all j 
contracts, both parties must j 
agree that a dispute exists
189
The classic-relational dichotomy apparent in the literature does not adequately 
reflect how contractual environments, both those that rely on a number of classic 
contracts, or those that blend both classic and relational contracts, operate. The 
following discussion provides examples of such differences.
Table 6.10, Decision Space Analysis as an analytical tool for contractual environments
Function Indicator
Range of choice (increasing from left to right)
TROR
(NZ)
TRHHI
(NZ)
DD (AUS) HTP(CAN)
KWHB
(AUS)
Year of incorporation 1988 1997 1991 1989 1998
Finance
Sources of 
Revenue
Public funding as % of 
total local health 
spending
Narrow to 
Moderate
Narrow to 
Moderate
Moderate Moderate High
Allocation of 
expenditures
Intergovernmental 
transfers as % of local 
spending that is 
explicitly earmarked by 
higher authorities
Narrow Narrow
Narrow to 
Moderate Moderate High
Contracts Number, type and level of fragmentation Narrow Narrow
Narrow to 
Moderate Moderate High
Length of 
contracts Short versus long term Narrow Narrow
Narrow Moderate 
to high High
Payment structure Block, volume, fee-for- servlce, partial funding
Narrow to 
Moderate
Narrow to 
Moderate
Narrow to 
Moderate Moderate
Moderate 
to high
Fair negotiations
Disclosure on all parties 
of financial basis for 
funding. Equal access to 
information.
Narrow Narrow Narrow Narrow to Moderate
Moderate 
to high
Governance and Service Organisation
Access Rules and 
Targeting
Defining priority 
populations
Narrow to 
Moderate
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate to high
Required
Programmes
Specificity of norms for 
local programmes Narrow Narrow Moderate Moderate High
Accountability
Measures of
reciprocal
accountability
Provision for dispute 
resolution Narrow Narrow Narrow
Narrow to 
Moderate
Moderate 
to high
Reporting Reporting required of the provider Narrow Narrow Narrow Narrow
Moderate 
to high
On classic contract, and the pursuit of efficiency through competition In
the context of the providers studied, the funder’s fragmentation of the contractual 
environment does not aim to increase provider efficiency through competition. Although 
contracts do not contain provisions for automatic renewal, providers such as Danila 
Dilba, TROR and TRHHI reported that between 75 to 80 percent of their funding was 
relatively stable from year to year. The goal is rather to direct providers to deliver 
services on health priorities defined nationally. This raises the issue of local 
responsiveness. It also raises the issue of purpose: is there an advantage to the New 
Zealand model of small distinct contracts? At this time, the contractual environment 
appears to be a remnant of the first part of the 1990s. It remains to be seen whether
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the current (DHBs) and future (PHOs) purchasers may be willing to let go of the control 
classic contracts provide them.
Competition is further hampered by the provider’s legitimacy and access to its 
indigenous client constituency. The Ngati Kahungunu TRHHI organisation can call on 
its iwi affiliation to legitimise its access to Ngati Kahungunu clients. The same can be 
said of TROR. Danila Dilba’s status as an ACCHS legitimises its access to its clientele. 
The same can be said of First Nations. These organisations may not be the only 
providers from which services are accessed, but their indigenous status provides them 
with increased legitimacy, which is re-enforced by health policies. The client- 
governance relation can be understood as a form of asset specificity that prevents 
other providers from being able to compete for the same contracts. The concept of 
political/cultural affiliation as a variation of asset specificity does not appear in the 
literature. It is however a useful distinction.
Multiple simple contacts create complex contractual environments 
Providers accessing a number of “classic” contracts with highly defined specific outputs 
shoulder a complex contractual environment, which involves higher transaction costs, 
higher levels of fragmentation potentially creating gaps in services shouldered by the 
providers at a cost to themselves, and an overall higher cost of coordination of the 
system, which may or may not be recognised or shouldered by the purchaser. This is 
most evident in New Zealand. This raises questions as to assumptions with regard to 
the monitoring costs of classic over relational contracts. While it is clear that a single 
classic contract may be easier to monitor than a single relational contract, it is also 
clear that monitoring a multiplicity of classic contracts can become onerous for the 
funder. For example, TROR and TRHHI are required to provide 30 and 36 reports 
annually to fulfil their reporting requirements, This workload Is for a single provider. The 
funder is tasked with assessing the performance of programs for all of its providers. 
Although there are likely some variations, the number of reports required of TROR or 
TRHHI are likely reflective of reporting requirements with other providers. This brings 
into question the likelihood that a large number of small contracts can be monitored to 
ensure accountability. This was investigated in New Zealand, where a single purchaser 
system exists. Government interviewees suggested that both historical and 
contemporary funding agencies lack the human resources to ensure an appropriate 
oversight. This suggests that in health care, a classic contractual environment can lead 
to the multiplication of contracts leading to high transaction and monitoring costs. 
These findings echo concerns expressed by Howden-Chapman and Ashton (Ashton 
1998, Howden Chapman & Ashton 1994). The same was documented in Canada 
(Auditor General of Canada 2002, Lavoie et al 2004). In other words, multiple simple
contracts generate a complex contractual environment that is also difficult to monitor, 
not for a lack of specific contractual provisions, but rather because of multiple specific 
contractual provisions. In the context of the case studies pursued, the costs have been 
born by both the purchaser and the providers. In the case of First Nations, the 
multiplicity of report does not add up to a coherent information mechanism for FNIHB 
(Auditor General of Canada 2002). It appears that the same issue is being raised in 
New Zealand (Crampton et al 2004). Cost effectiveness analysis does not appear to be 
part of the design of accountability systems.
Balancing contractual and community obligations Theoretically, providers 
funded through multiple classic contracts offer a patchwork of services that is defined 
by the contracts secured. In reality, services were reportedly offered beyond the scope 
of contractual agreements as theoretical boundaries clashed with common sense and 
community expectations.84 This however means that providers on the classic side of 
the contractual spectrum assume a larger part of the risk associated with their moral- 
cultural-political obligation to align services with local expectations (kaupara Maori 
services for example): the wider the gap between local expectation and contractual 
specifications, the higher the risk for the provider. The literature calls this the 
harnessing of community goodwill, defined as a provider’s willingness to go beyond 
contractual obligations to ensure that appropriate services are available (Lane 2001). 
Providers who benefit from some flexible funding are able to use this flexibility to 
amortise risks. It would follow that the higher the percentage of flexible funding, the 
lesser the potentially gap between expectations and service obligations. There is 
obviously a threshold beyond which limitations associated with targeted contracts are 
easily absorbed by the organisation: this is the case for KWHB and is related to the fact 
that core funding alone assures sustainability.
Relational contracts carry substantial risks for both the funder and the 
provider Providers funded with contracts of a more relational nature benefit largely 
from a single purchaser - single provider relationship with streamlined contracting and 
reporting requirements. Contracts are longer terms, three to five years, meaning lower 
negotiation costs for the purchaser and provider. They are broadly defined, outlining 
the responsibility of the provider to offer comprehensive primary health care, and 
leaving the provider the responsibility to allocate services, human and financial 
resources accordingly. Reliable, population based funding opens the door to long term
84 The distance between contractual expectations and service provision by Maori providers 
is the subject of Ms. Amohia Boulton PhD thesis. I am grateful for her insights (Boulton, 2004, 
personal communication).
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planning and strategising. It also draws on the cultural expertise of providers, a key 
theme for indigenous providers. The literature suggests that this situation creates a 
shared responsibility on the part of the purchaser and the provider to ensure that the 
relationship is protected, and that disagreements are addressed (Goddard & Mannion 
1998, Stewart 1993). During the implementation of the KWHB model (the CCT phase), 
KWHB could count on the Monitoring Group, which included membership from both 
government funding bodies, to work through issues (Monitoring Group 2001). Recent 
communications (email dated February 2004) suggests that OATSIH is now making 
unilateral decisions regarding the funding pool. KWHB, having no alternative funding 
for its core functions, is left with the choice of ending its own existence and the services 
provided to its mainly ATSI constituency, or signing on. First Nations have reported the 
same situation. In fact, at least in the indigenous environment, the single funding-single 
provider relationship carries significant risk for the provider, as unilateral decisions 
cannot be side-stepped. Indigenous organisations’ moral-cultural-political obligation to 
provide services simply compounds the situation.
The trust in trust-based contracts Relational contracts are also termed trust- 
based contracts. In these case studies reviewed, TROR had no trust-based contract. 
TRHHI had a small trust-based MDO contract with fairly flexible provisions. This 
contract provided mostly for administrative expenditures associated with the provider 
capacity building mandate of the MDO. Danila Dilba had access to a trust-based 
contract accounting for nearly half of its funding. KWHB-held the largest trust-based 
contract accounting for to thirds of its yearly budget, over £2M. As shown in Table 6.10, 
KWHB is the youngest of the organisations studied and had no track record in service 
delivery prior to the CCT. A majority of members on the Board of Directors at the time 
of fieldwork had limited literacy and numeracy capacity. It Initially benefited from a large 
relational contract with funding pooled from the Commonwealth and Territorial 
governments. More recent developments indicate some erosion in the governmental 
commitment to pooling funding and interest in fragmenting the funding under separate 
contracts (Whelan, 2004, personal communications). In contrast, Danila Dilba had 
been delivering services since 1991 and had a successful track record. Likewise in 
New Zealand, TROR was established in 1988, is acknowledged at least verbally by the 
MidCentral Health Board as a preferred provider,85 and counts Dr Mason Durie, one of 
the most respected Maori health researcher, as a member of its Board. TRHHI is ten
85 This unofficial designation emerged under the HFA to mean that providers who 
successfully delivered a program can expect that contract to be renewed without the contract 
having to go through a tendering process.
193
years younger. It experienced some difficulties with three of its founder member- 
providers and some credibility issues with the Hawkes Bay District Health Board. In the 
Canadian environment, the trust-based, single relational contractual environment has 
been eroded in favour of a blend on trust-based and classic contracts.
In the indigenous environment, trust-based contracts do not replace classic 
contracts once providers are established and have secured some credibility. Instead, 
trust-based contracts are used to introduce new approaches or models of service 
delivery promoted by policy (PHCAP, the MDO or the community-based model 
emerging from the Health Transfer Policy). The commitment to funding these models 
through relational contracts however appears to eventually wane in favour of more 
explicit or classic contracts. The reasons are likely varied. First, new models are 
usually designed and implemented by a central agency that Is distant from the day-to- 
day challenges of contract monitoring. Indigenous buy-in is important since uptake is 
generally voluntary, and poor uptake may reflect poorly on the government agency and 
carry political risks. Relational contracts, because they are flexible and can promote 
local approaches to service delivery, are more appealing. Second, new models 
necessarily mean that all possible future contingencies could not be known at the time 
of their deployment. As a result, relational contracts may be used until sufficient 
experience has been gained to make the drafting of more specific contracts practical. 
Third, once the model Is established, the funder's initial enthusiasm may be replaced 
with a pragmatic need to anticipate challenges related to service delivery and 
performance monitoring, and to limit them. The advantages of classic over relational 
contracts may be weighted differently when implementation is left to mid-level 
administrators working in regional organisations and tasked with the monitoring of 
contracts. Fourth, in the indigenous environment, trust between the funder and 
indigenous providers is vested with the collective as well as with the individual provider. 
Non-performance of some indigenous providers may lead to shifts in risk management 
practices affecting all. For example, the failure of the Tiwl Island CCT brought the issue 
of risk to the forefront of PHCAP discussions in 2002-03. The success of KWHB could 
not outweigh the concerns raised, and led to some rethinking on the pooling of funding 
Other factors, such as administrative difficulties experienced by the Canadian federal 
government86 in the mid 1990s, also lead to unilateral changes in the way contracting 
was perceived and pursued, whether with new or well established organisations.
86 Scandals emerged in the mid 1990s in the administration of Human Resources Canada 
and Health Canada, with allegations of embezzlement and fraud.
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The analysis outlined above shows that contractual environment exhibits some 
similarities and some important differences when compared to the literature on classic 
and relational contracts. In the indigenous environment, classic contracts are used not 
to promote competition and the associated efficiency it may promote, but rather to 
ensure that national priorities in health gains are reflected in service delivery. While the 
aim is justifiable, the means multiplies administrative costs. The siloed approach to 
contracting can also leave important service delivery gaps that may be overlooked, or 
addressed by indigenous providers. Signatories of relational contracts also face some 
risks is that the funder exercises considerable control over the terms and conditions 
contained in single substantial contracts. In the context of single funder, single provider 
relationships, the funder benefits from a quasi-monopoly over access to funding and 
the indigenous provider’s commitment to meet the needs of its constituency. As a 
result, some of the benefits reported in the literature, such as the resolving of dispute 
amicably, may or may not occur. The basis of the relational contract appears to have 
less to do with trust, and more to do with the need to secure indigenous buy-in in 
government initiatives. Once the buy-in has occurred, there seems to be less interest in 
maintaining the commitment to relational contracts.
6.3 Conclusions
Overall, the framework derived from Bossert is a useful tool to assess the 
responsiveness of diverse contractual environments and their alignment with the 
literature on contracting in health. It facilitates the analysis of contractual environments 
that blend classic and relational contracts and allows to explore the experience of 
organisations that operate with multiple and diverse contracts. In the context of this 
study, the framework clearly indicates the limitations of a reliance on a number of small 
and fragmented classic contracts. This model poorly reflects indigenous aspirations for 
self-determination and appears to carry more limitations and advantages. The 
limitations of classic contracts, higher transactions costs, are compounded once 
contracts multiply and their advantages, cost-effective monitoring, eroded. This brings 
up the last question raised at the beginning of this chapter: Is the contractual 
environment an accurate reflection of indigenous health policies or of the state 
practices in health contracting? Are compromises made to respect Indigenous 
aspirations?
195
CHAPTER 7, PATCHES FOR EQUITY?
Previous chapters explored the emergence of “by indigenous for indigenous” 
policies and their impact on the delivery of primary health care services in Australia and 
New Zealand. The historical context in which these policies emerged was discussed at 
length. Despite similarities, all three countries have developed somewhat different 
relationships with their indigenous health sector reflecting differences in history, health 
care system, jurisdiction over health and indigenous affairs. The contractual 
environment that emerged in each country was also explored at length.
The objective of this thesis was to explore how governments balance the ideal 
of indigenous self-determination with other pressures, such as current trends in public 
administration and accountability, pressures on the health care system, issues of and 
sensitivities around minority rights, equity in health and cost-efficiency. This chapter will 
review the findings discussed in chapters 4 to 6, in light of the study's original questions 
developed in chapter 2, and the international literature.
This chapter is organised in five sections. The first section explores the 
relationship between policy, implementation and the contractual environment in which 
indigenous providers operate. This section concludes by revisiting the findings in light 
of the study questions. Section two explores the lessons specific to contractual 
environments. Section three situates these findings within the larger context of 
international indigenous debates and policies directions in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. Section four discusses areas in which findings may be generalised and 
explore directions for further research. A final section revisits the objective of this 
study, and summarises the broad conclusions to be derived from this thesis.
7.1 Linking indigenous health policies to the contractual environment
This section provides a synopsis of the comparative analyses of indigenous 
health policies, the inevitable compromises associated with implementation, and of the 
resulting contractual environments. The research reported in this thesis was guided by 
eight questions:
1. What are the historical factors that impacted the development of indigenous health 
policies?
2. What values are apparent in policies?
3. Do policies more readily reflect indigenous aspirations, indigenous-state’s historical 
relationship or other interests?
4. What are the apparent compromises made in the process of implementation?
5. What factors led to compromises?
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6. Are indigenous providers able to exercise some control over key areas of decision­
making?
7. What are the constraints on operations? And,
8. Is the contractual environment an accurate reflection of indigenous health policies 
or of the state practices in health contracting? Are compromises made to respect 
indigenous aspirations?
Each question was explored in chapters 4 and 6 on a country per country basis. The 
purpose of this section is to re-explore these findings in light of the literature, in order to 
draw generalisable conclusions on the connection between policy, implementation and 
the contractual environment.
Table 7.1 summarises the key findings. Overall, all policies exhibit 
characteristics stemming for the historical relationship between the state and their 
indigenous constituency (questions 1 to 3). In all three countries, policies have 
endorsed indigenous-specific forms of collective representation and promoted service 
responsiveness through indigenous participation. There are however important 
differences. New Zealand’s approach is to design national policies that identify 
priorities. All providers are then tasked to address these priority areas, which include 
improving M5ori access to services and outcomes in key areas. These policies, 
although “Treaty-based", continue to reflect New Zealand’s commitment to integrated 
rather than parallel systems.
Canada and Australia have instead preferred to endorse the development of 
parallel services. The reasons for these differences are largely historical. In Canada, 
parallel systems emerged as a result of the historical Constitutional divide. The current 
policy focuses on a transfer of responsibility from the federal government to First 
Nations for on-reserve services. As such, it simply perpetuates an arrangement that 
has existed for some time. It also side-steps the engagement of the provincial health 
care systems that operate autonomously from one another, and to a large extent, from 
the federal government. In the Canadian context, First Nations understand themselves 
as distinct nations. This policy focus on local responsiveness may echo First Nation 
governance structures and aspirations, but leaves a major part of the system, namely 
all off-reserve primary health services, as well and second and tertiary care services, 
with no obligation to demonstrate responsiveness.
¡Table 7.1 Indigenous health policies j
"i _ , . . .  j Local priority setting and overall responsiveness to 
Focus of policies ] address inequalities: Australia
National priority setting in addressing health 
inequalities: New Zealand
Local engagement in primary health care to ensure 
responsiveness: Canada
i Factors impacting development
: Relationship with 
i the Crown (health) • No legislative framework recognised
» Treaty of Waitangi 
• Partnership
• Royal Proclamation !
• Self-government provision in the Constitution
» Not Treaty-based j
i History of 
i Indigenous-state 
t relation
• Focus on segregation and oppression.
• Recently, creation of parallel primary health care 
systems
• R angatiratanga
• Integration
• Focus on segregation and creation of parallel j 
systems
i Policy mentions 
¡indigenous/ 
i Treaty rights or 
: self-determination
• Recognition of pre-conquest ATS! rights in the 
area of land rights not extended to other area.
• Policy recognises self-determination, not tied to 
traditional community-based governance structures
• Policy cites the Treaty of Waitangi
• Policy situates Maori participation in health 
structures and processes, instead of the 
establishment of parallel structures and processes.
• Active resistance to pressure from First Nations to j 
acknowledge a Treaty obligation in policies j
• Health Transfer Policy integrated with national 
policy of self-government
; Policy
: Source of policy • Central government since 1995
• Historically, guidelines from central government 
issued to public service providers.
• Recent shift in 2002 Maori specific strategy and 
action plan drafted by Central government
• Aboriginal health policies issued by central 
government
Responsibility for 
; implementation
• Central government, with consensus from 
state/territorial governments • Regional authorities (DHBs, PHOs) • Central government j
¡Values
• Equity in health;
• ATSI participation in planning forums and at die 
national level;
» Community controlled health services;
• Responsiveness of the whole system;
• Substantial resource investment
• Maori participation within existing structures but at 
all levels
• Maori development as a people.
•  Building on improved Maori outcomes
• Increase service uptake
• Maori participation throughout the health and 
disability sector.
• Reducing inequalities in health care.
•  Concentrates on primary health care interventions i 
only - it
•  Focuses action solely on on-reserve services
•  Supports community development as mechanism j| 
to improve health ij
Results
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¡Table 7.1 Indigenous health policies j
i Focus of policies Local priority setting and overall responsiveness to j National priority setting in addressing health address inequalities: Australia j inequalities: New Zealand
Local engagement in primary health care to ensure 
responsiveness: Canada
i Contractual 
! environments
* Pre-PHCAP : classic contractual environment I
•  Classic contractual environment
•  PHCAP: Relational contractual environment j
•  From relational (1989) to a mix of classic and i 
relational contracts (1994). j
; Indigenous 
ji aspirations
•  Pre-PHCAP : policy expressed aspiration, but 
contractual environment was underfunded and 
limited ATSI participation in service delivery
•  PHCAP: policy and contractual environments now 
aligned.
•  Aspirations for high level participation reflected in 
policies, albeit reflecting integration rather than 
parallel systems.
•  The contractual environment is a poor reflection of 
aspirations and f  the language of the policy.
•  Indian Health Policy better reflects aspiration. !
•  The Health Transfer Policy as implemented in 
1989 addressed local aspirations at the expense of 
broader processes of engagement
•  The shift towards a classic contractual 
environment is seen as an erosion of FNIHB | 
commitment to First Nations’ rights to health. j
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In Australia, parallel systems emerged out of ATSI advocacy. The historical 
failure of the states and territories in addressing ATSI health needs also played an 
important role. The Commonwealth Government was able to gain control over ATSI 
affairs in the early 1970s. Coincidentally, ACCHS also emerged in the early 1970s as a 
result of community mobilisations. The Commonwealth government’s endorsement of 
parallel services was the logical next step. In contrast to Canada however, Australia is 
now looking at going beyond the ACCHS movement to address ATSI health 
inequalities. The current Aboriginal Health Strategy highlights the need to improve the 
responsiveness of the whole health care system. It was signed by all Health Ministers.
It appears that the contractual environment in which providers operate bears a 
highly nuanced resemblance to the official policy put in place by their respective 
governments (questions 4 and 5). Indigenous providers who operate in an environment 
where the funder is an indigenous-specific government authority (as in the case of First 
Nations, and in Australia under the new PHCAP program) have access to a more 
favourable contractual environment administratively, financially and in terms of 
comprehensiveness of services. In contrast, services that operate in a competitive 
environment are more likely to access funding via a multiplicity of fragmented 
contracts, which increases administrative costs for both the funder and the provider; 
generates operational costs for the provider; leads to increased and duplication in 
reporting requirements that do not necessarily contribute to the overall goals of health 
status monitoring or accountability; and creates coordination costs with other providers, 
to ensure that the overall services provided are as seamless as possible. As well, a 
fragmented contractual environment is less likely to facilitate the provision of 
comprehensive primary health care services for a defined population. This may result 
in a patchwork approach to service delivery, which may be less conducive to achieving 
the health gains sought.
Preferences in terms of contractual environments have also emerged. In New 
Zealand, and in the case of ACCHS, providers must compete for funding with other 
services providers. This results in a classic contractual environment, where each 
contract contains narrowly defined program specifications. In the case of the Canadian 
HTP, as originally implemented in 1989 and under the new PHCAP program, providers 
are understood as the sole legitimate provider to serve a geographically and culturally- 
defined population. Contracts are flexible and obligations broadly-defined (questions 6 
t ° 8).. .
The contractual environment in all three countries shows tensions related to 
competing values existing between indigenous demands for collective recognition and 
processes of engagement, and the purchaser’s broader concerns. The differences in
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focus are shown in Table 7.2. The responsibility for indigenous health is vested in 
central governments who will necessarily place more importance on national priority 
health gains, and on standardised approaches to facilitate evaluations and reporting on 
effectiveness. The focus of indigenous provider is local in both priority setting and in 
the design of interventions.
'3r‘x
Table 7.2, Competing values
Purchaser (governmen t ) _____ _
National priority setting____________
The role’s government as the steward 
I responsible for ensuring appropriate 
i expenditures and effectiveness
i Need to show results.
Requires harmonised approaches to facilitate 
evaluations
Indigenous Organisations |
Local responsiveness |
Indigenous provider’s independence, 1
responsiveness to their indigenous I
constituency |
The need to provide appropriate care that j  
requires flexibility and responsiveness f
Overall, the evidence collected in this thesis suggests that the contractual 
environment better reflects the tensions at play in indigenous-state relations, whereas 
policy statements embody national and international debates for indigenous rights and 
recognition. This finding echoes comments made by Apthorpe (1997). Indigenous 
advocacy has been successful in ensuring that policy statements and objectives reflect 
their aspirations. Implementation is subject to different forces, including divergent 
interests within the health care system, public perceptions of unfair advantages 
awarded to culturally-specific services, and values and practices entrenched in public 
administration.
7.2 Lessons from Contractual Environments
The four case studies, and the Canadian experience, are reflective of different 
contractual environments. These generally fall into two categories:
• Classic contractual environment; Providers rely on a majority of contracts that 
are closer to the “classic" model described in the literature. As a result, providers 
must compete for funding with other service providers. If core funding is provided, it 
is not sufficient to sustain the organisation’s core activities. Included in this category 
are TROR, TRHHI and Danila Dilba. •
• Relational contractual environment: Providers rely on a single or collection of 
contracts that are closer to the “relational” model described in the literature. 
Providers are understood by their government as the sole legitimate provider to 
serve a geographically and culturally defined population. This is the case for KWHB 
in Australia and for First Nations in Canada.
Each environment exhibits characteristics that emulate single classic and relational 
contracts. The multiplication of contracts, and the specificity of the indigenous
201
environment, however create some important differences. These are reviewed in 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
Table 7.3 compares the characteristics of classic contracts as defined in the 
literature, to contractual environments based on a collection of classic contracts. 
Contractual environments that rely on multiple classic contracts to fund on-going 
services face a number of challenges, including high transaction costs associated with 
contract drafting. In the indigenous environment, classic contracts may be used to 
promote interventions in nationally-defined priority areas, to stimulate innovation or to 
fund on-going services. The objective is not one of competition, but rather of ensuring 
that the purchaser retains substantial control over priority definition, funding and 
intervention. There is a risk that a collection of highly specific contracts, which may be 
easily monitored on a contract per contract basis, creates a patchwork approach to 
service delivery with significant gaps that may be difficult to track. From the provider’s 
perspective, it may not be possible to let gaps in funding lead to gaps in services. The 
closer relationship with the indigenous constituency creates opportunity to ensure 
responsiveness, which may in turn leave the provider caught in between contractual 
and community obligations.
The short-term and focused nature of the contracts facilitates single contract 
monitoring, but may complicate the performance monitoring of the overall contractual 
environment. Further, output-oriented monitoring provides little information on the 
overall value of the services provided in improving outcomes. Because of the short­
term nature of the contract, there is limited incentive for the funder to settle dispute. 
Instability in funding can create risks associated with securing and maintaining 
facilities, and in recruitment and retention.
In the context of this research, no provider operates under a single relational 
contract. Both KWHB and First Nations operate in mixed environments characterised 
by a single relational contract that accounts for over half of their funding, 
complemented with some classic contracts. In these environments, the relational 
contract funds the on-going primary health portion of services for a defined population. 
Classic contracts play a more limited role in focusing some interventions on national 
health priorities or providing an opportunity for experimentation. The flexibility apparent 
in this environment can promote community engagement in priority setting and 
intervention, as was the case for KWHB and First Nations. Characteristics are 
summarised in Table 7.4. Overall, this model ensures access to more stable funding.
The literature suggests that long term contracting carries a "massive moral 
hazard” because of the difficulty to monitor less defined contracts (Lane 2001). This 
study suggests that, at least in the indigenous environment, the moral hazard
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associated with monitoring contracts is shared between classic and relational 
contractual environments. Providers that are receiving their funding through a spectrum 
of small classic contracts require close monitoring to ensure that contractual 
requirements are met. Providers that access the majority of their funding through a 
single relational contract depend on the renewal of this contract for their continued 
existence. Further, the single purchaser-provider relationship that exists spreads the 
moral hazard to both parties, promoting an amicable resolution of disputes.
In summary, the results of this research do not necessarily reproduce the 
classic-relational dichotomy reported by other authors (Goddard & Mannion 1998, Lane 
2001). Two main reasons are at play. First, the indigenous environment has 
particularities that are not necessarily reflected in other environments. Indigenous 
providers have a political-cultural connection with their constituency, As a result of the 
legal framework in that informs indigenous-state relations, many indigenous providers 
benefit from a single purchaser-provider relationship. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, all research encountered focused on analysing single contracts, rather 
than the contractual environment, or looking at contracting from the purchaser’s 
perspective. More research is required in contractually fragmented areas to identify 
whether the conclusions presented here are unique to the indigenous environment, or 
reflect the context of multiple contracts. In that context, contractual environments show 
a continuum from classic to relational.
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| Table 7.3, Strengths and weaknesses of single classic contracts and contractual environments built on a collection of classic contracts
I  ; Single contract (Goddard & Mannion 1998, Lane 2001) Contractual environments: Danila Dilba, TROR, TRHHI
Criteria
Transaction
costs
Priority setting
Efficiency
i Organisational 
Î issues
Based on a single funder engaging multiple providers in competing for 
contracts.
Monitoring
Contract drafting requires careful definitions of requirements and 
outputs, as well as contingencies
Higher transaction costs associated with contract drafting and renewal
Based on a single organisation accessing funding for program through a 
number of separate classic contracts to fund on-going services
High administrative costs associated with a single contract is 
compounded with multiple contracts
No incentive for the provider to invest in long term interventions 
Tends to focus interventions on individuals 
In the case of vertical strategies, allows for the testing of new 
approaches across many providers
if proposal-driven, allows providers to experiment with specific 
interventions. Closer alignment between funding and output allows the 
funder to report on the performance of targeted strategies.
Tends to focus interventions on nationally-defined rather than local 
priorities
Over-reliance on vertical strategies for on-going funding
Promotes competition between providers and potentially efficiency
Promotes the deployment of resources based on contractual obligations 
May create instability in organisations as a result of lack of commitment 
to continuous funding
Not used to promote competition, but rather to ensure that the 
purchaser retains substantial control.
Contract specifications may not match community needs and 
expectations, leading to political instability for the providers or to 
providers over-extending the resources they have to ensure 
responsiveness
Patchwork of funding creates patchwork of services with higher 
coordination costs
May create instability in organisations as a result of lack of commitment 
for continuous funding
Explicit output requirements facilitate contract monitoring 
Provider performance assessed through contract outputs
Single contract monitoring is relatively easy.
Monitoring of the overall contractual environment onerous and complex 
Output-based monitoring provides little information of the performance 
of the overall contractual environment in achieving health gains.
PiiiriinvrrwTmTri’i in ir r y iT - ,'ij:» rr ir iïir i< n iir iiT 'CTTii»ifrariii iii i Ti!>iwiirMiirpB'iiiïTffirt~i».TifiKifiii^iM 'iirTiT.iiiim iim iii-
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Table 7.3, Strengths and weaknesses of single classic contracts and contractual environments built on a collection of classic contracts
Criteria
Risk
Single contract (Goddard & Mannion 1998, Lane 2001) Contractual environments: Danila Dilba, TROR, TRHHI
Based on a single funder engaging multiple providers in competing for 
contracts.
Based on a single organisation accessing funding for program through a 
number of separate classic contracts to fund on-going services
Settlement of 
dispute
Lower risk for government-funder as contracts are short term and can 
be easily terminated with limited consequences for the funder 
Higher risk for the provider who must provide facilities and recruit 
professionals, while relying on funding commitment that are short term 
only. ■ .. ■ .
Short term contract may act as a disincentive for the purchaser to settle 
dispute
Higher risk for the provider who must provide facilities and recruit 
professionals, while relying on funding commitment that are short term 
only.
Higher risk for the provider who bears the responsibility for accessing 
funding.
Short term contracts my act as a disincentive for the purchaser to settle 
dispute
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! Table 7.4, Strengths and weaknesses of relational contracts and relational contractual environments
; Description
Transaction
costs
Monitoring
3 Risks
Dispute
Resolution
Single contract (Goddard & Mannion 1998, Lane 2001) Blended contractual environments where a relational contract dominates
i KWHB, HTP
Priority setting
Based on a single funder and a single provider engaged in a long term 
cooperative contractual relationship
«■ Contract drafting broader and more flexible 
• Reduced transaction costs (drafting and negotiating)
. Promote long term planning and intervention
. Promote population approaches
. Possibility of improved responsiveness
j Based on a single funding engaging with a single provider in a substantial 
j relational contract that may be complemented with some classic contracts
Efficiency
Organisational
issues
Relational contract carries lower transaction costs for both the funder 
and provider
May result in organisational inefficiency and substandard performance
Stable funding facilitating recruitment and retention of staff 
Facilitates the strategic deployment of human resources as needed
Contract monitoring more challenging and costs may offset transaction 
cost savings.
Possibility of provider performance assessed through outcomes
Moral hazard: non-performance by providers is difficult to track and 
severing contractual relations may be costly.
Mutual interest in settling disputes amicablyj :
JjaistiaÌ9Ìia%gigiBjiiffàsaÌB8Ìiis^^
Flexibility promotes community goodwill and creativity
Promotes improved responsiveness
Reliance on vertical strategies for experimentation only
-..I
Promotes PHC, population-based approaches that are flexible to meet 
local priorities, and focus strategies to meet the need of national 
priorities
Relational contract provides stable funding
Recruitment & retention may be facilitated by long term funding 
guarantees.
Non-performance by organisation leads to higher risk for the funder 
Possible provider complaisance related to secure continuous funding 
(may be mediated by community expectations)
Neither the funder nor the provider can (readily) establish a contractual 
relationship with another contractual partner.
The provider’s viability may be tied to its acceptance of the contract.
Mutual interest in settling disputes amicably.
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Relational contracts have intuitive appeal and have been promoted by theorists 
(Allen 2002, Gilson et al 1997, Palmer & Mills 2003). Governments appear to see them 
in a different light. Trust-based contracting was first implemented in Canada, with the 
signature of a single, flexible 3 or 5 year contract. This has now been eroded, and a 
significant proportion of providers' funding (30-40 percent) is secured through classic 
contracts reflecting national health priorities. This situation reflects that of Danila Dilba. 
Recent correspondence with KWHB suggests that “risk management" may be 
becoming a major concern for OATSIH and eroding provisions such as the pooling of 
funding. Already KWHB is experiencing some erosion in its trust-based contract. This is 
linked not to KWHB’s performance, but is rather the result of (1) financial difficulties 
experienced by another PHCAP site, the Tiwi Health Board, (2) the pressures 
associated with the rolling out of PHCAP nationally, and (3) with funder's perceptions of 
risk associated with potential non-performance that would challenges the credibility of 
the overall strategy. As discussed in chapter 6, the shift from relational to classic 
contracts is related to a number of factors. Relational contracts are used when new 
models are introduced (PHCAP, MDO, etc.) in part because future contingencies 
cannot be known. Relational contracts have more appeal, and may promote contract 
uptake by indigenous providers, thus ensuring that the initiative promoted by a 
government agency is legitimised. Once models have been deployed and service 
provision is on-going, the focus may shift to performance and monitoring. The 
cumulated experience is then used to increase the specificity of contracts. This shift 
may be related to the needs of mid-level administrators tasked to ensure that 
contractual obligations are respected. This would suggest that the use of relational 
contracts has less to do with trust and more to do with punctual administrative 
priorities.
All three countries show evidence of compromises in their indigenous health 
contracting practices. In Australia and New Zealand, as in Canada, the contractual 
environment embodies the last years of indigenous advocacy for self-determination, 
albeit to varying degrees. The Health Transfer Policy is an anomaly and could not have 
occurred outside of the context of First Nations advocating for self-government at 
national and international levels. The same can be said of the core funding provided to 
ACCHS, and of the more ambitious PHCAP. In New Zealand, compromises are also 
apparent in the requirement that DHBs show evidence of a Treaty-based partnership 
with local iwi, the requirement that all providers have policies of engagement with Maori 
to ensure responsiveness, and the repeated commitment to Maori provider 
development.
While theorists may be prepared to continue to recommend relational contracts 
because their flexibility can better accommodate the needs of community-based health 
services, practitioners may be more comfortable in recommending a compromise to 
ensure long-term political sustainability. A blended approach to contracting may also 
allow both the purchaser and the provider to mediate their risks (real and perceived). 
Indigenous people are unlikely to see the trade-off in the same light. Relational 
contracts provide the most flexible environment, and thus align much more readily with 
indigenous aspirations, and with indigenous health policies that promote self- 
determination and local responsiveness.
The optimal contractual environment may very well be a single blended contract 
with defined benchmarks to focus attention on key priorities, supported by a relational 
component for core functions (essential services) to ensure that flexibility and 
responsiveness to local needs are protected. It is unclear why the two perspectives 
have yet to be embodied into a single contract.
7.3 Situating the findings within their Larger Context
The review of findings presented here offers a number of avenues for reflection. 
These findings can inform macro-policy directions into four broad areas, namely the 
appropriate focus of stewardship; the trade-offs associated between integrated and 
separate services; issues associated with resourcing contracting in health; and the link 
between indigenous engagement and democracy. .
7.3.1 The forest or the trees: the appropriate focus of stewardship
This research has shown that two strategic approaches have emerged in 
contracting health services to address health inequalities in indigenous minorities In 
New Zealand and in the case of ACCHS, the state fund providers for a selection of 
discrete and well-defined programs. The focus is on nationally defined health priorities. 
This approach had led to the development of health service patchworks rather than 
systems, funded as a collection of programs targeting narrowly-defined national 
priorities. While indigenous services are to some extent able to sew funding patches 
into a somewhat coherent and broader approach to service delivery, there is ground to 
wonder whether a patchwork approach is a strategically appropriate mechanism to deal 
with health inequalities, that themselves reflect complex and broad historical and 
societal processes. In other words, is the pursuit of efficiency in single contracts 
compromising the efficiency of the overall contractual environment.
The high level of contractual fragmentation documented in Australia in the pre- 
PHCAP era, in New Zealand and increasingly in Canada since 1995, reflects
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worrisome a trend in indigenous health care contracting where a broad concept of 
stewardship over the overall performance of the health care system is being displaced 
in favour of a narrow concept of efficiency and accountability over small contracts. The 
shift is neither cost-effective neither likely to yield the benefits anticipated. Oversight 
over fragmented contracts is time consuming and costly, and yield little information on 
the performance of the overall system.
While monitoring contracts for outputs is necessary, this focus should not 
overshadow the importance of monitoring the performance of the overall system in 
addressing these inequalities. Future analysis and policy development must consider 
the overall coherence of contractual environments. A system’s approach to health 
gains may be more readily achieved through the implementation of relational contracts 
that are population-based, flexible and comprehensive.
7.3.2 Integration versus separation: locating responsiveness within the overall 
system
Both Australia and New Zealand have expressed a commitment to ensuring 
that their overall health care system becomes and/or remains responsive to indigenous 
people’s needs (King 2000, National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health 
Council & Australian Health Ministers' Conference 2003, New Zealand Ministry of 
Health 2002b). In contrast, the 1979 Indian Health Policy suggested the same goal 
(Health Canada 2000a). Its implementation arm has however focused exclusively on 
improving the responsiveness of on-reserve primary health care services (Health and 
Welfare Canada 1989). The Health Transfer Policy does not extent to provincial 
authorities. These differences are rooted in historical processes. In New Zealand, the 
colonial government’s commitment to integration has shaped and is reflected in policy 
commitments to rangatiratanga, as opposed to tino rangatiratanga. The commitment to 
integration focuses responsiveness on the whole system, since it cannot be 
fragmented into Maori-specific and general components.
In Australia, the responsibility for ATSI health services was originally allocated 
to the states, but at least partially shifted to the Commonwealth Government in the 
1970s to finally rest with the Commonwealth Department of Health in 1995. The states 
and territories still fund secondary and tertiary care from the five-year Health Care 
Agreements signed with the Commonwealth Government. Although the structure is 
now very similar to that of Canada, the historical difference appears conducive to the 
recent national policy framework, and its focus on improving the responsiveness of the 
overall system, being extended to and ratified by state and territorial Health Ministers
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(National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council & Australian Health 
Ministers' Conference 2003).
Addressing health inequalities necessarily requires a whole system’s approach, 
to ensure responsiveness at all levels. Policy makers in Canada would be wise to learn 
from the approaches adopted in New Zealand and emerging in Australia. This should 
however not be at the expense of investing in responsive primary health care services.
7.3.3 Resourcing
In all three countries, indigenous primary health care services seem to have 
emerged at the juncture between an indigenous commitment to self-determination, 
governments’ attempt at giving voice to their indigenous constituency and ideological 
influences in the management of national health care systems. This paradox has been 
recognised, and indigenous peoples have been concerned that their respective 
government may be capitalising on the discourse of self-determination to off-load 
services onto the shoulders of poorly resourced indigenous health services (Assembly 
of First Nations 2002, Culhane Speck 1989, Durie 1998b). The Australian context has 
generated considerable amount of literature to support this argument (Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission 2000, Anderson 1997a, Australia Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Aged Care 2000a, 2000b, Australian institute of Health and 
Welfare 2001, Burns et al 1998, Deeble et al 1998, Gardner 1997, Jan 1998, Markey 
1997, McDermott 1995, 1998, Mooney 1996a, 1996b, 2000, Mooney et al 1998, 
Mooney & Wiseman 1998, Tsey & Scrimgeour 1996). This has led to debates and 
research on equity in Aboriginal health financing, which has been matched only to very 
limited extent in Canada.
The proposal-driven process of accessing funding, currently in place for 
ACCHS in Australia, embedded in the competitive funding model for Maori providers in 
New Zealand, and emerging in Canada, is remarkably adept at shifting the 
responsibility for accessing appropriate funding to providers, thereby making inquiries 
of equitable access to funding unlikely and methodologically problematic. It is 
impossible to gauge whether services funded under a competitive model are indeed 
appropriately funded for what they are asked to provide, or whether the sector 
experiences barriers in securing funding when compared to non-indigenous providers. 
Furthermore, the proposal-driven process is being imposed on populations with 
significant health inequalities and limited resources to access technical capacity, While 
proposal-driven processes can lead to innovation in service delivery, they are 
inadequate mechanisms to ensure that financial resources for core health activities are 
delivered where they are most needed.
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The use of proposal-driven vertical strategies should be limited to promote 
innovation in key areas. Core services must be funded through mechanisms that 
ensure that services are delivered where needed.
7.3.4 History. Context and Trust
The value of trust is that it is cheaper to trust people, 
and to develop institutions that will ensure trust, 
rather than to watch them (Walsh 1995).
The work of Williamson suggests that the closer the relationship between the 
provider and the purchaser, the more likely the contractual relationship may be based 
trust and flexible, thus ensuring that services are responsive to needs (Wlliamson 
2000). The goal is seductive. But what if trust is constrained by history?
Like the word control, the word trust is absolute. In practice, trust is a fluctuating 
notion that ebbs and flows depending on context and circumstances. From the 
government’s perspective, the mistrust associated with the contracting out 
responsibilities where the minister nevertheless remains accountable, is compounded 
by the limited capacity available in the indigenous sector. The experience of 
colonisation has shaped and continues to influence indigenous people’s relationship 
with the dominant society, as embodied by national and regional governments. It is 
nevertheless clear that in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, some measure of trust 
is more readily awarded to central as opposed to regional, state or provincial 
governments. First Nations have passionately opposed any proposal that would appear 
to shift the responsibility over First Nation health to provincial authorities. In Australia, 
the states had the responsibility for ATSI health until the 1970s. It was their lack of 
performance in improving ATSI health that led the Commonwealth government to take 
over this responsibility. In both countries, the responsibility for indigenous health is now 
vested in an indigenous-specific branch of the central government’s Department of 
Health. Both FNIHB (Canada) and OATSIH (Australia) also fund indigenous providers. 
Maori have advocated for a similar arrangement. The Maori Health Directorate is also a 
branch of the Ministry of Health. Its functions are however limited to an advisory role in 
Maori policy development.
If appropriately resourced,87 indigenous-specific government agencies have 
greater legitimacy, partly because their interventions are indigenous-focused, they 
have generally made efforts to indigenise their workforce and to engage indigenous 
communities in policy and program design. In the context of this study, indigenous-
87 ATSIC being a case in point.
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specific funders have produced more favourable contractual environments (the HTP 
and PHCAP). Because of their focus, these agencies are generally more aware and 
believed more responsive to indigenous needs and realities. They are however agents 
of their government and their policies and practices must reflect the ideology of the 
leading party, respect existing national priorities, and be mindful of policy and 
legislative frameworks related to public administration. In Australia and Canada, the 
indigenous population served by these agencies amounts to 2 to 3 percent of the 
overall national population. As a result, the level of compromise required of the central 
government to accommodate the particularities of the indigenous environment may be 
perceived as unreasonable or unwarranted by other sectors of the government. Thus, 
indigenous-specific government agencies find themselves caught between designing 
strategies that will meet indigenous needs and aspirations, and respecting constraints 
associated with the public administration framework and the political ideology in place.
In the Canadian context, trust-based contracts go against recent revisions of 
the public administration framework that requires all policies to be evidence-based and 
all programs to be evaluated against set standards. The vision favours standardised 
and clearly defined approaches. In New Zealand, relational contracts have yet to be 
seen as advantageous at least in the context of health services. This may be partly 
related to the quick succession of reforms and the funders being reluctant in making 
longer terms commitments that may not be seen as appropriate by the next 
government. The adoption of a relational contractual, framework as the basis of 
PHCAP is already being challenged by a heightened perception of risks associated 
with one ATSI provider. While risk management is necessary, all three countries 
appear to be choosing to respond to single providers difficulties with blanket risk 
management strategies. The cost-effectiveness of treating all providers equally 
appears to be ignored, in favour of standardised approaches.
It is important that governments and indigenous providers develop and 
implement processes that can attest to the performance of single providers in 
addressing health inequalities and in providing quality services. The reporting 
framework in place in all three countries falls miserably short of doing that, because it 
focuses largely on outputs, rather than outcomes. Realising this objective will require 
the development of appropriate indicators (Crampton et al 2004, Nazarea et al 1999), 
that can highlight individual provider’s achievement, and that can be aggregated to 
speak to the performance of the overall sector.
7.3.5 Failure or Successes
Indigenous health policies were designed to improve indigenous participation in 
the health care system. The ultimate goal was to address health inequalities. In all 
three countries, the policies have yet to show improvement in indigenous health. Part 
of the problem is that health services performance cannot be measured due to a lack of 
data that can be aggregated, and because of the limited number of years of 
implementation. There may be a tendency to claim that the policies have “failed” for a 
lack of evidence. There may also be a tendency to claim that the same policy 
“succeeded” because they have improved indigenous participation. The link between 
participation and improved health remains poorly articulated, although widely accepted.
Policies may be understood as having “failed” or “succeeded" depending on to 
extent to which the policy, as understood by on-lookers, has met its stated goals. Such 
categorical statements are perhaps easier to support for micro-level social policies. 
Because of their complexity, macro-level policies are more likely to go partway into 
meeting their stated goals. This is so for a number of reasons. First, the stated goals 
are generally over-optimistic, and their achievements influenced many factors and 
actors. And, second, the pursuit of these goals is generally longer term, spanning over 
shifts in government, ideology, allowing interest groups to self-advocate and change 
the direction of implementation, to better meet policy objectives or to better serve the 
interests of a selected number of actors. Fatigue can occur as a result of non-visible 
results.
“By indigenous for indigenous" policies have not failed indigenous people, in the 
sense that they have provided mechanisms through which indigenous people can 
engage as social actors and active participants in the health care system. The acquired 
expertise has led to increasingly sophisticated structures, methods of engagement, and 
analyses by indigenous scholars and practitioners These policies have effectively 
given a voice to indigenous people in a manner unprecedented. The first meeting of the 
International Network in Indigenous Health Knowledge and Development 
(https://www.icu.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/inihkd) in October 2003 is a case in point. This 
meeting brought together indigenous academics, government representatives, 
practitioners, and community representatives from Canada, the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand. Of the 200 or so delegates and experts, less than a dozen were 
non-indigenous. Of these, only one (the author) was invited to present. The definition of 
who is and who is not “an expert” on indigenous health and health care has changed.
“By indigenous for indigenous" policies have not failed government goals either, 
if the goal was indeed to create new opportunities for collective indigenous 
engagement, a stated goal of policies of self-government, self-determination and
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rangatiratanga. Although the level of achievement of that goal has differed in all three 
countries, depending on the contractual environment created, all countries have made 
significant gains in indigenous engagement over the past 30 years.
Indigenous peoples remain committed to moving their aspirations forward, and 
have increasingly been able to draw on the international community to validate these 
aspirations. The International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People (1995-2004) 
has come to an end, and resulted in the formation of the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues. The Permanent Forum met for the first time In May 2002. The 
Forum reaffirmed the vision that,
[The] underlying causes of poor health for indigenous people included colonization, 
homelessness, poor housing, poverty, lack of reproductive rights, domestic violence 
and addiction. Health care should be envisaged from an indigenous perspective, which 
encompassed mental, physical and spiritual health (United Nations 2002).
The Forum recommended that the decade end with a World Conference on Indigenous
Issues, and that a second International Decade be declared to ensure that the goals
set for the first decade are advanced further. There is hope that the United Nation
General Assembly will adopt the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People that
reaffirmed three key principles of Indigenous rights:
Article 22: ... the right to special measures for the immediate... improvement of social 
conditions... including health;
Article 23: ... the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies... for health 
programmes affecting them; and
Article 24: ... the right to their traditional medicines and health practices... (United 
Nations 2002).
These three principles are an attempt to reaffirm key provisions first proposed in 
the ILO Convention 169,88 which was ratified by only a handful of countries, namely 
Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Paraguay and Peru (International Labour Office 1991).
Indigenous people have and will continue to draw on an international debate 
that has tied their demands for recognition and self-determination to issues of human
88 The three provisions stated:
. Government will gradually expand the coverage of social security schemes, which 
are applicable to all citizens, so as to encompass indigenous and tribal peoples;
. Governments are required to provide indigenous and tribal peoples with adequate 
community based health services, drawing upon their traditional preventive and 
healing practices and medicines (this constitutes a recognition of the value of 
traditional medicine and of the need to preserve and further develop it);
Indigenous and tribal peoples shall participate in the planning and execution of these 
services, or undertake overall responsibility and control over health services; in both 
cases it is the State’s responsibility to supply the needed resources; local community 
health workers should be given training and employment on a preferential basis 
(International Labour Office 1991).
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rights. Global debates are now impacting national indigenous policies. Governments 
would be wise to negotiate compromises that satisfy indigenous aspirations. This is 
true for all three countries, but especially the case in New Zealand, where Maori now 
account for nearly 15 percent of the population. The Labour government in particular 
has so far been resultant In meeting Maori demands for parallel structures. While this 
may make sense from an administrative perspective, there are risks to ignoring Maori 
aspirations. Concessions, at least in the contractual environment, may at least go 
partway in meeting Maori demands and alleviate what appear to be increasingly 
polarised debates.
7.4 Generalising findings and direction for further research
Relational contracts better approximate indigenous aspirations. They also 
appear that make good economic sense. Two main obstacles stand in the way of 
implementing comprehensive contracts in indigenous environment. The first one is a 
trend in health care contracting towards smaller, more easily micro-managed contracts 
so that governments can ensure a higher level of accountability over single contracts, If 
not of the whole contractual environment. The choice here seems to be to focus on the 
tree rather than the forest. A second obstacle stems from the historical relationship of 
limited trust between government and indigenous people, and the discomfort 
associated with relinquishing control over the power to define. Additional research 
linking the cost-effectiveness of models of contracting to providers’ ability to perform on 
outcomes, may go along way to help convince purchasers of the value or otherwise of 
relational contracts. There is also a need for further research into the cost-effectiveness 
of different risk management frameworks.
Pan-indigenous comparative health research can inform policy development 
and implementation. To date, only one study has focused on indigenous health 
services financing, with case studies from Australia, Norway and Canada (Scrimgeour 
1996). International indigenous health policy analysis has tended to focus on Australia 
and the United States (Kunitz 1990, Kunitz & Brady 1995) or Canada (Crough 1997). 
The research presented here focused partly on the contractual environment created by 
different models of financing. It has shown that the reliance on vertical strategies 
creates an expensive environment, and leads to the creation of health services 
patchwork. Under this model, services are construed as if complementary to other non- 
indigenous services. It remains unclear to what extent and in what context indigenous 
services are used by indigenous people. To date, no research has documented the 
extent to which reliance on vertical strategies may create second rate services that 
nevertheless may act at the primary service delivery mechanism for marginalised
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populations. More work is required to assess the impact of competitive (ACCHS, MSori 
providers) as opposed to relational (Health Transfer Policy, PHCAP) contractual 
environments in providers' ability to deliver effective services. In other words, what is 
the linkage between contractual inefficiencies and quality of care?
More work is also required to evaluate how different contractual arrangements 
may favour or impede the implementation of responsive health services. This is a 
central question for indigenous providers and one that is prioritised by policy. It appears 
doubtful that a patchwork of inflexible contracts could lead to the implementation of 
responsive models of service delivery.
Also, more work is required focusing on contractual environments, rather than 
single contracts. The accumulation of contracts by single providers may well reflect an 
ability to compete, but it also carries an administrative burden for both the purchaser 
and the provider. Work is required to define optimal threshold in term of contract size. 
Work is also required to document the cost effectiveness of different accountability 
frameworks to ensure that concerns over accountability are met with reasonable 
solutions.
The analysis presented in this thesis, although indigenous-specific, offers 
general lessons in two broad areas. First, it documents the context in which indigenous 
providers operate under two broad categories of funding models. The lessons learned 
may be generalised to NGO health providers managing a diversity of contracts. More 
comparative research is required before a definitive assertion can be made. Second, 
the research documented processes in place to ensure the active engagement of 
indigenous people in policies design and service delivery, with their strengths and 
limitations. The lessons learned can be extended to apply to all marginalised 
populations.
7.5 Conclusions: A patchwork approach to health gains?
What are the broad lessons to be drawn from the analysis reported In this 
thesis? As stated in the introduction, international comparative analyses can be of use 
to first, provide some perspective on existing policies, and second, explore possible 
alternatives. The term self-determination is widely used in the indigenous environment. 
Governments have adopted their own versions, self-government in Canada, self- 
determination in Australia and rangatiratanga in New Zealand, thereby signifying to 
their indigenous contingency that a convergence of goals exist.
The overall analytical framework developed in chapter 2 was used to explore 
the dichotomy of classic contracts/complex environments versus relational 
contracts/rationalised environments. What appears to emerge is that the latter category
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generates a more manageable environment, where funding access and reporting are 
streamlined. Transaction and monitoring costs are also lower. This begs the question, 
why are simple contracts utilised at all in health care contracting. In the case of New 
Zealand, simple contracts were created at a time when the internal markets appeared a 
viable and attractive alternative. Small contracts provided an opportunity for 
competition. While that goal was quickly abandoned, the fragmented contractual 
environment has largely remained. Likewise in Canada, the initial focus on relational 
contracts was gradually supplanted by the proliferation of smaller short term contracts. 
One of the reasons is that small contracts appear more easily manageable: they have 
definite outputs, limited power and a short life-span. They maximise purchaser control 
over the contract. At one level, this may appear as a suitable goal. This goal must 
however be re-evaluated in light of the complexity and costly contractual environment 
this strategy generates. As Williamson pointed out, transactions are not free 
(Williamson 2000).
Strategic choices in health care contracting may therefore have more to do with 
the historical distrust existing between ' the purchaser and indigenous providers; 
purchaser’s shifting perception of risk; bureaucratic structures of oversight that assigns 
contract management to regional mid-level administrators who may be more concerned 
with preventing problems than with creating cost-effective contractual environments. As 
a result, strategic choices appear to have less to do with cost efficiency, maximising 
flexibility and accountability, improving care or indeed government - indigenous 
providers relations as described in policy. Mistrust appears to survive reforms. It is a 
personal reflection that in the indigenous environment, increased indigenous 
engagement in health policy and service delivery has produced a more sophisticated 
level of engagement and arguments by indigenous people in the pursuit of the same 
goal: some measure of self-determination. Proficient and sophisticated indigenous 
organisations have generated a number of indigenous health leaders and scholars. 
Increased capacity and sophistication in arguments have not necessarily improved 
trust.
The compromise between indigenous aspirations and national priorities 
appears to be a contractual environment that looks more like a patchwork than a 
system, albeit to varying degrees. Is a patchwork approach a satisfactory compromise 
or is it the worst of both worlds? The question requires reflection at three levels. First, 
the patchwork is expensive to administer for both the purchaser and the provider, and 
appears to hold few advantages than that of facilitating indigenous engagement in 
health care delivery. Second, a patchwork approach to contracting also falls short of 
indigenous aspirations, a reality that adds political costs and risks to the mix. This is
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particularly evident in New Zealand. Third, a patchwork approach is unlikely to bear the 
fruits of health equity sought through indigenous engagement. This question will 
regretfully remain largely unanswered for the time being. The patchwork approach, with 
its multiplication of activity reports and contract-defined quality indicators is unable to 
produce information that can be collated to produce a provider and health system 
report card. In an era where governments pride themselves on speaking of evidence- 
based policies, this issue remains outstanding.
APPENDIX I, INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS, CONFERENCES AND THEIR RELEVANCE
TO INDIGENOUS HEALTH
Internationa) Covenants, Conferences and their relevance to Indigenous Health
1! t ' ■' -
tv • • •' j;
|| Covenant j Document
■ ' ..........  . ' •
• ' ■ ' ' ' ■ ' ' • • ' • 
Relevance
Ratified (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2003)
References I
#  Countries Can OZ NZ Primary Secondary
it Universal Declaration of ( Universal 
|i Human Rights United j Declaration 
1; Nations 1948 j
• right to health,
• right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
• right to non-discrimination
• right to take part in the government of the country 50
Yes although 
Canada was 
initially
opposed along 
with the USSR 
and Saudi 
Arabia.
(United Nations 
1948)
(Healy & McKee j 
2003a, j 
Thombeny
2002) j
si International Labour I Legally 
ft Organisation Convention l binding 
I* No. 107 on the Protection j agreement for 
i  and Integration of j signatories 
Is Indigenous Tribal and j 
|i Semi-Tribal Populations in | 
ft independent Countries j 
1 1 9 57 ,':. t.-i', ■ |
• Intro: recognition of the existence and significance of indigenous 
people
• 2. Promotion of integrative policies (assimilation)
.  3. equal rights between indigenous and non-indigenous 
.  12 no forced removal from territory unless for health
• 19,20: adequate services for social security and health, based on 
studies of social, economic and cultural conditions
27
Neither ratified 
nor
denounced.
Assimilationist
(International 
Labour Office 
1957)
(Havemann 
1999b, Î 
Magallanes 
1999, i 
Thomberry 
2002) !
|  International Convention j UN Human 
i  on the Elimination of AH j Rights Treaty 
» Forms of Racial i 
f t  Discnmination (CERD) j 
1 1965 j ' . '
• right of all citizens to be treated as equal under the law
• 5(e): right to public health, health care, social security and social 
services• ' . . . . . . .  ’• ' ; .• .
. : : : ' : - .... :________ :______ _______________________
166
OZ: 30/9/75 
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function (United Nations 1976), and the second dealing with the elimination of the death penalty (United Nations 1989). These are important but 
peripheral to the object of this review.
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systematic discrimination.
• 36. Funds should be made available by the national authorities for 
investments, the uses of which are to be determined with the 
participation of the indigenous populations themselves, in the 
economic life of the areas concerned, as well as in all spheres of 
cultural activity.
.  37. Governments should allow indigenous populations within their 
territories to develop cultural and social links with related or similar 
populations, taking into account the important role of international 
organizations or associations of indigenous populations, and with 
due respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of those countries in which indigenous populations 
live.
.  38. The Conference further urges States to facilitate and support 
the establishment of representative non-governmental international 
organizations for indigenous populations through which they can 
share experiences and promote common interests. The Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities should ensure that the urgent work being carried out by 
its Working Group on Indigenous Populations is continued so that 
the complex issues involved can be analyzed and appropriate 
measures taken at the international and national levels.
.  39. In view of the vulnerability of indigenous populations to
discrimination and violations of their human rights, and of the gravity 
of the threat faced by indigenous populations in some parts of the 
world, Governments should pay close attention to situations in 
which the rights of indigenous populations may be violated or 
denied, in order to prevent such violations, which should be widely 
publicized as soon as they are detected.
i
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; international Covenants, Conferences and their relevance to indigenous Health |
■ Covenant Document Relevance
Ratified (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2003)
References j
#  Countries Can OZ NZ Primary Secondary j
' Convention against 
; Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading 
i Treatment or Punishment 
; (CAT) United Nations 
¡1984
UN Human 
Rights Treaty
♦ Peripheral, not reviewed.
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OZ: 8/8/89
(United Nations 
1984)
(Healy & McKee 
2003a)
Ottawa Charter on Health 
: Promotion 1986
. Community participation in primary health care (World Health
Organisation
1986)
ILO Convention No. 169 
i Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries 
! 1989
Legally 
binding 
agreement for 
signatories
• 25. Health services should be community-based, with local 
employment.
, ; ' ■' ' ■ ' ■ '
17 Not ratified by OZ, Can or NZ
(International 
Labour Office 
1991)
(Havemann 
1999b) j
I ’ Convention on the Rights i UN Human j .  17d. encourage mass media to give regards to the linguistic needs 
1 of the Child (CRC) United | Rights Treaty of indigenous and minority groups;
J; Nations 1989 j ! *  30. the right for a child to enjoy their culture, process and practice 
ft | } their religion and use their own language.
191
OZ: 17/12/90 
Can: 13/12/91 
NZ: 6/4/93
(United Nations 
1990)
(Healy & McKee ; 
2003a) i
|i 1993 World Conference 1 Adopted by j .  20. recognises the unique contribution of indigenous people to the 
|  on Human Rights j  UN j development and plurality of society, full participation of indigenous 
| i  J. t people in society,
is [ j .  28. Support the drafting of the Declaration on Indigenous Human
i  ■ ■ ■ j ' |  :■ Rights
li ! i .  29. 30. 31 and 32. all about representation at the UN.
UN Resolution (United Nations 1993b)
(Healy & McKee i 
2003a) S
|  draft Declaration on the 
|. Rights of Indigenous 
|; Peoples
li 1993 Working Group on 
| ' indigenous Populations
Draft ! * 31. Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to 
j self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in 
i matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture,
] religion, education, information, media, health, housing, 
i employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources 
j management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as 
i ways and means for financing these autonomous functions.
| (United Nations 
i 1993a)
__________ _ I
224
International Covenants, Conferences and their relevance to Indigenous Health
; Covenant Document Relevance
Ratified (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2003)
i
References |
# Countries Can OZ NZ Primary Secondary
1; 1994 International 
li Conference on Population 
ft and Development
Adopted by 
UN
• Equality
UN Resolution (United Nations 1994, 1999)
(Healy & McKee ! 
2003a) j
|i Health for all in the j Declaration 
|i Twenty-First Century j 
ft WHO Regional Office for j 
|i Europe 1999 S
•  No mention of community-based primary health care.
-V
-v ‘ ; ■
1 -  x -  5.
(World Health 
Assembly 1998)
(Healy & McKee i 
2003a) i
fs UN Combat Racism | Endorsed by 
Conference 2001 j UN
• Indigenous issues in light of gross violation of human rights.
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APPENDIX II, POLICY ANALYSIS
Canadian Policy Environment !
Source Canada (Health and Welfare Canada (MSB) 1986a, 1986b, 1989, Health Canada 2000a) i
Authority Policy, implementation, and responsibility for outcome lies with one institution, Health Canada since 1944
Indigenous-specific 
or integrated FNIHB is Indigenous-specific branch within the Federal Ministry of Health.
policy document^) Parent policy: 1979 Indian Health PolicyImplementation policy: 1989 Health Transfer Policy !
i -'V. . ' ' . 
Parent
poticy/strategy
foundation
Policy flows from constitutional and statutory provisions, treaties and customary practices.
Recognizes the intolerable conditions of poverty and community decline that affect many Indians, and seeks a framework in which Indian communities can remedy these ; 
conditions.
Federal Government recognizes its legal and traditional responsibilities to Indians, and seeks to promote the ability of Indian communities to pursue their aspirations within the j 
framework of Canadian institutions.
Implementation
imechanism(s)
The 1986 Health Transfer Policy,
promoting the transfer of on-reserve primary health services to First Nation control; and
ensuring that appropriate funding would be in place, allowing the community to undertake a community-based assessment, hire capacity to draft operational plans and ! 
undertake negotiations. ’ I 
The Health Transfer Policy makes no provision to promote increased First Nation participation in all level of the Canadian health care system.
Policy objectives Parent policy: To achieve an increasing level of health in Indian communities, generated and maintained by the Indian communities themselves. 
Implementation policy: transfer of on-reserve services to a First Nation authority.
Values
! .
.
Parent policy: looks at inequalities from a determinants of health’s perspective; looks at the role of the whole health care system; assumes cross-sectorial cooperation, ! 
including federal-provincial; and supports community development as mechanism to improve health
Implementation policy: funding for three loosely-defined mandatory programs (immunization, environmental health and primary health intervention) and for complementary, ’ 
flexible and community-driven health promotion, prevention and community well-being programs
Australian Policy Environment
Source Australia (Australia National Aboriginal Health Strategy Working Party 1989, National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council & Australian Health Ministers' Conference 2003) !
Authority
In 1989, responsibility for policy, implementation, and outcome lie with ATSIC.
In 1995, the Commonwealth Department of Health since 1995 took over this responsibility.
The 2003 National Framework was however signed with all state/territorial Ministers of Health \
Indigenous-specific 
or integrated OATSIH is Indigenous-specific branch within the Commonwealth Department of Health. Implementation includes the territories/states.
Policy document(s) 1989 National Aboriginal Health Strategy2003 National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health
Policy/strategy
Foundation
1989 NAHS focused on community control of health services, funding remaining with DAA, the formation of a joint DAA and Health Council of Aboriginal Health, j 
Commonwealth/state/territorial Minister of Health report on Aboriginal health.
2003 Framework sets nine principles that are necessary for sustained improvements in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health into the 21st Century.
1. Cultural security: ensuring that the legitimate cultural rights, views, values and expectations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are respected.
2. Improving the health of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander individuals, families and communities as a core responsibility and a high priority for the whole of the health 
sector. • ■■■■■■
3. A holistic approach to health issues including physical, spiritual, cultural, emotional and social well-being, community capacity and governance. j
4. Community control of primary health care services as a preferred method of service delivery.
5. Working together with other government non-government and private organisations and within and outside the health sector to improve the broader determinants of health, i
6. Localised decision-making that responds to the needs and priorities set by local Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities.
7. Promoting good health and preventing illness as a core activity for health services.
8. Building the capacity of health services and communities to respond to health needs and to take more responsibility for health outcomes.
9. Accountability for health outcomes to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and governments.
Parent policy 
objectives
To ensure that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples enjoy a long and healthy life enriched by a strong living culture, dignity and justice. j 
Within this goal are given specific aims or desired outcomes:
1. Increased life expectancy.
2. Decreased mortality rates in the first year of life.
3. Decrease all-causes mortality rates across all ages.
4. Reduce the impact of: ;|
* chronic disease, particularly cardiovascular disease, diseases of the endocrine system and cancers; and I
* communicable disease, particularly infections in children and the elderiy, and blood borne diseases. I
5. Enhance social and emotional well-being and reduce the impact of:
* mental disorder; ;
* substance misuse; and ;j
* injury and poisoning. ;|
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Australian Policy Environment
| • 
i
Values
•  Equity in health;
•  ATSI participation in planning forums and at the national level; j
•  Community controlled health services; 1
•  Responsiveness of the whole system; i
•  Substantial resource investment
Implementation
mechanism(s)
Nine key result areas; \
1. Improving coordination between programs and services, reforming mainstream health services, and supporting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participation on ! 
management of all health services. ;
2. Improve training or non-lndigenous health workers in both mainstream and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander specific services, and to enhance Aboriginal and Torres i 
Strait Islander participation in the health workforce. ;
3. Support the delivery of comprehensive primary health care to Aboriginal and Torres strait Islander communities, particularly through support for Aboriginal community- ! 
controlled services and ensure that primary health care for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities are adequately resourced, properly planned, integrated with the j 
rest of the health system, and able to provide a full range of services including promotion and prevention programs.
4. Enabling, facilitating and supporting the capacity for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities to take responsibility for their own health. This means focusing in 
particular on the responsibilities of governments and services to provide programs, funding and staffing in ways that support community priorities and healthy choices. !
5. Improve standards of environmental health, including housing and essential services, in Aboriginal and Torres Strait communities.
6. Develop partnerships with, and commitment from, other sectors whose activities impact on health.
7. Develop the infrastructure, strategic approach in data gathering, research.
8. Increase resources available to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health services to levels commensurate with levels of needs, based on the real costs of services and 
capacity to deliver health outcomes.
9. Provide increased and equitable levels of accountability to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and to governments for the delivery and effectiveness of health ! 
services.
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New Zealand Policy Environment
Source New Zealand (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2002b, King 2000)
Authority Policy is from New Zealand Ministry of Health, implementation is the District Health Board. The policy and implementation mechanisms are not indigenous specific.
‘Indigenous-specific 
■or integrated Maori policy written by the Maori Health Directorate of the Ministry of Health. Implementation requires the adoption of Maori specific provisions by all providers. j
' H. A. King, “The New Zealand Health Strategy" (Ministry of Health, 2000). j 
Policy document(s) New Zealand Ministry of Health, “The primary health care strategy’ (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2001).
New Zealand Ministry of Health, “He Korowai Oranga, Maori Health Strategy: Discussion Document" (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2001).
Policy/strategy
Foundation
The 2000 New Zealand Health Strategy was a shift away from the competitive environment set in place in the early 1990s. It defines seven principles:
1. Acknowledging the special relationship between Maori and the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi.
2. Good health and well-being for all New Zealanders throughout their lives.
3. An improvement in health status of those currently disadvantaged.
4. Collaborative health promotion and disease and injury prevention by ail sectors. '
5. Timely and equitable access for all New Zealanders to a comprehensive range of health and disability services, regardless of ability to pay.
6. A high-performing system in which people have confidence.
7. Active involvement of consumers and communities at all levels.
The first principle is further explained as,
This principle recognises that the Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand's founding document and the Government is committed to fulfilling its obligations as a Treaty partner. This 
special relationship is ongoing and is based on the underlying premise that Maori should continue to live in Aotearoa as Maori. The nature of this relationship has been 
confirmed through interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi, which stem from decisions of the Waitangi Tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council.
Central to the Treaty relationship and implementation of Treaty principles is a common understanding that Maori will have an important role in implementing health strategies 
for Maori and that the Crown will relate to each other in good faith with mutual respect, co-operation and trust
Parent policy 
objectives
■
The strategy highlights ten objectives:
1. A healthy social environment
2. Reducing inequalities in health status ,
3. Maori development in health, meaning building capacity for Maori participation in the health sector, enabling Maori communities to identify and to provide for their own 
health need, and fostering the development of a Maori health workforce.
4. A healthy physical environment
5. Healthy communities, families and individuals
6. Healthy lifestyles
7. Better mental health
8. Better physical health
9. Injury prevention
10. Accessible and appropriate health care services
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N e w  Z e a la n d  P o licy  E n v iro n m e n t j
|
V a lu es
T h e M aori H ealth Strategy further details  the direction fo r M aori prim ary health care developm ent, highlighting three threads:
• Rangatiratanga, m eaning w hanau, hapu, iw i and M aori aspirations to exercise som e control over the direction and shape o f institutions, comm unities and de velopm ent as; 
a people.
•  Building on the gains, highlights im provem ents in M aori and whanau ora  outcom es, service uptake and M aori participation throughout the health and disability sector. ]
•  Reducing inequalities in health  ca re . ;
implementation
m echanism (s)
T h e  N e w  Zealand Health Strategy involved the developm ent o f 21 District Health Boards funded on capitation m odel to regionalised health decision-m aking. T h e  strategy w as j 
followed by a  num ber o f docum ents to direct im plem entation. T h e  Prim ary H ealth C a re  S trategy directs th e  district health boards to encourage the developm ent o f P rim ary  
H ealth  Organisations that will b e  funded on a capitation m odel for a  registered population. T h e  goal of the P H O  is to rationalise and coordinate the prim ary health ca re  sector, \ 
including services provided b y  general practices and non-governm ent providers. It focuses on five objectives,
1. W ork with local comm unities and enrolled populations
2 . Identify and rem ove health inequalities
3. O ffer access to com prehensive services to im prove, m aintain and restore people’s health
4 . C o-ordinate care across service areas
5. D evelop the prim ary health ca r workforce
6. Continuously im prove quality using good information
T h e strategy reaffirms a com m itm ent to health services by M âori for Mori.
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APPENDIX III, INTERVIEW GUIDES
Interview Guide for Government Officials
Two categories of Government officials will be approached for this study. The 
first category includes people who were key players in the development of PHC 
transfer mechanisms/policies. The second category includes people who are currently 
involved in the implementation of the mechanisms/policies (Governmental Programme 
Managers). Questions for each will have a different focus.
Questions for Historical Key Players
• What were some of the factors that led the Commonwealth/New Zealand 
Government to begin to fund community-based Aboriginal PHC initiatives?
• What were some of the key events that shaped the process?
• Who were some of the key players involved in shaping this process?
• What was your role/how did you become involved?
• What did you hope to accomplish, what was the vision?
• What were the obstacles along the way?
Questions for Governmental Programme Managers
• What is the scope of the transfer (Commonwealth/state/private or National/private), 
which community groups can apply to deliver themselves? Is this negotiable?
• How are the initiatives financed? Are they block-funded or funded per program? 
What is the process of application for funds? What kind of reporting is required for 
accountability?
• Can initiatives raise revenue, how? Can surpluses be kept from one year to the 
next?
• Who defines how providers are paid? Can aboriginal organisations set up their 
own insurance scheme? Who defines programmes standards?
• Are there national salary grid standards, are workers unionised still? Who 
hires/fires? •
• Who can access services from these organisations (catchment area, terms for 
inclusion/exclusion, organisational discretion)?
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Interview Guide for Indigenous Health Organisations Leaders and Administrators
In this category, I include leaders who were involved in the process at a political
level.
• What were some of the factors that led the Commonwealth/New Zealand 
Government to begin to fund community-based Aboriginal PHC initiatives?
What was the process?
What were some of the key events that shaped the process?
Who were some of the key players involved in shaping this process?
What was your role?
What did you hope to accomplish, what was the vision?
Were there obstacles along the way?
What is the scope of the transfer (Commonwealth/state/private), what can 
community groups apply to deliver themselves? Is this negotiable?
Tell me about the negotiation process.
How are the initiatives financed? Are they block-funded or funded per program? 
For how many years?
What kind of reporting is required for accountability?
Can initiatives raise revenue, how? Can they keep surpluses?
Who defines how providers are paid? Can aboriginal organizations set up their 
own insurance scheme?
Who defines programs standards?
Are there national salary grid standards, are workers unionized still? How 
hires/fires? : y yy y
Who can access services from these organizations (catchment area, terms for 
inclusion/exclusion, organizational discretion)?
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Is the governance structure limited/defined by the contract?
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APPENDIX IV, DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Australian Policy and Context Documents Reviewed
Aagard, Jane, 2002, The new face of Indigenous health, Ministerial statement, the 
Honourable Jane Aagard, Minister for Health and Community Services. 
Government of the Northern Territory, Darwin
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. 2000. Resourcing Indigenous 
development and self-determination. Australia Institute, Canberra
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. 2001. ATSIC health policy. ATSIC 
National Policy Office
.Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Forum. 2001. Guide for Planners for the 
Primary Health Care Access Program (PHCAP), Strategic Planning for Health 
Zones. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Forum, Darwin
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care. 2000, Policy
framework, Commonwealth Regional Health Services Program, Enhancing 
primary health care in rural communities. Australia Commonwealth Department 
of Health and Aged Care, Canberra
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care. 2000. The Australian 
Health Care System; an outline. 2000. Australia Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Aged Care.
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care. 2000, Submission to 
the Commonwealth Grants Commission's Inquiry into Indigenous Funding. 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, Canberra
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, Office for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders Health Services, 2000. Standard terms and 
conditions of agreement for Aboriginal and torres Strait Islander health and 
substance misuse services funded by the Commonwealth of Australia 
represented by the Department of Health and Aged Care. 22. Canberra.
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care Office of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islanders Health Services. 2000. Program Summary Report - 
Stocktake of Indigenous Specific and Mainstream Health Programs Impacting 
on Indigenous People. OATSIH, Canberra
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care. 2001. The Aboriginal & 
Torres Strait Islander Coordinated Care Trials, National Evaluation Report 
Volume 1, Main Report. Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and 
Aged Care and KPMG, Canberra
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Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care. 2001. The Aboriginal & 
Torres Strait Islander Coordinated Care Trials, National Evaluation Report 
Volume 2, Supplementary Papers 1-5. Australia Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Aged Care and KPMG, Canberra
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care. 2001. Better health 
care: studies in the successful delivery of primary health care services for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians. Australia Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Aged Care, Canberra
Australia Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission, Aboriginal Medical Services Alliance Northern 
Territory, and Territory Health Services. 2001. PHCAP, Primary Health Care 
Access Program, Central Australia, Health Zones Steering Committees 
Workshop. Red Centre Resort - Alice Springs
Australia Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory Public Accounts Committee. 
1996. Report of the Provision of Health Services to Aboriginal Communities in 
the Northern Territory. Rep. Report number 28, Legislative Assembly of the 
Northern Territory Public Accounts Committee, Darwin
Australia Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. 2000. Health is life: Report on 
the inquiry into Indigenous health. House of Representatives, Standing 
Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Canberra
Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council. 1998. National performance indicators 
and targets for 1998-2000 to monitor governments' efforts to improve Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander health. 61. Canberra.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. 2001. Expenditures on health services for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People 1998-1999. Rep. AlHWCat. No 
IHW 7, AIHW, Canberra
Australian National Audit Office. 1998. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health 
Program, Department of Health and Aged Care. Rep. Audit Report No. 13, 
Australian National Audit Office, Canberra
Commonwealth of Australia and Government of the Northern Territory. 2001.
Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth of Australia and 
the Government of the Northern Territory, cooperation on the extension of 
primary health care services to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in 
the Northern Territory under the Primary Health Care Access Program. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra
National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council. 2001. National Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Health Strategy, Consultation Draft. NATSIHC, 
Canberra
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National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Council and Australian Health 
Ministers’ Conference. 2003. National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Health. National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Health Council; Australian Health Ministers' Conference, Canberra
Northern Territory Aboriginal Health Forum. 2001. Top End Indigenous Health 
Implementation Plan. Northern Territory Aboriginal Health Forum, Darwin
Northern Territory Government, Department of Health and Community Services. 2001. 
Framework for action in Central Australia. Northern Territory 
Government,Department of Health and Community Services, Alice Springs
Northern Territory Minister of Health, Family & Children's Services, Commonwealth 
Minister of State for Health and Family Services, Chairperson Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission, and Executive Secretary Aboriginal Medical 
Services Alliance Northern Territory. 1998. Agreement on Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Health. Canberra, unpublished.
Northern Territory Minister of Health, Family & Children's Services. 2002. Regional 
realignment project, Top End Services Network, Central Australian Services 
Network. Northern Territory Minister of Health,Family & Children's Services, 
Darwin
Territory Health Services. 2001. Annual Report 2000/2001. Territory Health Services, 
Darwin
World Health Organisation Regional Training Centre for Health Development, School of 
Medical Education Faculty of Medicine The University of New South Wales.
1999. Essential primary health care services & standards for remote Aboriginal 
health centres in the Northern Territory. World Health Oreganisation Regional 
Training Centre for Health Development,School of Medical Education,Faculty of 
Medicine,The University of New South Wales, Alice Springs
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New Zealand Policy Documents Reviewed
1990. Runanga Iwi Act 1990. No. 125.
Barnett, Pauline and Jacobs, Kerry. 2000. Policy-making in a restructured state: the 
case of the 1991 health reform policy in New Zealand. Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 59(1 ):73-87
Bennion, Tom and Melvin, Geoffrey. 2002. Maori Affairs (2) Government Agencies, 
Historical Background. 2003[24 September 2002]. Butterworths Publications.
Central Region Maori/lwi Integrated Care Organisations. 1998. Response to discussion 
document"The Next 5 Years in General Practice”.
Crampton, Peter and Matheson, D. 1993. Advantages and disadvantages of community 
trusts for Maori, a discussion document. New Zealand Te Puni Kokiri,
Wellington
Duignan, Paul, Casswell, Sally, Howden-Chapman-Phillipa, Barnes, Helen Moewaka, 
Allen, Bridget, and Conway, Kim. 2003. Community Project Indicators 
Framework (CPIF) Its use in community projects. New Zealand Ministry of 
Health, Wellington ,
Gauld, Robin. 1999. Beyond New Zealand's dual health reforms. Social Policy & 
Administration 33(5):567-582
Grafton Group. 2002, Pari B: A situational analysis of the Horowhenua/Otaki District 
and Issues regarding health services. Grafton Group, Otaki
Hartley, Ngahana and Mules, Chris. 1996.M idland-Iw i Relationships in an integrated 
care environment: a discussion paper. Midland Regional Health Authority, 
Wellington
Hawke’s Bay District Health Board. 2002, Board Repoit, Wai 692 Progress Report 
Hawke's Bay District Health Board, Hawke's Bay
Hawke's Bay Transitional District Health Board. 2005. Board paper, Maori Involvement 
in shift to transitional District Health Board. Hawke's Bay Trransitional Health 
Board, Hawke's Bay
King, Honourable Annette. 2000. The New Zealand Health Strategy. Ministry of Health, 
Wellington
King, Honourable Annette. 2000. The New Zealand Health Strategy Discussion 
Document. Ministry of Health, Wellington
Maori Health Commission. 1998. Second report to the Minister of Maori Affairs. Maori 
Health Commission, Wellington
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MidCentral District Health Board. 2002. Establishing primary health organisations in 
MidCentral District: Report to Community and Public health Advisory 
Committee. MidCentral District Health Board, Palmerston North
New Zealand Central Regional Health Authority. 1996. Te Kite Aronga, directions: three 
year strategic plan for Maori health 1996-1999. New Zealand Central Regional 
Health Authority, Wellington
New Zealand Department of Health, Circular Memorandum. 1988. The Treaty of 
Waitaigi and its implications for the Health Services. Department of Health, 
Wellington
New Zealand Department of Health. 1996. Policy guidelines for Maori health, Nga 
Aratohu Kaupapahere Hauora Maori 1995/96. Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Department of Health. 1998. Action for health and independence:
bridging the gap between actions and outcomes... the population perspective, 
Maori health issues. New Zealand Department of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Government. 1998. Maori health, advice to the incoming Minister of 
Health, background briefing papers. New Zealand Government, Wellington
New Zealand Government. 1998. Health and Stability Services Amendment. No 74.
New Zealand Government. 2000. New Zealand Government Cabinet CAB (00) M 
11/1 A(4). New Zealand Government, Wellington
New Zealand Government. 2000. New Zealand Public Health and disability Act 2000. 
Public act 2000 No 91, Section 2. Date of Ascent 14 December 2000.
New Zealand Government. 2002. Primary health care, executive summary, briefing to 
the Minister of Health. New Zealand Government, Wellington
New Zealand Health Funding Authority, n.d. Improving our health, Te Whai Ora: Te 
wero mo Aotearoa. New Zealand Health Funding Authority, Wellington
New Zealand Health Funding Authority. 1998. Health Funding Authority Maori Health 
Policy full version. New Zealand Health Funding Authority, Wellington
New Zealand Health Funding Authority. 1999. Health Funding Authority Strategic
Business Plan, for the period: 1 july 1999 to 30 june 2000. New Zealand Health 
Funding Authority, Wellington
New Zealand Health Funding Authority. 2000. Final report for the six-month period 
ended 31 December 2000. Health Funding Authority, Wellington
New Zealand Health Funding Authority. 2000, Health Funding Authority performance 
report quarter two, 1999/2000. New Zealand Health Funding Authority, 
Wellington
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New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1984. Hui Whakaoranga: Maori health planning 
workshop, Hoani Waititi Marae, 19-22 March 1994. New Zealand Ministry of 
Health, Hoani Waititi Marae
New Zealand Ministry of Health Health Reform Directorate. 1992. Making it work: A 
primary care provider's guide to contracting in the new health system. New 
Zealand Ministry of Health Health Reform Directorate, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health and New Zealand Te Puni Kokiri. 1993. Whaia te ora 
mo te iwi, strive for the good health of the people: Maori health policy objectives 
of Regional Health Authorities and the Public Health Commission. New Zealand 
Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1994. 1994/95 Policy Guidelines for Maori health/Nga 
Aratohu Kaupapahere Hauora Maori. New Zealand Ministry of Health,
Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1994. 1994/95 Policy Guidelines for the Public Health 
Commission. New Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1994. He Taura Tieke, Measuring effective health 
services for Maori. New Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1994. Policy Guidelines for Regional Health Authorities 
and the Public Health Commission - Summary. New Zealand Ministry of Health, 
Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1994. Policy Guidelines for Regional Health 
Authorities. New Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1995. Co-ordinated Care for Maori - Issues for 
Development. New Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1995. Policy Guidelines for the Public Health 
Commission. New Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1995. Policy Guidelines for Regional Health 
Authorities, 1995/96. New Zealand Ministry of Health. Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1995. Wananga Purongo Korerorero, Nga Matatini: 
Strategic direction for Maori health, a discussion document. New Zealand 
Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1995. Advancing health in New Zealand. New Zealand 
Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Health Funding Authority. 2001. Procedure for prioritising new service
initiatives. New Zealand Health Funding Authority, Wellington
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New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1996. Policy Guidelines for Regional Health Authorities 
1996/97. New Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1996. Public Health funding formula 1997/98 - 
technical guide. New Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health Transitional Health Authority. 1997. Te Tipunga
Transitional Health Authority Maori Provider Development Strategic Plan 1997 
and beyond. New Zealand Ministry of Health Transitional Health Authority, 
Wellington
New Zealand Ministry of Health. 1998. Whaia Te Whanaungatanga: Oranga Whanau. 
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Danila Dilba Staff orientation manual
"Contract number F-15-30 (initially F-15-09, F-15-14), Counseling services, 
Department of Health and Aging, OATSIH, NT, Under the Bringing them 
Home program, Response to Stolen Generation REPT, Project, multi-year, 
renewable one year commitments, began 98/99
Contract number F15-39, Regional Indigenous Centre for emotional and ; 
¡■social wellbeing, Department of Health and Aging, OATSIH, NT, under the 
¡ Mental Health program (ATSI Emotional & Social Well Being), Multiyear, 
¡renewable yearly ( no commitment), 6 years ^
¡Contract number F-15-28, Primary health care services, OATSIH, NT, 
funder Best practice initiative, with funding form Health, staff training and 
¡hearing pool. Recurrent core ___^ ___._______
¡Capital Works Grant, OATSIH Canberra, Project, onejof
¡Contract number F-15-31, Eye Health Coordinator, OATSIH, NT, under 
|NT indigenous eye healthplan, Project, one of „  _
| Indigenous Education Strategic Initiative Programme, Commonwealth 
< Dept of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Indigenous Education 
(targeted assistance) NT office, Recurrent but vulnerable to political will
[Nutrition Project, OATSIH, NT, Multiyear, renewable yearly ( no 
|commitmentj, 3 years
|Contract number F-15-33, Sexual health, OATSIH, NT, Multiyear 
¡■renewable yearly, 1 year
| National Illicit Drugs Strategy, NOG Treatment Grants Programs, OATSIH,j 
| NT, Multi year project/ _ I
| Purchase of vocational education and training programs and services from! 
¡ Registered Training Organisations, NT Employment and Training Authority1 
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